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Abstract 
The primary benefit of digital content, the ease with which it can be duplicated 
and disseminated, is also the primary concern when endeavouring to protect 
the rights of those creating the content. Copyright owners wish to deter illicit 
file sharing of copyrighted material, detect it when it occurs and even trace the 
original perpetrator. Embedding a unique identifying watermark into licensed 
multimedia content enables those selling digital content to trace illicit acts of 
file sharing to a single transaction with a single a buyer. However, evidence of 
such illicit activity must be gathered if and only if the buyer truly shared the 
content for a seller to prove such behaviour to an arbitrator. For this purpose, 
Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) protocols have been developed to be used in 
conjunction with digital watermarking schemes. 
The work recorded in this thesis increases the rigour with which BSW proto- 
cols are analysed against their requirements. This thesis demonstrates the success 
of the formal approach we have developed in finding attacks on BSW protocols 
using the process algebra, Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP), and the 
model checker, Failures-Divergence-Refinement (FDR). In particular, we con- 
struct a formal definition of the requirements of BSW protocols, against which 
we evaluate five published protocols. We use FDR to automatically generate 
traces indicative of protocol failures verifying three previously known attacks on 
BSW protocols and identifying seven otherwise unreported flaws. We describe 
how our approach can be extended to analyse BSW protocols under alternative 
assumptions, in order to demonstrate how our approach may endure changes to 
the properties BSW protocols aim to provide or the environment in which they 
are to be deployed. Finally, we identify a flaw within Memon and Wong's exam- 
ple construction of their BSW protocol by scrutinising the properties inherent in 
such a construction, which is based upon the Cox et al. 's secure spread-spectrum 
watermarking scheme. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The major benefit of digital media is the ease with which multimedia content can 
be duplicated and disseminated on a large scale. However, copyright owners are 
faced with the task of limiting these activities so that they may make a financial 
gain from licensing such content. To this end digital watermarking schemes are 
used to imperceptibly embed an identifying mark within the multimedia content 
in order to deter unauthorised distribution by tracing unauthorised copies to the 
original owner [5]. 
Pfitzmann and Schunter observed that previous schemes, in which the seller 
chose the watermark, failed to provide a seller with adequate evidence of illicit 
file sharing by a buyer as they are unable to identify the agent acting illicitly [37]. 
Even if the seller is convinced of the buyer's illegal activity, whilst the seller has 
acted honestly throughout, the seller remains unable to prove that it was not they 
that leaked the watermarked content. Qiao and Nahrstedt remarked that new 
protocols were required to accompany existing watermarking schemes to prevent 
this issue, known as the customers' rights [45]. 
In response, Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) Protocols have been proposed 
aiming to distribute watermarked content from a seller to a buyer in a manner 
that protects the rights of both parties [32,28,23,22,24]. If the buyer illicitly 
shares the file, the seller should be able to trace the shared file back to the buyer. 
However, no seller should be able to fabricate evidence of illicit file sharing against 
a buyer. 
BSW protocols are a new class of security protocol, i. e., some message ex- 
change aiming to achieve one or more security related goals. There is an inherent 
difficulty in designing and analysing security protocols: security properties can 
be difficult to define; the protocols are often distributed over a large hostile en- 
vironment, such as the Internet; and the concurrent nature of such protocols 
results in a large volume of complex interactions [49]. Contrary to this, security 
protocols are often simple in form, the Needham Schroeder Public Key Protocol 
can be reduced to just three lines [36]. Such systems that are easily expressed 
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but difficult to evaluate frequently find value in the use of formal methods [49]. 
When Qiao and Nahrstedt first proposed watermarking schemes for the pro- 
tection of customers' rights, they expected such schemes to consist of various 
components: message exchanges between buyers, sellers and possibly trusted 
third parties; agent authentication; secure transmission of messages; and non 
repudiation of evidence [45]. They also acknowledge that protocols constructed 
of such security components are amenable to formal analysis. However, only 
informal security analyses have been presented alongside BSW protocols. It is 
therefore the aim of this thesis to increase the rigour with which BSW protocols 
are analysed by adopting a formal approach, which has been proved successful in 
identifying otherwise unknown attacks on security protocols [13,49). 
In this thesis we present a general approach to modelling BSW protocols 
in Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [21]; CSP is a process algebra 
used to provide precise, compact and unambiguous high-level models of systems. 
Analysing CSP models of published security protocols using the refinement-based 
model checker, Failures-Divergence-Refinement [54], has led to the successful 
identification of numerous vulnerabilities [13,49]. We use FDR to analyse CSP 
models of BSW protocols against a formal specification of the protocol require- 
ments. Should a protocol fail to meet its requirements, FDR automatically gen- 
erates traces, or trace/refusal pairs, indicative of the flaw. 
Our general approach is such that modelling multiple BSW protocols un- 
der consistent assumptions results in minimal differences between each protocol 
model. Each model differs only in the agents' initial knowledge, the strict be- 
haviours of the agents, and the set of all messages involved in each protocol. 
We have used FDR to automatically generate traces indicative of flaws in five 
BSW protocols, verifying three previously known attacks on BSW protocols and 
identifying seven otherwise unreported flaws. Additionally, we demonstrate that 
only minor modifications need be made to each protocol model to cause the sig- 
nificant differences in behaviour expected under differing assumptions, in order 
to demonstrate how our approach may endure changes to the properties BSW 
protocols aim to provide or the environment in which they are to be deployed. 
In particular we identify failures of BSW protocols in meeting their require- 
ments under the most abstract properties of informed one-bit digital watermark- 
ing. Under closer scrutiny, the construction of a digital watermarking scheme [32], 
proposed for use in conjunction with BSW protocols, provides additional proper- 
ties that must be considered during protocol analysis. With minor modifications 
to our models we are able to incorporate such properties into our models and re- 
analyse the protocols in FDR with finer granularity, leading to the identification 
of additional fundamental flaws. 
This thesis is composed of the above three primary contributions made when 
conducting our research on the analysis of BSW protocols, which are described 
1.1. Structure of Thesis 3 
in Chapter 4, Chapters 5 and 6, and Chapter 7, respectively, The initial investi- 
gations we conducted in this field, which led to the first of these contributions, 
were published in the following conference proceedings: - 
" [60] D. M. Williams, H. Treharne, A. T. S. Ho, and C. Culnane. Using a 
formal analysis technique to identify an unbinding attack on a buyer-seller 
watermarking protocol. In 10th ACM Workshop on Multimedia and Secu- 
rity, pages 205-214,2008. 
" [61] D. M. Williams, H. Treharne, A. T. S. Ho, and A. Waller. Formal analysis 
of two buyer-seller watermarking protocols. 7th International Workshop on 
Digital Watermarking, pages 278-292,2009. 
. [59] D. M. Williams, H. Treharne and A. T. S. Ho. On the importance of 
one-time key pairs in buyer-seller watermarking protocols. International 
Conference on Security and Cryptography, pages 441-446,2010. 
In addition, the following journal submissions are currently in preparation 
to disseminate the main contributions of Chapters 4 and 5, and Chapter 7, 
respectively: - 
" D. M. Williams, H. Treharne, A. T. S. Ho, and A. Waller. The formal mod- 
elling and analysis of BSW protocols. Submitted for review. 
" D. M. Williams, C. Culnane, H. Treharne, and A. T. S. Ho. On the insecurity 
of a watermarking scheme used for copy deterrence. Submitted for review. 
1.1 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2 begins the thesis by describing the cryptographic and watermarking 
primitives used to construct BSW protocols. The abstract properties of crypto- 
graphic primitives have been captured using the entailment relation, as proposed 
in [50] and described in Section 2.1. By abstracting the underlying cryptographic 
primitives and reasoning that a message exchange alone is not open to attack, we 
can be confident that the security objectives will be achieved if the encryption 
is suitably robust. In Section 2.2 we introduce digital watermarking as a process 
of embedding an imperceptible mark within digital content. Subsequently, we 
capture the most abstract properties of informed one-bit watermarking using the 
entailment relation, such that the actions of watermark embedding and extraction 
can later be built into our CSP models of BSW protocols. Finally, the process 
algebra, CSP, is introduced as our chosen method of modelling BSW protocols. 
Chapter 3 describes the analysis of two security protocols [36,63], chosen for 
the similarity of certain characteristics they share with BSW protocols, using CSP 
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and the model checker, Failures-Divergence-Refinement, (FDR) [54]. We adapt 
this approach for the modelling and analysis of BSW protocols in Chapter 4. 
Our general approach to the modelling and analysis of BSW protocols using 
CSP and FDR is proposed in Chapter 4. Our approach complements the work 
of Poh and Martin [41] by adopting the environmental assumptions explicated 
by their comprehensive framework for the design and analysis of BSW protocols. 
Memon and Wong coined the term Buyer-Seller Watermarking in [32], in which 
they proposed a novel method of embedding the watermark in the encrypted 
domain, an approach subsequently adopted by many BSW protocols, [28,23,22, 
24]. As such, we use the Memon-Wong (MW) protocol as a case study when 
describing our approach to the analysis of BSW protocols. Chapter 4 establishes 
a foundation for the research of all subsequent chapters. 
We analyse four additional BSW protocols, [28,23,22,24], in Chapter 5. 
Modelling multiple BSW protocols in CSP under consistent assumptions results 
in minimal differences between each protocol model. Each model differs only in 
the agents' initial knowledge, the strict behaviours of the agents, and the set of 
all messages involved in each protocol. We use FDR to automatically generate 
traces indicative of protocol failures verifying three previously known attacks on 
BSW protocols and identifying seven otherwise unreported flaws. 
Additionally, we demonstrate that only minor modifications need be made 
to each protocol model to cause the significant differences in behaviour expected 
under differing assumptions, in order to demonstrate how our approach may en- 
dure changes to the properties BSW protocols aim to provide or the environment 
in which they are to be deployed. Chapter 6 discusses how subtle alterations to 
the CSP model result in the significant differences in behaviour expected under 
differing assumptions of the environment. 
The research in Chapter 7 was conducted in collaboration with Dr Chris 
Culnane, in which we increase the granularity of our analysis by reviewing the 
properties inherent in Cox et al. 's the spread spectrum watermarking scheme [8], 
as employed by Memon and Wong in their example construction of the MW 
protocol. With minor modifications to our models we can incorporate the addi- 
tional properties we identify into our models and reanalyse the MW protocol in 
FDR. We conclude that such a construction is insufficient in meeting the primary 
requirements of BSW protocols. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises our contributions and suggests future research 
directions related to our work. The notation used throughout the thesis, is in- 
cluded in the appendix. For a comprehensive survey of BSW protocols and an 
introduction to security protocol analysis, the reader is referred to [41] and [49], 
respectively. 
Chapter 2 
Background 
This chapter provides the necessary background concerning the cryptographic 
and watermarking primitives used in the construction of BSW protocols. The 
abstract properties of the cryptographic primitives discussed in this chapter were 
captured as deduction rules using the entailment relation in [50]. Such abstrac- 
tions have been useful in the modelling and analysis of security protocols [49] 
using the process algebra, Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [21], and 
the model checker, Failures Divergence Refinement (FDR) [54], as described in 
Chapter 3. In this chapter we shall also use the entailment relation to capture 
the most abstract properties of digital watermarking when used in conjunction 
with BSW protocols, such that the CSP approach to the modelling analysis of 
security protocols can be extended for the analysis of BSW protocols, as proposed 
in Chapter 4. Finally, we present the necessary background regarding CSP and 
FDR. 
2.1 Cryptography 
Traditionally, cryptography provided the means of communicating securely over 
a potentially insecure channel. Typically, two well-behaved agents, A and B, 
wish to communicate across a channel, which is under the complete control of 
a misbehaving agent, M, who has the means to listen in on each message sent, 
block messages from being received and insert messages onto the channel. 
Gollmann challenges this traditional perception of cryptography, in which 
only the actions of the antagonist, M, are of concern and the actions of A and B 
are assumed to remain true to the protocol [19]. For example, when applied to 
electronic commerce and law enforcement, the two communicating agents A and 
B are not necessarily assumed to be well-behaved. A well-behaved buyer wishes 
to be protected from a potentially misbehaving seller, whilst each seller may wish 
to be protected against the potentially malicious actions of buyers. 
This thesis concerns the modelling and analysis of Buyer-Seller Watermarking 
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A. 1. if fE Fthen FE- f 
A. 2. if Fý-f and FC F' then F' ý-f 
A. 3. if F F- fti for each f; E F' and F' F- f then F[-f 
Table 2.1: Axioms for an information system 
(BSW) protocols, a new class of security protocol aiming to meet the requirements 
of buyers and sellers in a copy deterrence solution to the problem of illicit file 
sharing. Vulnerabilities in security protocols frequently occur, not because the 
encryption has been broken, but because the associated message exchange leaks 
information after clever manipulation by an active adversary [30]. By abstracting 
from the underlying cryptographic primitives and reasoning that the message 
exchange alone is not open to attack, we can be confident that the security 
objectives will be achieved if the encryption is suitably robust. Memon and Wong 
make a similar observation of BSW protocols in [32]. Should a BSW protocol 
meet its objectives then the security of the overall system should be dependent 
only on the security properties of the underlying cryptographic primitives and 
digital watermarking scheme. 
The abstract properties of such cryptographic primitives are captured as de- 
duction rules, as described in [50]. The entailment relation, I-: P(fact) x fact, 
denotes a relation between a finite set of facts and a single fact where fact is 
declared as a datatype in CSP. Facts can be either atomic items, e. g., nonces, or 
functions thereof, e. g., H (fact). The meaning of F I- f is that the fact, f, can be 
inferred from knowledge of the set of facts, F. The relation is closed under the 
axioms for an information system listed in Table 2.1. Table 2.2 lists the possible 
ways that a message may be constructed and Table 2.3 captures the properties 
of the cryptographic functions used in such constructions. The notation used in 
these tables is defined in the Notation Appendix. 
When building CSP models of security protocols it is necessary to provide a 
misbehaving agent with the ability to perform such inferences. However, since 
vacuous deductions of the form F I- f where fEF are of no use to an agent 
in expanding their set of current knowledge, and because they can complicate 
the CSP coding, such deductions are omitted from the CSP models [49]. Instead 
the deduction rules listed in Table 2.4, derived from the rules in Table 2.1 and 
Table 2.3 as labelled, cover the useful deductions that an agent could perform. 
In Chapter 4 we shall also find it useful to provide well-behaved agents with the 
ability to perform such inferences. 
The remainder of this section describes of the cryptographic primitives used 
in this thesis with reference to the rules of deduction included in Table 2.4. 
For example, the composition of sequences, defined by the deduction rule SEQ- 
2.1. Cryptography 
M. 1. FF-f1n... nFý- f 
M. 2. FF- fA F F- k 
M. 3. FF-fAFF-pk 
M. 4. FF-fnFF-sk 
M. 5. FF- (a, pka)nFF-sk 
M. 6. FF- f 
ý 
ý 
ý 
ý 
ý 
ý 
F ý- (fl.. . fn) F f- EX) 
FI-Epk(f) 
FýSsk(f) 
F I- Csk(a, pka) 
H(f) 
Table 2.2: Deduction rules enabling the construction of messages 
K. 1. Ek(Ek(f)) ýf 
K. 2. E8k(Epk(f)) ý- f 
K. 3. Epk(Sek(f)) ýf 
K. 4. Epk(C8k(a, pka)) I- (a, pka) 
7 
Table 2.3: Deduction rules capturing properties of cryptographic primitives 
SEQ-COMP. {fi,. .., fn} 
SEQ-DCMP. .,. /, {(... 'f,... )} 
(fl ", fn) 
f F 
ý- SYM-ENC. {f, kj 
SYM-DEC. {Ek (f ), k} ý- 
ASYM-ENC. {f, pk } ý- 
ASYM-DEC. {Epk(f ), sk} ý- 
I- SIGN-SIG. If , sk} 
SIGN-VRF. {Sek(f ), pk} I- 
CERT-SIG. {(a, pka), sk} I- 
Ek(f) 
f 
Epk(f) 
f 
Sek(f ) 
f 
Cak (a, pka) 
CERT-VRF. {Cek(a, pka), pk} ý- (a, pka) 
HASH. {f } f- H(f) 
A. 1, M. 1 
A. 1, M. 1 
A. 1, M. 2 
A. 1, M. 2, K. 1 
A. 1, M. 3 
A. 1, M. 3, K. 2 
A. 1, M. 4 
A. 1, M. 4, K. 3 
A. 1, M. 5 
A. 1, M. 5, K. 4 
A. 1, M. 6 
Table 2.4: Derived deduction rules capturing properties of cryptographic primi- 
tives 
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COMP in Table 2.4, captures the ability of an agent to construct a message of 
some sequence of facts. It holds that if some set of facts is known, such facts may 
be composed into a sequence. Likewise, knowledge of a sequence of facts allows 
each fact in the sequence to be inferred, as defined by the rules SEQ-DCMP1 and 
SEQ-DCMP2. 
Symmetric Key Encryption 
Symmetric key encryption is analogous to the physical security afforded by a 
padlocked box, which is both locked and unlocked using matching keys. There 
are separate deduction rules for symmetric key encryption and decryption, as 
defined by SYM-ENC and SYM-DEC, respectively. It holds that any agent in 
possession of some encryption key, k, and some fact, f, can construct the fact 
encrypted under the key, Ek (f ). Likewise, any agent in possession of an encrypted 
fact, Ek(f ), and the corresponding decryption key, k, may deduce the unencrypted 
fact, f. 
The plaintext, f, is encrypted by substituting and transposing its data ele- 
ments according to some publicly known algorithm using a key to produce the 
ciphertext. Decryption converts the ciphertext back into plaintext by reversing 
the substitution and transposition operations and it must only be practical to do 
so with use of the same key as used for encryption. 
Should two agents, a and b, share a key, kab, the agent, a, may share a secret, 
f, with the agent, b, over an insecure channel by sending the secret encrypted 
under the shared key such that b can decrypt the secret using the same key. 
Likewise, b can send secret messages to a having encrypted such secret messages 
using kb. Secure communication using symmetric key encryption relies on the 
assumption that two agents, a and b, share the secret key kab, and hence it may 
still be necessary to solve the problem of establishing and distributing the key. 
Public Key Encryption 
The asymmetric nature of public key encryption is a consequence of enabling 
ciphertexts to be decrypted using a different key to which it was encrypted. 
If an agent, a, calculates the keys, pka and ska, then publicly announces the 
value of the encryption key, pka, but keeps the value of the decryption key, ska, 
secret, then we have an environment in which every agent has a mechanism for 
constructing encrypted facts, Ep,. (f ), that only a can decrypt. 
In this instance we call the publicly known encryption key, pka, the public 
key, which is associated to a single agent, a. Similarly, ska is known as the 
secret key, held only by a and used to decrypt facts encrypted using her public 
key, E,,,, (f). Such encryption schemes are known as public key or asymmetric 
encryption schemes. 
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Rivest, Shamir and Adleman worked together to invent a public key encryp- 
tion scheme subsequently named after them, RSA [461. Their scheme relies on 
the computationally hard problem of finding the prime factorisation of an inte- 
ger. In RSA, the product of two large primes, n= pq and a randomly chosen 
integer e form a's public key. The value e must lie in the range 1<e< 
where 0= (p - 1)(q - 1) and the greatest common denominator of e and 
must be 1, i. e., ged(e, 0) = 1. The extended Euclidean theorem is subsequently 
used to calculate the decryption key. The decryption key d is the unique inte- 
ger in the range 1<d<0, such that ed =1 mod ¢. To encrypt a message, 
m, using the publicly known encryption key (n, e), an agent computes the ci- 
phertext E(n, e)(m) = me mod n. 
Decrypting the message involves computing 
m= cd mod n, where c= Ern el(m). 
Currently there is no efficient algorithm 
for solving the integer factorisation problem, thus the message m cannot be com- 
puted from E(n, e)(m) even when the encryption 
key, (n, e), is publicly known. 
The deduction rules ASYM-ENC and ASYM-DEC, defined in Table 2.4, de- 
scribe the desired properties of public-key encryption. The difference between 
the deduction rules for symmetric and public-key encryption is that the former 
are defined in terms of a single key, k, used for both encryption and decryption, 
whereas the latter are defined in terms of a pair of keys, (pk, sk), where one is 
used for encryption, the other for decryption. 
Hash Functions 
A hash function takes input of arbitrary length and maps this to a fixed length 
output [33]. A second defining property of hash functions is that inputs are 
mapped to outputs such that small differences in input result in large changes 
in output. A cryptographic hash has the additional property that for a given a 
value, f, or a hashed value, denoted by H (f ), it should be very difficult to discover 
a value, f', such that H(f) = H(f'). Thus any agent in possession of the fact, 
f, is able to produce the hash, H (f ), as captured by the deduction rule HASH. 
The opposite does not hold true, i. e., no agent is able to deduce f from H(f). 
Cryptographic hash functions enable commitment to a value without revealing it 
and are often used as a component of a digital signature. 
Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures provide some assurances about the authenticity of a message 
and its origin [33]. Public key encryption makes the task of digitally signing 
messages possible. We have already seen that encrypting a message using a public 
key results in a situation in which only one agent can decrypt the message, the 
owner of the associated secret key. Similarly if an agent, a, encrypts a message, 
m, using the secret key, ska, and distributes to all agents, then each agent can 
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verify that a originally generated Sk. (m), with use of the publicly available key, 
pka. 
When analysing security protocols against their requirements we shall assume 
that digital signatures provide such properties, as captured by the deduction rules 
SIGN-SIG and SIGN-VRF. In practice it is more efficient to sign the message di- 
gest rather that the whole message [331. As we are making no assurances of 
secrecy here we can simply send the message in the clear with a signed cryp- 
tographic hash of the message appended, (f , 
Sek (H (f))) 
. 
Verification involves 
decrypting using the public key and comparing this value to that of the message 
hashed using the appropriate cryptographic hash function. 
Once the message is signed and sent it can be replayed in a context outside 
that wished by the signatory. Therefore, like encryption and hashing, digitally 
signing messages is simply a security component that can be composed into a 
broader security scheme that to satisfy a specific set of security requirements. 
Digital Certificates 
A specific occurrence of a message signed using a secret key is the digital certifi- 
cate. Digital certificates are sent between agents to indicate a certified association 
between an agent and their public key. The receiver trusts the correctness of the 
association made by the certificate, should the signature authenticate its source 
as a trusted origin. Other information may also be included in the certificate, 
e. g., an X. 509 Digital Certificate includes its version, serial number, the identity 
of the issuer, the validity period, the identity (or pseudonym) of the subject, the 
public key of the subject, the public key algorithm adopted, the signature algo- 
rithm adopted and the certificate signature. As its primary purpose is to certify 
an association of an identity to some public key, we model a digital certificate as 
a signed pair, consisting of just these two values, C, kb(a, pkn). 
Public key encryption is a partial solution of how to share keys across a 
distributed and insecure network but we require additional measures to afford 
appropriate levels of trust within a key distribution system. Any agent can 
publish some identity linked to some public key that they have chosen regardless 
of the true identity of the agent. It is thus common to rely upon a certification 
authority (CA), as a root of trust, to sign valid associations of identities to public 
keys, e. g., CkcA(a, pk. ). 
Homomorphic Encryption 
We adopt the definition of homomorphic encryption presented in [16], which 
provides a survey of such schemes. If we denote the set of plaintext messages as 
M, and denote the set of ciphertexts as C, then an encryption scheme is termed 
homomorphic if the property defined in Equation 2.1 holds, where k is any given 
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encryption key and the operator, E-, means `can be directly computed from', i. e., 
can be computed without decryption. 
Vml, m2 E M, Ek(ml OM M12) E- Ek(ml) Oc Ek(rn2) (2.1) 
Such a property enables some signal processing to be performed in the en- 
crypted domain. The public key encryption scheme RSA, described earlier in this 
section, is multiplicatively homomorphic: 
E(n, 
e)(ml) - 
E(n, 
e)(m2)= m1 m2e mod n 
= (mlm2)e mod n 
= E(n, e)(ml " m2) 
Homomorphism is a property enabling solutions to privacy-preserving cooper- 
ative computation problems [14]. Digital watermarking in the encrypted domain 
is one such problem that relies on homomorphism as a solution. We introduce 
digital watermarking in the encrypted domain, first proposed by Memon and 
Wong [32], in Section 4.3. For further reading on this technique the reader is 
referred to the literature published as a result of the Signal Processing in the 
Encrypted Domain (SPEED) Project [39]. 
2.2 Digital Watermarking 
Digital watermarking is the process of embedding, within digital content, an 
imperceptible mark associated to the content itself. Applications of digital wa- 
termarking include: broadcast monitoring, in which the watermark is embedded 
within adverts on commercial television and radio used to count the number 
of times it has been broadcast; proof of ownership, in which the watermark is 
embedded into content to identify the copyright owner; transaction tracking, in 
which the embedded watermark identifies the recipient of the content; and con- 
tent authentication, where we wish prove that the content has not been modified 
since being watermarked [9]. 
A digital watermark is said to be robust if it remains detectable following var- 
ious signal processing operations that may occur during the lifetime of the digital 
content within which it is embedded, e. g., JPEG compression. Furthermore, if 
the watermark is also able to withstand attacks from an active adversary, whose 
aim is to remove the mark, then it is considered secure [9]. 
Communications Based Models of Watermarking 
In [91, Cox et at. describe a communication based model of watermarking. Fig- 
ure 2.1 illustrates a standard model of a communications channel that uses a key 
during encoding. The message to be communicated, m, is encoded to a before 
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Figure 2.1: Model of Communications Channel Using Key During Encoding 
transmission, transmitted along a noisy channel, and decoded upon receipt. The 
encoder converts the message into a physical signal suitable for transmission over 
the channel. The decoder converts the received signal, b, back into the original 
message format. It is assumed that some random noise is added to the signal 
during transmission, but the decoder is constructed such that the probability of 
the decoded message, gym, differing from the original message, m, is negligible. 
Deliberate attempts may be made to jam communications sent along the 
channel, such that the noise added during transmission significantly reduces the 
value associated to the message. Spread spectrum communication has been de- 
veloped to restrict the potential for jamming signals for applications that require 
a high assurance of delivery. 
Cryptography is used to prevent a misbehaving agent from reading a message 
intended to be kept secret from them. It may also be used to provide some 
assurance of the source of a message such that the misbehaving agent is unable 
to spoof a message as if it originated from some other agent. Cryptography does 
not necessarily prevent the misbehaving agent knowing that a message has been 
sent or blocking its receipt by the intended recipient. 
In spread spectrum communication the sender uses a secret key to modulate 
the message to be sent, such that the signal is spread across a wider bandwidth 
than is necessary to transmit the message [38], as illustrated in Figure 2.1. For 
example, when frequency hopping the sender splits the message into portions, each 
transmitted over a different frequency determined in a pseudorandom manner. 
Each transmission sent by the sender may or may not contain a message, 
and without the encoding key the misbehaving agent should be unable to detect 
whether a message has been sent. In addition, the misbehaving agent should find 
it difficult to jam the transmission of a message, as without knowledge of the 
encoding key noise must be added to all frequencies. 
Spread spectrum communications is used to increase the assurance of receipt 
of a message, whereas cryptography concerns message secrecy. In traditional 
communications they may be used in conjunction in order to achieve both of 
these properties. Likewise, we shall also find value in using digital watermarking 
in conjunction with encryption. 
2.2. Digital Watermarking 
---------------------------------------------------------------- Embedding Stage 
m il 
................ T ----------------------------------- 
W 
In Figure 2.2 the communications channel from Figure 2.1, is adapted to 
model the watermarking process, based upon the basic communication-based 
model of watermarking presented in [9]. In this model the cover material, x, is 
considered to be part of the channel over which a message is communicated. In 
Figure 2.2, the communications channel from Figure 2.1, is adapted to model 
the watermarking process. The message to be embedded, m, is encoded using 
the watermarking key, wk, into a form that can be embedded within the dig- 
ital content to produce the watermarked content, denoted by WM(x, w). The 
watermarking key, wk, is a secret key used during watermark embedding and de- 
tection, analogous to the secret pseudonoise-sequences used in spread spectrum 
communications [8]. 
A robust and secure watermark must remain detectable following various 
signal processing operations that may be performed by a passive or active ad- 
versary. As such, some modified but perceptually similar watermarked content, 
, WM (x, w), is expected as input to the watermark detection process. Along 
with the original content, x, and watermarking key, wk, the watermarked con- 
tent, «. WM(x, w), is used to derive the message, Nm, that should differ from the 
original message, m, with negligible probability. As the original content, x, is 
available at both the embedding and detection stage, only the signal processing 
operations, modelled in Figure 2.2 as additive noise, applied to the watermarked 
content between embedding and extraction will have an effect on the message 
output, Nm. 
It is the aim of the misbehaving agent, in both spread spectrum communica- 
tions and spread spectrum watermarking, to determine the pseudonoise sequence 
used to encode the message, in order to remove the message from the host signal. 
Blind and Informed Watermark Detection 
Blind detection and informed detection differ in whether the original cover ma- 
terial is required during watermark detection. Schemes that do not require the 
cover material are often preferred as they remove the need to store large amounts 
of data. However, in applications where storing all cover material is feasible, or 
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Figure 2.2: Basic Communications-Based Model of Watermarking 
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even necessary, informed watermark detection often benefits from an increase in 
performance [8]. 
Embedding Stage 
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TWetermark 
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Figure 2.3: Communications-Based Model of Blind Detection 
Assuming the original is available, many malicious and passive operations, 
including scaling, cropping, and rotation, can be reversed before performing the 
watermark detection process. By reversing such operations it may be possible 
to limit an active adversary's ability to remove or desynchronise the watermark. 
For Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) protocols, in which the seller performs 
the watermark embedding and detection, it shall be appropriate to assume that 
the seller always has the original in his possession in order to construct uniquely 
watermarked content on demand. 
One-bit and Multi-bit Watermarking 
In Figure 2.2 the watermarking key was a secret key, used during the embedding 
stage and detection stage, analogous to the pseudo-noise sequence used as the 
secret encoding key in spread spectrum communications [8]. The message, m, 
represented as a binary string constructed of multiple-bits, was encoded using the 
watermarking key, wk, to produce a watermark, w, that is added to the digital 
content, x. 
One-bit watermarking concerns the embedding of a watermark carrying no 
hidden message, and is therefore also referred to as zero-bit watermarking [18]. 
Embedding the pseudo-noise pattern, wk, directly into the digital content, x, may 
be considered as encoding the binary string, 1, into the embedded watermark, w. 
Conversely, if the message m is the binary string, 0, then the watermark embedder 
makes no change to the original content x. It is clear that in such a scenario there 
is little distinction to be made between the watermark, w, and watermarking 
key, wk. 
When providing the watermark, Nw, extracted from the watermarked content 
. WM (x, w), as input to the watermark decoder we would expect as output the bi- 
nary string 1 indicating that the watermark w was embedded within JWM (x, w) 
or the binary string 0 indicating that the watermark, w, is not embedded within 
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-NM (x, w). As such, a distinction is often made between watermark extraction, 
which determines the message in that is hidden within the watermarked con- 
tent, and watermark detection, which determines whether digital content has the 
pseudonoise sequence, w, embedded. The difference between the approaches has 
caused a confusion of terminology in the literature, where the word watermark 
may be used to mean the hidden message, the pseudo noise pattern, or a function 
of the two. 
-------------------------- 
Embedding Stage 
Watermark 
w Embedder W(x, w 
------------------------------ 
x 
---------------- -------------- 
Detection Stage 
l Watermark 
-W(x, w) Extractor - 
1; 
------------- ------------' 
x 
ºi + 
Figure 2.4: Communication-Based Model of One-Bit Watermarking 
2.2.1 Secure Spread-Spectrum Watermarking for Multimedia 
In [8], Cox et al. perceive digital watermarking to be the provision of a reli- 
able communication channel within multimedia content drawing inspiration from 
spread-spectrum communications. A watermark, w= (wl, w2, ... , w, 
), is con- 
structed as a sequence of n independent real numbers drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, i. e., N(0,1). For a practical imple- 
mentation the real numbers are assumed to be represented by a reasonable but 
finite precision and insignificant rounding errors are ignored [8]. In retrospect 
we consider the watermarking algorithm proposed in [8] a one-bit watermarking 
scheme, as illustrated in Figure 2.4, where the watermark taken as input is the 
pseudonoise sequence. 
Embedding involves extracting a sequence of n frequency coefficients from 
the digital content, (xl, x2, ... , xn), and adjusting each value, xi, using the corre- 
sponding watermark element, wi. Cox et at. propose the following three formulae 
for computing such adjustments, where a is some scaling factor [8]. Each equation 
is invertible, assuming xi # 0, hence extracting involves performing the inverse 
function to derive wi from xi and xi. 
xi +QW, (2.2) 
xs(1 + aw; ) (2.3) 
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WMRK-EMB. {x, w} I- WM (x, w) 
WMRK-EXT. {WM(x, w), x} I- w 
Table 2.5: Deduction rules capturing watermarking embedding and extraction 
: ii = (2.4) 
The watermark is spread across the frequency coefficients of some digital 
content, selected to ensure that the content degrades significantly should an ad- 
versary attempt to destroy the watermark. The experimental results, presented 
in [8], were obtained by using Equation 2.3 to embed 1000 watermark elements, 
into the 1000 highest magnitude AC coefficients of a digital image, after applying 
the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). A small concrete example of applying the 
Cox et al. scheme is presented in Section 7.1. 
Capturing Properties as Deduction Rules 
We shall denote watermarked content as WM (x, w) where the watermark se- 
quence to = (wl, u4, ... , w, 
) has been embedded, using Equation 2.3, into the n 
highest magnitude AC coefficients of the digital content, x, i. e. (xi, 1, ... , xn). 
Although Cox et at. provided insight into how multiple scaling factors might 
be determined, the experimental results they presented, were obtained using a 
constant scaling factor, a=0.1. Moreover, we shall later describe the use of 
Cox et al. 's watermarking scheme within the context of the Memon-Wong (MW) 
protocol [32], which also assumes the scaling factor to be some small constant. 
The scaling parameter forms part of the watermarking algorithm and is therefore 
assumed to be known to all protocol participants, following Kerckhoffs' princi- 
ple [25), and is implicitly included in the function WM(. ). 
We capture the properties of Cox et al. 's watermarking algorithm by defining 
deduction rules in Table 2.5, in a similar manner to those that capture the prop- 
erties of cryptographic functions in Table 2.4. We only capture the most abstract 
properties of watermarking, in relation to 2.4, but shall return to scrutinise the 
inherent properties of Cox et al. 's scheme in Chapter 7. We also provide a con- 
crete example of Cox et al. 's scheme in Section 7.1 that may aid in understanding 
the scheme. 
It follows from our description of Cox et al. 's watermarking algorithm that 
anyone with the original content, x, and the watermark, to = (wl, wl, ... , wn), 
can evaluate the n highest magnitude AC coefficients of x and use Equation 2.3 to 
produce the watermarked content, WM (x, w), as captured by the deductive rule 
WMRK-EMB. The deductive rule, WMRK-EXT, captures watermark extraction 
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performed using the invertibility of Equation 2.3 to derive w from WM (x, w) 
and x. 
2.3 Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) 
It has been demonstrated that the process algebra Communicating Sequential 
Processes (CSP) [21] and its associated model checker Failures Divergence Re- 
finement (FDR) [54] are effective tools in identifying security flaws in security 
protocols [49,13]. 
The CSP syntax necessary for constructing models of BSW protocols using 
our approach is given by the following grammar, where A denotes some set of 
events, aP denotes the set of events on which the process P is to synchronise, 
otherwise known as its alphabet, and the set of all events is denoted by E: 
P, Q :: =STOPI a-+ PI c. vi ... vn-+ PIc? vET-+ PI 
PQQI QP(x)IPnQI (lP(x)IP\AI P[b/a] I 
xEA xEA 
PIIIQIIII P(x) IPIIQIP II QI II (P(x), aP(x)) I 
xEA A aP aQ xEA 
P; QI PA QISKIP 
Processes and Events 
The simplest process is STOP, which is the deadlocked process that performs 
no events. The process, Pl =a -+ STOP, is able to perform the event, a, and 
then acts as STOP. The recursively defined process, P2 =a -+ P2, is able to 
perform any number of events, a, and P3 =a -+ b -+ P3 alternates between 
performing a and b. The processes, P4 =a -4 P5 and P5 =b -+ P4, provide 
an example of mutual recursion. Supposing we initially perform the process P4 
then the resulting behaviour is exactly as in the process, P3, in which the events 
performed alternate between performing a and b ad infinitum. 
Events may be constructed of a single channel name plus any finite number 
of data components delimited by an infix dot, c. vi ... v0, where c is the channel 
name associated with the event, and the vi are data values. The type of the 
channel, c, is the set of values that can be associated with c to produce events. 
For example, consider the channel name comm and AxAxM as its type, where 
A is a set of agents that may send and receive messages over comm, and M is 
the set of all possible messages that the agents, A, may wish to transmit over 
comm. For example, comm. J. B. Sek, (EpkB(WJ)) may be one such event. 
A data value v of type T may be input onto channel c to form the event 
c? v ET -º P. Convention dictates that c? v denotes input whereas c! v denotes 
output. The process, c? x! v -4 P, is prepared to accept any value for x along 
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channel c, provides v as output, and then behave as P (whose behaviour can be 
dependent on x). 
Choice Operators 
The Q operator denotes a deterministic/external choice. The process, PQQ, 
may act as either P or Q, the choice of which is resolved by the environment. 
Similarly, the process, PnQ, may act as either P or Q, but in this case the choice 
is resolved internally by the system. The difference between the two operators 
is evident when considering the two processes, P6 = (a -+ Ps) Q (b -a P6) and 
P7 = (a -+ P7) n (b -+ P7). The process, P6, shall always accept the occurrence 
of the events, a and b, whereas P7 will nondeterministically decide whether the 
next event it is willing to accept shall be a or b. In its replicated form, OP(x), 
xEA 
the environment resolves an external choice between a number of finite processes 
P(x) for XEA. Similarly, f P(x) denotes replicated internal choice. 
XEA 
Abstractions 
The process, P\A, acts as P with the exception that all events in a set, A, are 
made invisible to the environment and occur as internal events. The process, 
P[b/Q], acts as P with the exception that all events a are renamed such that 
they now appear to the environment as b. 
Composition 
We may wish to synchronise two or more processes on some subset of events that 
they perform when running in parallel. Processes can be combined together using 
the composition operators parallel '11' and `111'. The simplest form of synchroni- 
sation is interleaving in which two or more processes are run in parallel but do 
not synchronise on any events. 
The alphabetised parallel process, P 11 Q synchronises on the events lying 
oP OQ in the intersection of the alphabet of each process, aP n aQ, whereas the gener- 
alised parallel composition of two processes, P 11 Q, synchronises P and Q on all 
A 
events contained within the set A. In fact we could use generalised parallel to 
represent interleaving and alphabetised parallel, where A=0 and A= crPnaQ, 
respectively. Finally, replicated alphabetised parallel synchronises a number of 
processes on events occurring lying in the intersection of the alphabet, aP(x), of 
each process, P(x), where xEA. 
The sequential composition of the processes, P and Q, written as P; Q, states 
that following the successful termination of the process P the system shall then 
act as Q. Neither the deadlocked process STOP, nor a divergent process, e. g., 
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(P8 =a -+ P8) \ {a}, can be considered to have successfully terminated. Instead 
we shall denote the process that successfully terminates immediately as SKIP. 
For example the process, P9; Q10, where P9 =a -9 SKIP and P10 =b --i P10, 
shall produce a trace consisting of a single occurrence of the event, a, followed 
by any number of b events. Note that SKIP; P =P for all P, as SKIP performs 
no events but immediately terminates successfully, whereas STOP; P = STOP, 
as the deadlocked process, STOP, never successfully terminates. 
Finally, the interrupt operator, `A', allows one process to take over from 
another. For example the process, P11, L P12, in which P11 =a -+ P11 and 
P12 =b -4 P12, can perform any number of events, a, until the process, P12, 
interrupts the execution of P11 following which any number of events, b, can be 
performed. 
Semantic Models 
There are various semantic models of CSP, which enable us to describe process 
behaviour and in this thesis we use the traces and stable failures models. Full 
details of the models can be found in [49]. The traces model captures the traces of 
events which a CSP process may exhibit. A sequence, tr, is a trace of a process, 
P, if there is some execution of P in which exactly that sequence of events is 
performed. The empty trace, containing no events, is written (). More generally, 
a trace may be written as a sequence of events (el, e2, ... , e). 
For example, the set of all traces that can be performed by the process, 
P12 =a -> STOP Qb -+ STOP, which provides the environment with a 
choice between performing an a or ab before reaching a state of deadlock, is 
the set, {(), (a), (b)}. The same set of traces can be generated by the process, 
P13 =a -f STOP nb -> STOP, although it provides different behaviour. P13 
makes the choice between performing a or b internally before reaching a state of 
deadlock. The set of possible traces remains the set {(), (a), (b)}, although the 
environment has no choice between whether an a or ab can be performed. 
CSP has a theory of refinement that enables us to compare the behaviour 
of processes. If a process, S, is refined by a process, P, then all of the possible 
behaviours of P must also be possible behaviours of S. In this paper we will 
make use of trace refinement checks: SCTP. We also make use of stable 
failures refinement checks: S CF P. 
We are able to discern between P12 and P13 if we evaluate the failures of the 
processes. Traces express the behaviour that a process can perform but tells us 
nothing about what a process may refuse to perform. A refusal is a set of events 
that a process shall never accept in a particular state. In the stable failures model, 
a pair (tr, R) is a trace/refusal pair of a process P where R is the set of events 
that P can refuse to participate in after some execution of the sequence of events 
tr. A trace/refusal pair may be written as a sequence of events paired with the 
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set of events that can be refused thereafter ((el, e2,. . ., en), 
{e2, ei+1 i ... , ej }). If 
no internal events (7-) can be performed immediately following the trace tr, then 
the trace/refusals pair, (tr, R), is termed a stable failure. For example, the set of 
all stable failures of P13 are: - 
{((), {a}), ((), {b}), ((a), {a, b}), ((b), {a, b})} 
Initially, P13 makes a non deterministic choice between whether to perform 
an a, resulting in b being refused, or to perform b, resulting in a being refused. 
Subsequently, either the a or b is performed following which no event is accepted. 
For comparison, the set of all stable failures of P12 are: - 
{((), {}), ((a), {a, b}), ((b), {a, b})} 
Initially, P12 is willing to accept a or b, the choice of which is made by the 
environment. Subsequently, either a or b is performed following which no event 
can be performed. Both processes, P12 and P13, have precisely the same set 
of traces. The traces model is thus unable to distinguish between internal and 
external choice. Should we wish to make this distinction we must use the stable 
failures model. Generally speaking, liveness properties state that some good 
behaviour will occur, as opposed to safety specifications that demand that no bad 
behaviour may occur [56]. We reason whether the protocol satisfies liveness and 
safety properties in the traces and stable failures semantic models, respectively. 
Model Checking 
The modelling of systems in CSP and their formal verification is supported by 
model checking tools, such as Failures Divergence Refinement (FDR) developed 
by Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd [54). FDR checks assertions of refinement of the 
form SPEC C MODEL, i. e., it automatically checks whether the specification, 
SPEC, is satisfied by a model of the proposed implementation, MODEL. If the 
result of a check is negative a trace, or trace/refusal pair, is returned by FDR 
indicating the sequence of events that lead to the violation of the property. FDR 
can generate up to 100 traces, or trace/refusal pairs, if there are at least 100 
traces that lead to such violations. The GUI also enables the user to explore the 
traces of individual processes used in the composition of the model and can be 
used to reveal events hidden or renamed during it construction. 
FDR constructs a labelled transition system (LTS) for each of the processes, 
SPEC and MODEL, and explores the state space of each, given by the opera- 
tional semantics, to check whether all possible behaviour of MODEL is also a 
possible behaviour of SPEC. FDR adopts the use of techniques such as normal- 
isation and hierarchical compression to increase the efficiency with which such 
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refinement checks are performed. A more comprehensive description of the opera- 
tional semantics of CSP and the hierarchical compression techniques implemented 
by FDR is provided in [47]. 
In this thesis we will define the requirements of BSW protocols as CSP pro- 
cesses (to be used as SPEC above). Likewise, we shall model the possible be- 
haviour afforded by some BSW protocol as the CSP process, MODEL, and au- 
tomatically check whether the protocol meets its specification using FDR. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter provided the necessary background regarding the cryptographic and 
watermarking primitives used in the construction of BSW protocols. This chapter 
also described the process algebra CSP, and its associated model checker FDR, 
which we shall use to analyse BSW protocols in Chapter 4. Our contribution 
was to capture the most abstract properties of informed one-bit watermarking 
using the entailment relation, which was defined to capture properties of cryp- 
tographic primitives in [50], as presented in Table 2.5. Abstracting from the 
underlying watermarking scheme and cryptographic primitives shall enable us 
to reason whether BSW protocols alone fail to meet their requirements using a 
similar approach to that previously proposed for the analysis of other security 
protocols, which is described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Modelling and Analysis of 
Security Protocols in CSP and 
FDR 
This chapter rationalizes our approach to the modelling and analysis of BSW 
protocols, as proposed in Chapter 4, by describing the success of using CSP and 
FDR to identify attacks in security protocols [49]. Perhaps the most famous 
example is Lowe's attack on the Needham Schroeder Public-Key (NSPK) pro- 
tocol [30], the first case study included in this chapter. We shall recount how 
the NSPK protocol and the Zhou-Gollmann (ZG) non-repudiation protocol were 
modelled and analysed in [47] and [57], respectively. The analysis of the NSPK 
protocol provides an example of how security protocols may be modelled in CSP 
to include a Dolev-Yao (DY) saboteur [12] and analysed against safety specifica- 
tions. The analysis of the ZG protocol demonstrates how security protocols may 
be constructed using a threat model that differs from the conventional DY model. 
The fairness requirements of the ZG protocol shall also be useful in describing 
how to define liveness specifications in CSP. 
The BSW protocols analysed throughout the remainder of this thesis share 
many of the characteristics inherent within these two protocols. In particular, the 
two primary requirements of BSW protocols shall be defined as liveness and safety 
properties, in a similar manner to those requirements defined of the NSPK and 
ZG protocols, respectively. In this thesis we aim to use CSP and FDR to identify 
flaws in BSW protocols, and so we extend Wei and Heather's CSP model of the 
ZG protocol [57] to include the behaviour assumed by Gärgens and Rudolph in 
order to verify their attack. 
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3.1 Overview 
A security protocol is some message exchange between agents aiming to achieve 
a set of security related goals across a potentially hostile and distributed net- 
work [49]. To claim that a protocol is secure is to say that the protocol meets all 
its security objectives under certain assumptions. Such security objectives must 
be defined precisely, as indeed must the environment in which the protocol is to 
be used and any assumptions made. 
There is an inherent difficulty in designing and analysing security protocols. 
Security properties can be difficult to define, the protocols are often distributed 
over a large hostile environment, such as the Internet and the concurrent nature 
of such protocols results in a large amount of complex interactions. Contrary to 
this, the protocols themselves are often simple in form, e. g., the NSPK protocol 
described in this section can be reduced to just three lines. Such systems that 
are easily expressed but difficult to evaluate frequently find value in the use of 
formal methods [49]. Vulnerabilities in security protocols frequently occur, not 
because the encryption has been broken, but because the associated message 
exchange leaks information after clever manipulation by an active adversary [30]. 
By abstracting the underlying cryptographic primitives and reasoning that the 
message exchange alone is not open to attack, we can be confident that the 
security objectives will be achieved if the encryption is suitably robust. 
There are two predominant approaches that have proved successful for the 
analysis of concurrent systems: theorem proving and model checking. We focus 
on the latter approach, which offers fully automatic analysis at the expense of 
only being able to reason about systems with finite state spaces. Model checking 
becomes intractable unless the protocol model is composed of a small number of 
agents, messages, keys and nonces. Therefore the set of atomic values used is 
limited. Thus, model checking alone does not necessarily provide a general proof 
of correctness for protocols implemented over a distributed network. However, 
model checking is an effective way of automatically finding attacks on protocols. 
In this thesis we shall automatically generate a number of examples of protocols 
failing to meet their requirements rather than ever verifying that a protocol meets 
its security requirements. In this chapter we shall describe the use of the refine- 
ment based model checker, FDR, to determine whether CSP models of security 
protocols meet their security requirements, which are also expressed in CSP. 
3.2 Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) Proto- 
col 
The Needham-Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) Protocol aims to provide entity 
authentication for both the agents, a and b, whom take the roles of initiator 
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and responder respectively [36]. An authentication protocol aims to provide 
guarantees upon completion regarding the identity of the agent that another has 
been interacting with. The initiator wishes to be sure of which responder they 
have established an authenticated session with and, likewise, the responder wishes 
to be assured of the identity of the initiator. 
The NSPK protocol also assures message secrecy within the resulting secure 
session established by the NSPK protocol in which one of the nonces is used as 
the symmetric key shared between the agents. In this case we interpret secrecy to 
mean that a misbehaving agent is unable to derive the plaintext of any encrypted 
message sent from one well-behaved agent to another. 
The protocol is initiated by an agent, a, and proceeds as follows: - 
1. a->t . a, 
b 
2. t--+a : Sskt(pkb, b) 
3. a -+ b: Epkb (na, a) 
4. b -+t : b, a 
5. t -+ b: Sskt (pka, a) 
6. b -* a: Epka (na, nb) 
7. a --k b: Epkb(nb) 
In the NSPK protocol, agents need only contact the third party, t, to receive 
certificates of public keys and four of the protocol steps may be omitted assum- 
ing each agent keeps a local cache of commonly used public keys. Therefore 
the protocol is frequently analysed in its three message form [29], constructed 
only of messages 3,6 and 7, as in [47]. However, there are striking similari- 
ties between BSW protocols and authentication protocols that include a trusted 
server/certification authority, so in this section we extend the case study provided 
in [47] to demonstrate how to construct a model including a trusted server. 
The approach taken in the NSPK protocol to provide authentication of both 
initiator and responder is to use a nonce challenge and response, where nonce is 
an abbreviation of number used once [3]. Having been issued certification of the 
public key of b, a sends her own identity along with some nonce, na encrypted 
under the public key of the responder, b. In doing so, a is challenging b to decrypt 
the first message and evaluate na. The secret key, skb, is known only to b, so 
only b can evaluate the value of na. When a receives the a response containing 
the correct value of na, as part of the sixth message, a can be confident that it 
was b that sent the message. 
Agent b, acting as the responder, also requires assurance that he is in commu- 
nication with a, so he too sets a nonce challenge. The sixth message is constructed 
by b by encrypting na, the correct response to a's nonce challenge, and nb, a fresh 
nonce that a is challenged to evaluate, under the public key of a. Finally, a is 
expected to respond correctly to the second nonce challenge. Only a should be 
able to decipher the second message and evaluate the value nb, so by returning 
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this value to b, encrypted under the public key of b, b is confident that it can 
only have been a with which he has communicated. 
In addition to providing authentication of both initiator and responder, the 
secrecy of messages sent in the resulting authenticated session should also be 
maintained by the protocol. We shall see in Section 3.2.4 that the NSPK fails 
to satisfy its security requirements [29]. In order to analyse the NSPK protocol 
in the model checker FDR we must construct CSP processes representing the 
behaviour allowed by the specification and of the various interacting agents. 
We describe the construction of a small finite system modelling the seven 
message version of NSPK protocol such that it can be checked in FDR. Two 
well-behaved agents, namely A and B, are constructed alongside a well-behaved 
trusted server, J, and a misbehaving agent M, whose behaviour shall be modelled 
by the processes, ALICE, BOB, JEEVES and MALLORY, respectively. 
The overall system is modelled as the parallel composition of the well-behaved 
agent processes, ALICE, BOB and JEEVES, with the misbehaving agent pro- 
cess, MALLORY. The well-behaved agents act precisely as defined in the proto- 
col, whereas a deductive system is constructed such that the misbehaving agent, 
M, can act as a Dolev-Yao (DY) saboteur i. e., can overhear, intercept and spoof 
messages sent between the well-behaved agents in order to manipulate the mes- 
sage exchange with the aim of breaking the security requirements of the protocol. 
Regardless of how the misbehaving agent, M, interacts with the well-behaved 
agents he must never be able to convince A or B that they are in an authenticated 
session with the other when they are not. A single misbehaving will suffice in our 
model as the protocol will not become any weaker in an environment in which 
more misbehaving agents participate than if such identities were all regarded as 
M [47]. 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, all agents share an insecure communication chan- 
nel, Comm EAxAx Jul. Such communications are susceptible to attack by M, 
who may intercept or spoof messages sent between any two agents over the take 
and fake channels. Overhearing, as assumed in the DY model, is modelled by a 
take and subsequent fake of the same message, i. e., the message is rerouted via 
M although the sender and recipient remain unaware of this. The well-behaved 
agents are aware that they are communicating over an insecure network but are 
unable to discern whether messages have been sent honestly along the comm 
channel or dishonestly along the take and fake channels. 
The remainder of this section describes the construction of processes mod- 
elling the behaviour of the well-behaved agents, that follows the protocol pre- 
cisely, and a process modelling the misbehaving agent who may accept any mes- 
sage, from the well-behaved agents, and send any message that they are willing to 
accept. We conclude this section with a precise description of how such processes 
are composed into the protocol model, MODEL. 
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comm. A. B 
comm. B. A 
Figure 3.1: NSPK: Composition of well-behaved agents with the misbehaving 
agent 
3.2.1 Well-behaved Agents 
As initiator, an agent, a, makes a choice of which agent, b, he is to attempt to 
authenticate with, modelled as the resolution of an internal choice. The initiator 
requests the digital certificate of b from the third party, J, and encrypts the 
given nonce, n47 to issue a nonce challenge to the responder, b. The initiator 
expects to receive the correct answer to the nonce challenge set alongside a new 
nonce challenge issued by the responder. The initiator must accept any nonce, 
nb E N, as the challenge set by the responder, modelled as the resolution of 
an external choice. The initiator answers the nonce challenge accordingly in the 
final message. Once the authentication protocol is complete, the initiator opens a 
session with the responder using the responder's nonce as the key for symmetric 
encryption. 
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INI T(a, na) _ 
/ 
n 
6EA-{a, J} 
` "°' k SESS(a, b, nb) ýJ 
comm. a. J. (a, b) -+ 
comm. J. a. S, k,, (pkb, b) -ý 
comm. a. b. Epkb(na, a) ý 
comm. b. a. Epka(na, nb) -a 
comm. a. b. Epkb(nb) -º .. cA/ 
As responder, the user has no choice over whom will initiate a protocol with 
them nor does the user have a choice of what nonce they will receive. As such 
both are modelled as the resolution of external choices. In a similar manner to 
the initiator, upon successful completion of the protocol the responder opens a 
session with the initiator using their own nonce as the key for symmetric key 
encryption. 
RESP(b, nb) _ 
comm. a. b. Epkb(na, a) -a 
comm. b. J. (b, a) -º 
comm. J. b. S, k, (pka, a) -+ 
aEA-{b, J} comm. b. a. Epka(na, nb) -3 
"°EX comm. a. b. EPkb (n6) -4 
SESS(b, a, nb) 
Upon completion of the NSPK protocol the initiator and responder are ex- 
pected to share two nonces, secret values known only to themselves, and as such 
either of these values may be used as a symmetric key used for an authenticated 
session between the two agents. 
The session process is simply a way of the model producing signals about the 
state of the system once a protocol run has completed. The value, secret. a. b, 
represents a secret saved by a for sending only to b during an authenticated 
session and encrypted under a secret key shared by a and b. Upon termination 
the session the initiator and responder are no longer willing to participate in 
any further run of the protocol using the same nonce value, as modelled by the 
deadlocked process, STOP. 
SESS(a, b, n) = 
comm. a. b. E,, (secret. a. b) -º SESS(a, b, n) 
C3 O comm. b. a. E,, (m) -4 SESS(a, b, n) tnE{ýsecý+eiý} 
) 
o STOP 
If we consider specific instances of a and b then clearly A, as a, shall only 
ever send secrr'et. A. B to B and secret. A. M to M. Hence, M should never learn 
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secret. A. B, or indeed secret. B. A by similar reasoning. As such it can be checked 
whether M can convince A or B that they are in session with the other honest 
agent as in this case either the secret secret. A. B or secret. B. A will become known 
to the misbehaving agent. 
The process, JEEVES, models the behaviour of J who acts performs the 
role of a trusted third party TTP, i. e., a certification authority in a public- 
key infrastructure (PKI) issuing digital certificates associating agents with their 
public keys. By assuring an agent of another's public key, agents can communicate 
directly without requiring J to be online other than when requesting digital 
certificates. 
TTP = 
-i 
bEA-{a, J} 
comm. b. J. (a, b) 
ID comm. J. b. Ssk, (pkb, b) 
aEA-{J} TTP 
Having modelled the behaviour of those agents that follow the protocol pre- 
cisely we next construct a process, MALLORY, modelling the behaviour of the 
misbehaving agent, M. 
3.2.2 Misbehaving Agent 
A process, MALLORY, is constructed that can perform every possible trace that 
the misbehaving agent could also perform, which synchronizes on the comm, take 
and fake channels defined previously. The misbehaving agent builds knowledge 
based on their initial knowledge, the messages overheard and intercepted, and 
via deductions made using such knowledge. 
The misbehaving agent, illustrated in Figure 3.2, is constructed such that 
the messages he may fake are each fact that he does not initially know but 
could learn during a protocol run. The hear event enables the misbehaving 
agent to receive messages as input sent to them from other agents or intercepted 
from communications between the other agents. The infer channel enables the 
misbehaving agent to deduce new knowledge from what he currently knows and 
the say event enables the misbehaving agent to send messages that may or may 
not be accepted by the well-behaved agents. 
Roscoe's lazy spy provides an efficient method for keeping track of the current 
knowledge of the misbehaving agent, i. e., one that avoids unmanageable state 
space explosion [471. Deductions need only be made for the misbehaving agent's 
set of learnable facts, L. That is, M can never learn a fact that they knew initially 
or that cannot be deduced from their initial knowledge and all the messages they 
could hear, and Roscoe's lazy spy elegantly omits infer events for such facts. 
As such we construct a set, D, of every useful deduction that the misbehav- 
ing agent could make during any run of the protocol. In Table 2.4 we presented 
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Figure 3.2: NSPK: Misbehaving Agent 
a list of deduction rules that the misbehaving agent has at his disposal to per- 
form various cryptographic operations, including composition of sequences and 
encryption. The rules of deduction are defined in CSP using functions returning 
sets of pairs. Each function operates on a subset of the set of facts conforming to 
a particular type. As an example, the following function returns all possible de- 
ductions associated with the deduction rules SYM-ENC and SYM-DEC, defined 
in Table 2.4: - 
deductioni2(X) = {({f, ka}, Ek (f)), ({Ek. (f), ka}, f) I Eka(f) t- X} 
The function, deductions(X), is constructed as the set union of all of the 
deduction functions and outputs the set of all deductions that can be made from 
the set, X, using the rules defined in Table 2.4. 
deductions(X) =U deduction= (X) 
iE{1.. n} 
A set, M, is constructed of every message potentially sent during each possible 
run of the protocol and an explode function is defined to construct a set of a mes- 
sage and all its constituent parts. For example, applying the explode function to 
the message, Epk (NA, A), returns the set of useful facts, { Epk w (NA, A), NA, Al. 
Hence, the finite set of all interesting facts, F, is conctructed by applying the 
explode function to the set of messages, M. 
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M= {(a, b) la+-A, b+-A-{a}} 
U{Saki (pka, a) I at-A} 
U{Epkb(na, a) IaE-A, b+-A-{b}, na4-N} 
U{Epka(na, nb) I a--A, naF-N, nbt-N} 
U{Epkb(nb) Ib+-A, nb+-N} 
U{En(secret. a. b) Ia+-A, bt-A-{b}, n+-N} 
explode(xs) = {xs} U U({explode(x) Ix +- set(xs)}) 
explode(Epk(f )) = {Epk(f ), pk, sk} U explode (f 
explode(Ek(f)) = {Ek(f ), k} U explode (f ) 
explode(S9k(f )= {S, k(f), sk, pk} U explode (f 
explode(x) =x 
, M}) F= U({explode(m) 
Im +- 
The misbehaving agent, M, initially knows of all other agents, A, although 
he does not at first know their public keys. Instead, like any of the agents, M can 
request that the third party, J, issue him certification of another agents public 
key. To verify such certification M must initially know the public key of the third 
party, pkj. M also knows his own public key, pkM, and of course his secret key, 
skM. He also holds a set of values, {secret. M. x Ix +- A- {M, J}}, saved for 
sending to each well-behaved agent within authenticated sessions, and a nonce, 
nm. The initial knowledge, 11C, of the misbehaving agent, M, is therefore defined 
as: - 
Z1C = AU {pkM, skM, nm, pkj} U {secret. M. x Ix i- A- {M, J}} 
It shall also be useful to construct a finite set of all knowable facts, 1C, by 
closing the set of all messages and the initially known facts. The close function 
recursively makes all possible deductions from a set of facts S using the finite set 
of all interesting facts, F. 
IC = close (21C U . 
M) 
close(s) _ 
let 
S' = if I (X, f) deductions (F), (X - S) 
within 
if (S' - S) =0 then F else close(S U S') 
Having defined a set of knowable facts, 1C, and the closure of all initial knowl- 
edge, close(ZAC), we can subsequently define the set of all facts that can be learnt 
by the misbehaving agent, G, as the set difference between the two. 
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G =1C - close (11C) 
It is of no use to the misbehaving agent to deduce knowledge that is already 
known to him, or indeed to deduce a fact that is not useful to him, thus the set 
of deductions is defined as: - 
D={ (X, f) 1 (X, f) 4- deductions j), 
f EG, f ¢X, 
X-1C=0} 
We have thus demonstrated how a set, D, is constructed of every useful de- 
duction that the misbehaving agent could make during any run of the protocol. 
This is subsequently used to define a process for every fact that the intruder does 
not initially know but could learn during a protocol run. 
Each component process starts in a state in which the misbehaving agent 
is ignorant of the fact. The fact can either be heard or inferred and then en- 
ters a state in which the misbehaving agent now knows the fact. In this state 
the fact can still be heard or inferred and remain in a state where the fact is 
known. Likewise, the fact can now be said whilst remaining in the known state. 
Finally, if the fact happens to be either secret shared between A and B, i. e., 
{secmt. A. B, secmt. B. A}, then a signal event signal. knows. M is used to indicate 
that the misbehaving agent has learnt one of these forbidden facts. 
IGN(f )=fE .M& hear. f -a KNW (f ) 
0 infer7tE{(X, f')I (X, f`)F-D, f'=f}->KNW(f) 
KNW (f)=fE J1il & hear. f -> KNW (f) 
Q infer? t E {(X, f') I (X, f') <-- V, fE X} -+ KNW(f) 
QfE JVt & say. f-+ KNW ( f) 
QfE {secret. A. B, secret. B. A} & signal. knows. M. f -+ KNW (f ) 
where EV = {secret. A. B, secret. B. A} 
The process, DED, modelling the deductive system of the misbehaving agent, 
is then the parallel combination of all component processes. The misbehaving 
agent may use his initial knowledge as well as his deduced knowledge to say 
messages as defined in the KNW process. 
DED = (IIfEC (IGN(f), a1GN(f))) \ 11 infer 11111 KNOWN 
The replicated alphabetized parallel composition of the IGN(f) processes 
is such that the alphabets, aIGN(f ), cause synchronisations of infer events of 
dependent facts. 
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aIGN(f) = 
{hear. f, say. f IfE M} 
U{ signal. knows. M. f IfE EV} 
U{infer. (X, f') I (X, f') E D, (f' =f )} 
U{infer. (X, f') I (X, f') E D, fE X} 
The synchronisation blocks say events of unknown facts occurring, as well 
as infer events dependent upon knowing such facts. Once a learnable fact is 
heard or inferred the process behaviour changes to allow the fact to be said and 
dependent inferences to be made. We must not block the inferred fact from 
being heard again later and we must also enable our model to report when facts 
of interest are known, i. e., those contained within EV. 
Where one process, KNW (fl), allows inferences to be made that depend on 
knowledge of fi, infer? t E {(X , f') 
I (X 
, f') - Da, fl EXJ, another process, 
IGN(f2), may infer the unknown fact, f2i with use of fl, in synchronisation with 
KNW(fi), i. e., infer? t E {(X, f') I (X, f') - Da,, f' = f2}. 
Let us consider the chaining of inferences through an example involving just 
two instances: - 
IGN(f1)aIGN(Ii) II 
aIGN(f2) 
IGN(f2) 
where 
fi = EpkM (nm, nA) 
f2=nA 
infer. ({skM, fl}, f2) E aIGN(fi), 
infer. ({sky, fl}, f2) E aIGN(f2) 
Here IGN(f2) is unable to perform the event infer. ({sky, fl}, f2) whilst it 
cannot be performed by IGN (fl) . However, IGN (fi) may perform a hear. fl 
and subsequently allow infer. ({sky, fl}, f2) in KNW(fl). As KNW(fl) does not 
block the the event infer. ({sky, fl}, f2), IGN(f2) now performs such an inference, 
in synchronisation with KNW (fl), and then acts as KNW(f2). 
In reality there are many more IGN processes which are run in synchroni- 
sation and the process, KNW(f2), would subsequently allow previously blocked 
infer events, e. g, infer. ({pkA, f2}, f3) in IGN(f3) where f3 = EpkA(nA). 
The process, DED, does not include IGN(skM), as skM is not a learnable fact 
(it is part of M's initial knowledge). As such inferences requiring knowledge of 
skM shall be blocked by no process in DED. The same is true for pkA and all 
knowable facts that are not also learnable facts, i. e., close(IX). 
As the process, IGN(f), or indeed KNW (f ), does not appear in the con- 
struction of DED, where fE close(IK), we need to allow messages found within 
the set, close(IK), to be accepted on the hear channel and relayed on the say 
channel. The process, KNOWN, adds this important additional behaviour to 
DED. 
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KNOWN = 
say? f E close (21C) nm -+ KNOWN 
Q hear? f E close (11C) nM- KNOWN 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the effect of the renaming used in the construction of the 
process, MALLORY, below. Two channels take and fake are defined of the same 
type as comm, modelling the event of messages being intercepted and faked. Each 
message sent across the network can be intercepted by the misbehaving agent 
regardless of whether it was intended to be received by him. The misbehaving 
agent can hear any message sent to him along the channel comm and also hear 
any message intercepted along the take channel. Each outbound say is renamed 
such that the misbehaving agent can send the message as if from himself, over 
comm, or spoof the communication as though it originated from another agent, 
over fake. 
MALLORY = 
DED comm. p. M, comm. M, take. p. p', fake. p. p' ý /hear, sap, hear, sayl 
where pt-A, p+-A, pop' 
In this section a process, MALLORY, was constructed to model the behaviour 
of a misbehaving agent, and is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Having modelled the be- 
haviour of the well-behaved agents and the misbehaving agent we have reached 
a stage at which we may construct the overall protocol model as a parallel com- 
position of all agents synchronising on the events that they share. 
3.2.3 Composition 
There are infinitely many systems that one could compose of the elements dis- 
cussed in this section. Model checking becomes intractable unless the protocol 
model is composed of a small number of agents, messages, keys and nonces. We 
therefore construct only a small finite system modelling the seven message version 
of NSPK protocol such that it can be checked in FDR. 
Therefore, the set of atomic values used must be limited. We have already 
limited the initial knowledge of the misbehaving agent to be the set of all other 
agents, the public key of the third party, his own public/private key pair, just 
one nonce nm and a set of values, {secret. M. x Ix E- A- {M, J}}, saved for 
sending to each well-behaved agent within authenticated sessions. 
We have already implicitly assumed that each agent has knowledge of each 
agents identity, their own public/secret key pair and the public key of the third 
party as they require them to construct the messages they send in a protocol run. 
In addition we shall provide each agent a single nonce to use in some run of the 
protocol. 
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Figure 3.3: NSPK: ALICE as renaming of of INIT(A, nA) 
Finally, two well-behaved agents, namely A and B, are constructed along- 
side a single well-behaved trusted server, J, and a single misbehaving agent M. 
Their behaviour shall be modelled by the processes, ALICE, BOB, JEEVES and 
MALLORY, respectively. A and B shall each perform a single instance of each 
role, i. e., INIT(A, nA) and RESP(B, nB). A single fresh random nonce has been 
provided to each. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of the renaming has on a well-behaved agent, 
in this case A. Two channels take and fake are defined of the same type as comm, 
modelling the event of messages being intercepted and faked. Each inbound comm 
is renamed such that the user cannot distinguish between a take and an honest 
comm, and each outgoing message comm is indistinguishable from a fake. 
ALICE =n 
INI T (A, nA) comm, take. A. p, fake. p. A/comm, comm. A. p, comm. p. A] 
where p4-A-{A} 
BOB= 
RESP(B, nB) comm, take. 
B. p, j'ake. p. B/Comm, 
comm. B. p, comm. p. Bn ] 
where pt-A-{ B} 
JEE VES = 
TTP 
I comm, take. J. p Jake. p. J /comm, comm. J. p, comm. p. Jý 
wherepF. A-{J} 
The protocol model, MODEL, is constructed as the parallel composition of 
the well-behaved agents, ALICE, BOB and JEEVES, with the misbehaving 
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agent, MALLORY. The well-behaved agents act precisely as defined in the pro- 
tocol, whereas the misbehaving agent uses a deductive system to manipulate the 
message exchange in any manner accepted by the well-behaved agents. Having 
renamed the agents, they are run in parallel synchronising on the events that 
they share. 
M ODEL = 
((ALICE BOB) JEEVES) 
{I comm. A. B, It JI comm. J. p, I pt-{A, B} Iý comm. M. p, t comm. B. A fl comm. p. J comm. p. M, take. p. p', 
fake. p. p' 
MALLORY 
pt-{A, B, J}, 
Il 
p'F{A, B, J}, I1 pop, 
Such a system is small enough for FDR for model checking to remain tractable 
but large enough for an attack to occur, as we shall see in Section 3.2.4. Ryan 
et at. suggest that in practice the following list of systems are worth model 
checking are adequate in finding the majority of attacks when model checking 
security protocols. If a third party is also involved then including one or two in 
the model is also deemed adequate. 
" an initiator A, and a responder B 
" an initiator A, and a responder A 
" an initiator A, a responder A, and an initiator B 
" an initiator A, a responder A, and an responder B 
" an initiator A, and two responders B 
" two initiators A, and a responders B 
We have constructed the process, MODEL, of a single initiator, A, responder, 
B, third party, J, and misbehaving agent M who can perform either role, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. Our protocol model is now ready for analysis against 
the protocol requirements described in the next section. 
3.2.4 Formal Specification of Secrecy and Authentication 
A and B only send the confidential messages secret. A. B and secret. B. A on occa- 
sions when they believe they are participating in an authenticated session with 
B and A, respectively. Should M ever know secret. A. B then A must have been 
deceived into thinking that they are participating in an authenticated session 
with B when they are really communicating with M impersonating B. Like- 
wise, M shall know aecret. B. A when B has been deceived into thinking they are 
interacting with A. 
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In order to discern when M is in possession of particular knowledge signal 
events are included in the model and the specification shall also be written in 
terms of such signal events. The specification need not be written in terms of 
additional signal events but doing so aids our understanding of an otherwise 
complicated specification. Signal events added to the model are not intended to 
model any action taken by the protocol participants but rather provide analysts 
with the ability to monitor when particular points in a protocol run are reached 
for comparison to the specification. 
Safety specifications demand that certain behaviour must not occur and can 
be evaluated in the traces model of CSP. A more detailed explanation of the traces 
model of CSP is provided in Section 2.3. In order to check the safety property that 
M never knows secret. A. B or secret. B. A we may check that the process, STOP, 
that may never perform any event, is trace refined by our protocol model when 
all events but the signal. knows. M events are hidden. In fact such an assertion 
does not hold for the NSPK protocol. 
STOP 9T MODEL \E- {I signal . knows. M I} 
When model checking in FDR we are automatically provided a trace indicative 
of the failure of the protocol in providing message secrecy of secret. A. B. The 
protocol also fails to provide message secrecy of secret. B. A in the case where B 
initiate the protocol run a and A participates as responder in protocol run /3. 
(comm. A. J. (A, M), 
comm. J. A. S, k, (pkM, M), 
comm. A. M. EpkM (nA, A), 
fake. A. J. (A, B), 
take. J. A. Sskj (pkB, B), 
fake. A. B. EpkB (nA, A), 
comm. B. J. (B, A), 
comm. J. B. Sek,, (pkA, A), 
take. B. A. EpkA (nA, nB), 
comm. M. A. EpkA (nA, nB), 
comm. A. M. EpkM (nB), 
fake. A. B. EPkB (nB), 
take. B. A. EnB (secret. B. A), 
signal. knows. M. secret. B. A) 
This corresponds directly to the following attack presented in protocol nota- 
tion in Figure 3.4. The attack consists of two interleaved runs of the protocol. 
A acts as initiator and M as responder in an initial protocol run, a, whilst in a 
second protocol run, p, M convinces the responder B that he has been commu- 
nicating with the initiator A when in fact he has been interacting with M. 
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a. 1. A -ý J: A, M 
a. 2. J -ý A: Sek, (pk, yr, M) 
a. 3. AýM: EPk, (nA, A) 
ß. 1. M(A) ýJ: A, B 
ß. 2. J -> M(A) : Sek, (pkB, B) 
0.3. M(A) -ý B EPkB (nA, A) 
ß. 4. B -ý J: B, A 
ß. 5. JýB: Sek, (pkA, A) 
0.6. Bý M(A) : EPkA (nA, nB) 
a. 6. MýA: EPkA (nA, nB ) 
a. 7. A -a M EPk, (nB) 
ß. 7. M(A) -ý B: EPkB(nB) 
Figure 3.4: Lowe's Attack on the NSPK Protocol 
A first run of the protocol, a, is initiated by A, aiming to create an authenti- 
cated session with M. M takes advantage of this situation, and begins a protocol 
run, ß, with B acting as A, attempting to deceive B into believing that he is 
establishing an authenticated session with A. B immediately answers the nonce 
challenge set and sends the answer along with a nonce challenge that he believes 
can only be answered by A. M is unable to decrypt the message intercepted 
from B but is confident that it includes the answer to A's initial nonce challenge 
because that is precisely the nonce challenge he set B. 
Although M does not know the new nonce challenge he has set A, as it was 
in fact chosen by B, he can expect to receive the answer to the nonce challenge 
in a new message that he can now decrypt. M is thus able to answer B's nonce 
challenge with the unintentional assistance of A. At the end of the seven messages 
of the protocol run, ß, B believes that he shares an authenticated session with A 
when in fact A has never participated in a run of the protocol with B. Thus M has 
broken the secrecy requirement of the protocol as he is able to infer message. A. B 
sent in the resulting `authenticated' session. 
The attack is clearer when considering the three message version of the pro- 
tocol, although our explanation of the attack is appropriate for describing either 
the seven message or three message version. This is because the attack does 
not depend upon manipulating the interactions between agents and the trusted 
server, who act as a certification authority. Issuing digital certificates is not the 
vulnerable part of the protocol, but rather the nonce challenges that make up 
the three most important messages of the NSPK protocol. 
Lowe provided a fix for the protocol in [30]. By changing the message sent 
in Step 6 (of the seven message version) to include the identity of the sender, 
Ep(na, nb, b), the attack we have described is avoided. We are interested in the 
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NSPK protocol only as an example of how CSP and FDR have been used to 
break security protocols. As such it is of greater interest to consider only the 
NSPK protocol in its original form that does not include Lowe's fix. 
A more direct method of model checking authentication properties, as de- 
scribed in [19], is to include signal events (signal. running and signal. commit) 
confirming when an agent is running the protocol and indicating when an agent 
has enough confidence to commit to having authenticated the other agent. The 
initiator is confident that they have authenticated the responder once they have 
received the correct answer to the nonce challenge that they sent. Hence a 
signal. running event is added to the INIT process following Step 6 in the proto- 
col. The initiator a signals that they are running the protocol with b using the 
nonces na and nb. 
INIT(a, nn) _ 
ý 
comm. a. J. (a, b) --> 
comm. J. a. S9ki (pkb, b) --> 
comm. a. b. Epkb (na, a) -+ 
comm. b. a. Epka(na, nb) --> 
Q signal. running. a. 
b. na. nb -3 
nbEJV comm.. a. b. Epkb(nb) -ý 
SESS(a, b, nb) 
i 
n bEA-{a, J} 
Ji 
The responder is confident that they have authenticated the initiator only 
once they have received the correct answer to the nonce challenge that they sent. 
Hence a signal. commit event is added to the INIT process following Step 7 of 
the protocol. The responder b signals that they are running the protocol with a 
using the nonces na and nb. 
RESP(b, nb) _ 
/ 
p 
aEA-{6, J} 
na EA( 
` SESS(b, a, nb) I 
comm. a. b. EPkb(na, a) -ý 
comm. b. J. (b, a) -+ 
comm. J. b. S9k,, (pka, a) -º 
comm. b. a. EPka ( na, nb )-ý 
comm. a. b. EPkb(nb) --ý 
signal. commit. b. a. na. nb 
The specification shall then be written such that every signal. commit event 
must be preceded by a corresponding signal. running event. The PRE (i, j) can 
be read as the event i precedes the event j. The process, PRE(i, j), is written 
such that any event in 11 signal } may occur at any time with the exception of 
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j until the event i occurs after which any event in {1 signal (} including j may 
now occur. 
PRE(i, j) _ 
let 
/ 
P1 = STOP nIn x--ý (P1 n P2) ` xE{laignall}-{i, j} 
P2=i--ºP3 
P3=STOP nl 
xE 
x-+ P3 ý 
within 
P1nP2 
) 
If every signal. commit event must be preceded by a corresponding event, 
signal. running, then it is enough to show that a specific commit event is not pre- 
ceded by its corresponding running event to demonstrate a failure of the protocol 
in meeting its requirements. As we are only concerned with the occurrence of 
signal events we hide all other events, {1 comm, take, fake 1}, in MODEL during 
analysis. 
PRE(signal. running. A. B. nA. nB, signal. commit. B. A. nA. nB) ¢T MODEL \ {komm, take, fake} 
When model checking in FDR we are automatically provided a trace indicat- 
ing the failure of the protocol in meeting this requirement. FDR even enables 
us to reveal the events, hidden in the assertion above, in order to reconsider the 
sequence of events performed by the process, MODEL, that lead to the protocol 
failure. 
(comm. A. J. (A, M), 
comm. J. A. S, k, (pkM, M), 
comm. A. M. Epkm (nA, A), 
fake. A. J. (A, B), 
take. J. A. S, k,, (pkB, B), 
fake. A. B. EpkB (nA, A), 
comm. B. J. (B, A), 
comm. J. B. S, k., (pkA, A), 
take. B. A. EpkA (nA, nB), 
comm. M. A. EpkA(nA, ng), 
signal. running. A. M. nA. nB, 
comm. A. M. Epk,, (nB), 
fake. A. B. E,, kB (nB), 
Signal. commit. B. A. nA. nB ) 
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The trace indicates a failure of the protocol model in meeting the specification 
defined in terms of PRE and corresponds to precisely the same attack as described 
previously in this section. The final event in the trace signal. commit. B. A. nA. nB 
is not preceded by the event signal. running. A. B. nA. nB. The only signal. running 
event in the trace, signal. running. A. M. nA. nB, appears as a consequence of a 
different run of the protocol in which the initiator A confirms they are running 
the protocol with M and not B. 
3.2.5 Summary 
In this section we demonstrated how the model-checker FDR can be used to 
automatically identify an attack on a CSP model of the NSPK protocol. The 
NSPK protocol failed to provide message secrecy and authentication, properties 
that are similar to those required in BSW protocols. In Chapter 4 we adopt 
aspects of the two methods of model checking the NSPK protocol for the analysis 
of BSW protocols. In particular, we use signal events, to report when knowledge 
of interest has been learnt by an agent, in conjunction with an extension of 
the process, PRE, to construct a formal definition of the requirements of BSW 
protocols. BSW protocols aim to provide evidence of illicit file sharing in a fair 
manner, and so, before considering the analysis of BSW protocols in Chapter 4, 
we describe how fairness has been defined formally in [51] regarding the Zhou- 
Gollmann (ZG) Non-repudiation protocol in the next section. 
3.3 Zhou-Gollmann (ZG) Non-repudiation Protocol 
BSW protocols aim to provide evidence of illicit file sharing in a fair manner, 
i. e., evidence of illicit file sharing must be provided to a seller if and only if the 
file has been illicitly shared. A buyer should be unable to deny that they have 
illicitly shared content once they have done so but must not be prosecuted when 
they have not. Such properties appear similar to fair non-repudiation, a desirable 
property that many security protocols aim to provide. The ZG protocol is a fair 
non-repudiation protocol in which a message, m, is transmitted from some agent, 
a, to another, b, such that the each agent may gather evidence proving delivery 
and receipt of the message [63]. A simplified version of the protocol is given 
below: - 
1. a -> b: S, k, (fNRO, b, l, Ek(m)) 
2. b -4 a: Sek6(fNRR, a, l, Ek('ºn)) 
3. a -+ t: S, k, (fsae, b, 1, k) 
4. bHt : Skt (fcoN, a, b, l, k) 
5. aHt: S, kt (fcoN, a, b, 1, k) 
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The values, fNRO, fNRR, fsua and fCON, are flags to identify the step of the 
protocol for which the message was constructed. Similarly, 1 is a label used to 
uniquely identify the run of the protocol for which the message was constructed. 
Agent a's approach is to first send m encrypted under some key unknown 
to b signed by a as proof of origin. Agent b then confirms receipt by signing a 
message for proof of receipt. A third party is used as a notary who now accepts 
a signed message from a that includes the key needed by b to decrypt m. Upon 
receipt, the third party then makes available the final message signed by him and 
sent to either agent upon request. In this section we describe how CSP and FDR 
have been used to analyse the ZG protocol in [51,57,58,56]. 
The ZG protocol is a fair non-repudiation protocol that protects an agent 
from another that they do not trust to behave honestly whilst communicating 
over an unreliable medium [63]. It is not guaranteed that each agent collects 
the evidence they require at precisely the same time, instead the aim is to assert 
that should one agent have collected the evidence then the other agent cannot be 
denied from also accessing such evidence. 
Fairness is guaranteed to an agent only if they faithfully follow the proto- 
col [51], i. e., a well-behaved agent is assured that no other agent may gain an 
advantage by misbehaving. This differs from the conventional DY model, in 
that each agent wishes to protect themselves from the other agent instead of two 
well-behaved agents wishing to be protected from some outside intruder [12]. As 
such the way this class of security protocol is modelled must be adapted in order 
to capture this different environment and behaviour. Figure 3.5 illustrates the 
composition of the well-behaved agent, the misbehaving agent, the trusted third 
party and the unreliable medium. 
Schneider analysed the ZG protocol using the process algebra CSP [51]. He 
verified the protocol against formal definitions of non-repudiation and fairness 
requirements via a hand written proof based on rank functions. Building upon 
Schneider's analysis and drawing from the work of Evans [15], Wei and Heather 
analysed the ZG protocol using CSP and FDR [57], as well as the theorem prover 
PVS [58]. We have already seen how security protocols can be analysed against 
safety properties in Section 3.2 and so in this section we focus our interest only on 
the analysis of fairness as an example of how we may analysed protocols against 
liveness properties. 
Wei and Heather's CSP model of the ZG model [57] is similar to that of 
Roscoe's analysis of the NSPK protocol [47]. The overall system is modelled as the 
parallel composition of a well-behaved agent, a misbehaving agent and a trusted 
third party all of whom communicate via a faulty medium, modelled as a separate 
CSP process. The well-behaved agent acts precisely as defined in the protocol, 
whereas a deductive system is constructed such that the misbehaving agent can 
deduce new information and manipulate the messages they send in order to break 
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Figure 3.5: ZG: Composition of Agents and Unreliable Medium 
the security requirements of the protocol. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, each agent 
communicates with every other over the unreliable medium MED via snd and 
rcv channels, of type AxAxM. A further resilient channel, get, also of type 
AxAxM, is used by the trusted third party to communicate securely with 
both the well-behaved and misbehaving agents. 
The CSP model of the ZG protocol differs primarily to the NSPK protocol 
in how they specify and test against the requirements of the protocol. In this 
section we only include the CSP appropriate for highlighting differences to the 
approach described in Section 3.2. The remainder of this section will describe 
in more detail how the agents are defined as CSP processes, what assertions are 
made about the composition of these elements and the analytical outcomes of the 
formal analysis. 
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3.3.1 Formal Specification of Fairness 
Fairness is defined to be a liveness property stating that certain behaviour must 
occur, as opposed to safety specifications, which demand that certain behaviour 
must not occur. We reason whether a process satisfies liveness properties in the 
stable failures semantic model of CSP (see Section 2.3). 
In order to ensure that the protocol is fair to the initiator, A, it must hold 
that the responder, M, possessing proof of origin implies that proof of receipt 
must be available to A. Hence, SBk., (fcoN, a, b, 1, k) and Seka(fNRO, b, 1, Ek(m)) 
must only be known to b if a has received the message Sskb(fNRR, a, 1, Ek(m)), 
and Sk, (fcoN, a, b, 1, k) is available to a, or has been received, from the trusted 
third party. 
FA IRI,,; t ( tr, R) = 
`daEA-{M, J}, lEGa, kElCa, mEJVta" 
signal. knows. M. Saka(fNRO, M, 1, Ek(m)) in tr 
n signal. knows. M. S, k, (fcoN, a, M, 1, k) in tr 
ý 
get. J. a. S, k, (. fcoN, a, M, 1r/, 
Fýk) 
VR 
v signal. 
knows. a. Sk,,, 4ºNRR, a, 1, Ek(m)) 
¢R 
A signal. knows. a. S, k,, (fcoN, a, M, 1, k) it R 
In order to ensure that the protocol is fair to the responder, a, it must hold 
that if the initiator, b, has proof of receipt then proof of origin must be available 
to a. Hence, S, kr(lCON, a, b, 1, k) andýýS, k, (fNRR, b, 1, Ek(m)) must only be known 
to b if a has received the message S, kb (lNRO, a, 1, Ek(m)), and Saki (fcoN, a, b, 1, k) 
is available to a, or has been received, from the trusted third party. 
FAIRRup(tr, R) = 
daEA-{M, J}, lEGM, 
rkE1CM, 
mEJýIM" 
aignal. knows. M. S, k, (fNRR, M, 1, Ek(m)) in tr 
A signal. knows. M. S, k,, (fcoN, M, a, 1, k) in tr 
get. J. a. S, k,, (fcoN, M, a, 1, k) ¢R 
V signal. 
knows. a. S, k(fNROe a, 1, Ek(m)) ¢R 
A signal. knows. a. Ssk, (fcoN, M, a, 1, k) 0R 
Both fairness properties are defined as liveness specifications, requiring that 
the messages must be available to b but not necessarily already received by b. 
The ZG protocol was refinement checked against such fairness properties, defined 
as process orientated specifications in [56]. The stable failures model is used to 
reason whether the protocol satisfies such specifications. The specification shall 
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also be written in terms of such signal events, which must also be included in the 
model to discern when M is in possession of particular knowledge. 
3.3.2 Well-behaved Agent 
The well-behaved agent is modelled as the process, ALICE, in terms of the 
messages they may send or receive. The well-behaved agent may either complete 
a run of the protocol as initiator or responder. 
The initiator, a, sends a message intended for the chosen responder, b, en- 
crypted under some key unknown to b and signed by a as proof of origin. The 
initiator, a, then expects to receive, in response from b, signed confirmation of 
receipt of the message. Subsequently, the initiator uses the third party, J, as a 
notary, sending him signed message that includes the key needed by b to decrypt 
the encrypted message. Finally, the initiator, a, receives from J the evidence 
that he has made the key, k, available. 
INI T(a, 1, k) = 
snd. a. b. S9ka (fNRo, b, 1, Ek (message. a. b) )ý 
rcv. b. a. Sskb(fNRR, a, 1, Ek(message. a. b)) -º 
fl snd. a. J. Sska(fsva, b, 1, k) -ý bEA-{a, J} 
get. J. a. SskJ(fCON, a, b, 1, k) 
\ FIN(a, {Sakb UNRR, a, I, Ek(message. a. b)), $akj ÜCON, a, bj, k)}) / 
The responder, b, receives a message from the initiator, a, encrypted under 
some key unknown to b and signed by a as proof of origin. The responder, b, then 
returns to b signed confirmation of receipt of the message. Finally, the responder, 
b, receives from J the key, k, to decrypt Ek(message. a. b), contained within the 
message proving that a has made the key, k, available. 
RESP(b) = 
rcv. a. b. S, k, (fNRO, b, 1, Ek(message. a. b)) --ý 
13 snd. 
b. a. S, kb(fNRR, a, 1, Ek(message. a. b)) --> 
aEA-{b, J} get. , l. b. Sakj (fCON, a, b, 1, k) -3 Eý ` FIN(b, {$aka (fNRO, b, I, Ek(message. a. b)), Sskj UCON, a, b, l, k)}) 
The FIN process is included to manufacture signal. knows. a events, indicative 
of the agent knowing particular evidence upon completion of a protocol run. 
FIN (a, E) = 
Q signal. knows. a. e-+FIN(a, E) 
eEE 
The behaviour of the third party, J, is modelled as the process, TTP. Upon 
receipt of a signed message, which includes the key needed by a responder to 
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decrypt an encrypted message, the third party provides the signed evidence, that 
a has made k available, to either agent whenever they require it. 
TTP = 
III ( rcv. a. J. Ska(fsuB, b, 1, k) -i TTP2(a, b, 1, k) 
aEA-{J} 
bEA-{a, J} 
lEG 
WC 
TTP2(a, b, l, k) = 
get. J. a. Sak,, (fcoN, a, b, 1, k) -i TTP2(a, b, 1, k) 
13 get. J. b. Sakj (fCON, a, b, 1, k) -+ TTP2 (a, b, 1, k) 
) 
3.3.3 Misbehaving Agent 
The misbehaving agent is modelled in a similar manner to Roscoe's lazy spy [47], 
as described in Section 3.2.2, although the composition of MALLORY with the 
rest of the system is quite different. The model of the misbehaving agent differs 
only in the set of initial knowledge, the set of facts transmitted as a signal event. 
Any unknown fact contained in an incoming message is added to the set of known 
facts and the possession of appropriate facts can be released on a signal channel. 
The composition of the process, MALLORY, is illustrated in Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.6: ZG: Misbehaving Agent 
., 
In order to ensure our model checking remains tractable the protocol model 
is composed of a small number of agents, messages, keys and labels. In fact M 
is provided only a single label, key and message in his initial knowledge. 
ZK =A UPK u . FC U {skM, lM, kM, message. M. A} 
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A process is defined for every fact that the misbehaving agent, M, does not 
initially know but could learn during a protocol run. Each component process 
starts in a state in which M is ignorant of the fact. The fact can either be 
heard or inferred and then enters a state in which M now knows the fact. In 
this state the fact can still be heard or inferred and remain in a state where the 
fact is known. Likewise, the fact can now be said whilst remaining in the known 
state. Finally, if the fact happens to lie in the messages set, then a signal event 
signal. knows. M. f is used to indicate that M has some fact of interest f in his 
possession. 
The process, MALLORY, is then constructed as the parallel composition 
of all component processes. The misbehaving agent, M, may use his initial 
knowledge as well as his deduced knowledge to say messages as defined by a 
KNOWN process, as described in Section 3.2.2. Two channels get and rcv are 
defined, modelling the event of messages being received from other agents, which 
the intruder can hear. Each outbound say is renamed, such that the intruder 
can send the message from himself over slid. 
3.3.4 Composition 
The overall system is composed of the medium, well-behaved agent, misbehaving 
agent and the third party all acting in parallel, synchronising on all the events 
that they share. Figure 3.5 illustrates the composition of the process, MODEL. 
The ZG protocol is designed to be used over some unreliable medium, sus- 
ceptible to message losses. The definition of the medium is of little concern to us 
when learning techniques for modelling BSW protocols, as we shall assume com- 
munication over a reliable but insecure channel, as defined by the DY model [12], 
although we shall relax this assumption in Chapter 6. As such we define an 
unreliable medium with limited behaviour that is enough to demonstrate the 
key aspects of modelling the ZG protocol whilst keeping the state-space very 
manageable. A single message shall be placed onto the medium, which non- 
deterministically resolves whether the message will be lost or delivered to its 
intended recipient in the next step, after which the medium will accept the trans- 
mission of another message. 
MEDIUM = snd? a? b? m -> (rcv. a. b. m -* MEDIUM n lost -a MEDIUM) 
The well-behaved agent may act as either initiator or responder defined as an 
interleaving between a single run of the protocol as initiator and a single run of 
the protocol as responder. 
ALICE = INIT(A, 1A, kA) III RESP(A) 
Fairness is guaranteed to an agent only if they act honestly, i. e., a well-behaved 
agent, who follows the protocol strictly, is assured that no misbehaving agent may 
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gain an advantage by not faithfully following the protocol. This differs from the 
conventional DY model, in that each agent wishes to protect themselves from 
the other agent instead of two honest agents wishing to be protected from some 
outside intruder [12]. As such the CSP model of the ZG protocol is composed 
differently to that of the NSPK protocol, in order to capture the difference in 
behaviour and environment. 
We do not assume that the misbehaving agent has full control over the net- 
work. The well-behaved agent wishes to protect himself from the misbehaving 
agent whilst communicating over an unreliable medium. As such we need not 
perform the renaming necessary in Section 3.2.3. The same is true of the process, 
JEEVES, which simply allows J to perform the role of the third party. 
JEEVES = TTP 
A and M share messages during numerous runs of the protocol, defined as 
a finite set of messages, {message. A. M, message. M. A}, for model checking in 
FDR. The messages are encrypted by the initiator under a key that remains 
secret to the responder until released by the trusted third party in due course. It 
can be analysed whether the misbehaving agent, M, whose behaviour is modelled 
by the process, MALLORY, can manipulate runs of the protocol such that the 
well-behaved agent, A, is unable to gather evidence for non-repudiation in a fair 
manner, i. e., M is unable to break the security requirements of the protocol. 
MODEL= ((ALICE 111 MALLORY) 11 JEEVES) 11 MEDIUM 
{Igeti} {Iand, rcvl} 
3.3.5 Alternative Approach 
We have extended the model described by Wei such that a deduction system be 
defined for the well-behaved agent, A, enabling A to announce their knowledge 
of evidence via aignal. know8. A events, as included in the specification above. In 
fact, we developed this approach whilst constructing our CSP models of BSW 
protocols and have applied it to the ZG protocol retrospectively. For a more 
detailed explanation of how to model security protocols to include a deductive 
system for all agents the reader is referred to Section 4.3.2. 
The same approach could be applied to the modelling of the well-behaved 
agents of the NSPK protocol. In this case no additional signal events need be 
generated by the deductive systems of the well-behaved agents, as their knowledge 
is not considered in the specification. However, running the existing well-behaved 
agent process in parallel with the newly defined deductive system would ensure 
that messages can be sent by the well-behaved agent only at a time when he has 
sufficient knowledge to construct the message to be sent. 
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The FIN process is no longer required to manufacture signal. knows. a events 
in the INIT and RESP processes as the deductive system of the honest agent 
shall now provide them. The same is true of the RESP process, which must be 
amended similarly. 
INIT(a, l, k) = 
snd. a. b. Sska(fNRO, b, 1, Ek(message. a. b)) -> 
--ý fl rcv. 
b. a. Sskb(fNRR, a, 1, Ek (message. a. b)) 
bEA-{a, J} snd. a. J. Sska(fsua, b, 1, k) -+ 
get. J. a. Sskj (fcoN, a, b, 1, k) -4 STOP ) Next, the strict behaviour of the well-behaved agent is defined as ALICE was 
previously, as the interleaving of the initiator role and responder role. 
STRA = INIT(A, lA, kA) III RESP(A) 
The new definition of ALICE shall instead be constructed as a parallel compo- 
sition of the newly defined STRA process and the yet to be defined DEDA process. 
Originally, the deductive system DED was constructed for use by MALLORY. 
However, we have also found it useful for monitoring the knowledge of the well- 
behaved agents. We must be able to distinguish between each agents deductive 
system and so the appropriate processes must now be parameterized by the iden- 
tity of each agent aE A-{J}. The only difference between each agent's deductive 
system, including that of the misbehaving agent, is the initial knowledge of each 
agent, DC, and the parameterization of the signal. knows. a event with the cor- 
rect agent's identity, aEA- {J}. Like M, the initial knowledge provided to A 
is constructed of the set of all agents, all public keys, all flags and the secret key 
of A, as well as a single label, key and message. 
Z1CA =AU P1C U FG U {skA, lA, kA, message. A. M} 
Running the two processes STRA and DEDA in parallel ensures that messages 
can be sent by the well-behaved agent only at a time when he has sufficient knowl- 
edge to construct the message to be sent. As the two processes synchronize only 
on the snd, rcv and get events the signal events, produced by the well-behaved 
agent's deductive system, are made available to the overall system whenever they 
are made available by the deductive system. 
ALICE = 
STRA ýI DEDA[get. J. A, rcv. p. A, snd. A/hear, hear, sayl { land, rcv, getl } where p4-A- {A, J} 
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Other than the amendments to the process, ALICE, and the parameterization 
of the deductive system, DEDM, in MALLORY to distinguish it from DEDA, 
we make no other changes to the model or the specification. The construction 
of the overall system remains as a parallel composition of the processes ALICE, 
MALLORY and JEEVES. 
MODEL= ((ALICE III MALLORY) 11 JEEVES) 11 MEDIUM 
{Igetl} {Isnd, rcvl} 
3.3.6 Analytical Outcomes 
When model checking the ZG protocol using either of the approaches described 
previously in this section, no attack is found. It is important to note that we have 
modelled only a small finite state system and such results alone do not prove the 
security of the protocol in general. 
In [51], Schneider provides a formal verification of the ZG protocol in the gen- 
eral case by producing a hand written proof making use of rank functions. In [15], 
Evans demonstrates how the safety properties of non-repudiation of receipt and 
non-repudiation of origin can be embedded within PVS to reproduce the veri- 
fication of such properties using a theorem prover, which is useful in avoiding 
pitfalls of the often erroneous task of producing hand written proofs. Wei and 
Heather [58], extended the work of Evans by also embedding liveness properties 
of fairness into PVS. Wei and Heather also demonstrated that a finite CSP model 
of the system could be model checked in FDR [57]. 
In each of these analyses of the ZG protocol it was assumed that the protocol 
participants have limitless memory. It is fairly intuitive to assume that the well- 
behaved agent, A, will always hold onto to all evidence of proof of origin and 
receipt. However, storage of the values used in each run of the protocol may 
become impractical in its implementation and a decision may be made to limit 
the amount of archiving performed in each protocol run. It has been shown that 
such a decision leads to the failure of the protocol to meet its requirements [20]. 
We have verified such an attack in FDR by modifying the model we constructed 
using our alternative approach proposed in Section 3.3.5. 
3.3.7 Identifying the Gärgens and Rudolph Attack in CSP and 
FDR 
If the protocol participants considered to have anything but perfect memory it 
has been shown that the ZG protocol is flawed [20]. M and A may success- 
fully complete a run of the protocol sharing a message encrypted under some 
key, Ekk(mesaage. M. A). The misbehaving agent, M, thus records the evidence, 
EakA (%NRR, M, iM, EkM (message. M. A)) and E, k, (ICON , M, A, iM, km). A is not so 
conscientious and eventually he fails to recall the evidence relating to this run of 
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the protocol. Subsequently, M uses the same symmetric key and label to initiate 
a new run of the protocol for a different message message'. M. A. The misbe- 
having agent, M, gathers the evidence, EskA(fNRR) M, lM, EkM(message'. M. A)), 
before halting the protocol after Step 2. Thus M is able to deceive an arbitrator, 
convincing them that A has received message'. M. A by presenting the evidence, 
ESkA(fNRR, M, lM, EkM(message'. M. A)) and EBk,, (fcoN, M, A, IM, kM), without A 
having the required knowledge to derive message'. M. A. 
In the remainder of this section we shall construct a CSP model of the ZG 
protocol that includes such forgetful behaviour in order to demonstrate that fail- 
ures of protocols in meeting liveness properties can be identified using CSP and 
FDR. We modify the behaviour of the well-behaved agent A, such that A per- 
forms two sequential runs of the protocol as responder, forgetting the evidence 
gathered in the first protocol run before beginning the second. 
The process, ALICE; ALICE, is constructed as the sequential composition 
of two instances of the process, ALICE, after amending ALICE to enable the 
process to successfully terminate. In Section 3.3.5, we defined ALICE as the 
parallel composition of the strict behaviour, STRA, and the deductive system, 
DEDA. The deductive system enabled A to infer facts from others building 
knowledge over time. A simple way of modelling forgetful behaviour is to allow 
the termination of one deductive system, DEDA, and begin a new instance of 
DEDA, which returns the current knowledge back to the initial knowledge of A. 
To trigger the termination of the deductive system, and therefore wipe the 
memory of A, we amend RESP(b) such that it shall perform the event, wipe. b, 
upon completion of a single run of the protocol, after which the process terminates 
successfully. 
RESP(b) = 
rcv. a. b. Seka(fNRO, b, 1, Ek(message. a. b)) -ý 
cl snd. 
b. a. S, kb(fNRR, a, 1, Ek(message. a. b)) -ý 
aEA-{b, J} get. J. b. Sskj 
(fcoN, a, b, 1, k) -ý 
kEý wipe. 
b -+ SKIP 
Synchronising STRA = RESP(A), i. e., the process modelling the strict agent 
behaviour, on the event, wipe, with the deductive system, DEDA, amended below 
to interrupt the normal execution with the process, wipe. A -4 SKIP, shall trig- 
ger the termination of DEDA once a single run of the protocol has successfully 
terminated. 
DEDA =(chase((IlfEGA (IGNA(f), aIGNA(f))) \ {1 infer 1}) III KNOWNA) 
Ewipe. A -* SKIP 
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ALICE = 
STRA II DEDAQget. J. A, rcv. p. A, snd. A/hear, hear, sayl 
flsnd, ricv, get, wipe. A1} where p4-A-{A, J} 
Finally, we construct the overall system as the following process, MODEL, by 
running the process modelling the forgetful well-behaved agent, ALICE; ALICE, 
in parallel with the misbehaving agent, MALLORY, the third party and the 
unreliable medium. 
MODEL= 
(((ALICE; ALICE) III MALLORY) 11 JEEVES) MEDIUM 
{1getl} {Iand, rcvl} 
However, following a single run of the protocol the fairness requirements re- 
garding the first message can be immediately broken as A may forget the evidence 
relating to a message from the first run of the protocol before M announces he 
has his evidence. Such a failure is demonstrated by the following trace/refusal 
pair. 
FAIRS ¢F MODEL 
((snd. M. A. S, kM (fNRO, A, IM, EkM (message'. M. A)), 
ncv. M. A. S, kM(fNRO, A, IM, EkM(message'. M. A)), 
snd. A. M. S, kA(fNRR, M, Im, Et, (message'. M. A)), 
rcv. A. M. SskA(fNRR, M, IM, EkM (message'. M. A)), 
Bnd. M. J. S, kM//(tfsuB, A, Im, kM), 
fýCV. M. J. S, kMýIsUB, A, IM, kM), 
get. A. M. S, k, (fcoN, M, A, IM, kM), 
get. J. M. S, k, (fcoN, M, A, IM, kM), 
wipe. A, 
signal. knows. M. S, kA(fNRR, M, IM, EkM (message'. M. A)), 
signal. knows. M. S, k, (fcoN, M, A, IM, kM)), R) 
where 8ignal. knowa. A. S, ki, ÜNROe A, iM, Ek, (message'. M. A)) E R, 
signal. knows. A. S, * ., (fCoN, A, lM, Ek. (message'. M. A)) E R, 
get. J. A. S, k, a(feoN, A, Im, Ekw (message'. M. A)) ER 
Our CSP model of the ZG protocol fails to meet the formal specification we 
defined of the customers' requirement and each counterexample provided by FDR 
corresponds to the same failure to meet its requirements. FDR can generate up to 
100 counterexamples and due to the manner in which the state space is explored 
these shall be the 100 shortest traces leading to an attack. 
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Each of the 100 trace/refusal pairs generated for our CSP model of the ZG 
protocol correspond to the `same' attack. That is, only insignificant differences 
occur between the traces, e. g., the order of the two signal. knows events is switched 
or insignificant messages are sent by the MALLORY and lost by MED. 
With subtle changes to the model we can explore traces that lead to failures 
beyond the 100 examples generated originally. By restricting the behaviour of 
the protocol, such that the responder will only send the non-repudiation message 
regarding message'. M. A once he has first sent the message message'. M. A. This 
ensures that a run of the protocol in which message. M. A is issued by M precedes 
a run of the protocol in which message'. M. A is issued by M. 
RESTRICTION = 
snd. A. M. SskA(fNRR, M, lM, EkM(message. M. A)) -> 
snd. A. M. S9kA(fNRR, M, lm, EkM(message'. M. A)) --> STOP 
FAIRResp ¢F MODEL 11 RESTRICTION 
{Isnd. A. MI} 
((snd. M. A. SskM(fNRO, A, lM, EkM(message. M. A)), 
rcv. M. A. SskM(fNRO, A, lM, EkM(message. M. A)), 
snd. A. M. SskA(fNRR, M, lM, EkM(message. M. A)), 
rcv. A. M. SskA(fNRR, M, lM, EkM(message. M. A)), 
snd. M. J. SskM (fsua, A, lM, kM), 
rcv. M. J. SskM (fsua, A, lM, kM), 
get. A. M. Ssk, (fcoN, M, A, lM, kM), 
get. J. M. Ssk,, (fcoN, M, A, lM, kM), 
wipe. A, 
snd. M. A. SskM(fNRO, A, lm, EkM(message'. M. A)), 
ncv. M. A. SskM (fNRO, A, lm, EkM (message'. M. A)), 
snd. A. M. SskA(fNRR, M) lM, EkM (message'. M. A)), 
rcv. A. M. SskA(fNRR) M, lM, EkM(message'. M. A)), 
signal. knows. M. SskA(fNRR, M, lM, EkM (message'. M. A)), 
signal. knows. M. Ssk, (fcoN, M, A, lM, kM)), R) 
where signal . knows . A. 
Sek,,, (fcoN, A, iM, EkM(message'. M. A)) E R, 
get. J. A. S9kM (fcoN, A, lm, EkM (message'. M. A)) ER 
Gärgens and Rudolph imply that the evidence may not be forgotten but 
that A simply does not realise that the messages he has received previously may 
contain the key needed to decrypt the message and that the evidence from the first 
run of the protocol S, k,, (fcoN, M, A, 1M, km) can be used in this second run of the 
protocol. The above counterexample, generated by FDR when analysing under 
the restriction, corresponds to the attack presented by Gürgens and Rudolph [20]. 
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We have focussed on the specification of the fairness properties of the ZG 
protocol as an example of a liveness property. We shall see in Section 4.3.1 and 
Chapter 5 the definition of aliveness property for BSW protocols in failures to 
satisfy it. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have demonstrated how two security protocols have been mod- 
elled using the process algebra, CSP, and analysed using the model checker, FDR. 
The failure of the NSPK protocol to meets its security requirements, even in its 
three message form, demonstrated that security protocols are systems that are 
easily expressed but difficult to evaluate. Such systems frequently find value in 
the use formal methods [49]. The NSPK protocol had been assumed secure for 
over 15 years prior to the published attack by Lowe [29]. The CSP approach 
to modelling and analysing the NSPK protocol demonstrates its effectiveness at 
automatically finding attacks on security protocols. 
We described a formal approach to the analysis two protocols such that we 
may adopt concepts from each in order to analyse BSW protocols in Chapter 4. 
We have described the analysis of the NSPK protocol to demonstrate how Roscoe 
captured message secrecy and agent authentication as safety properties, and as 
such analysed the protocol using the traces semantic model of CSP. The analysis 
of the ZG protocol was described in Section 3.3, as an example of a protocol 
aiming to satisfy properties of fairness, examples of liveness properties that were 
analysed using the stable failures model of CSP. 
A contribution of our work was to compose CSP models of security protocols 
to include multiple deductive systems. Deductive systems representing the build- 
ing of knowledge by both well-behaved and misbehaving agents were constructed 
such that they produced the signal events used during analysis in an efficient 
manner, following Roscoe's construction of the lazy spy [47]. We demonstrated 
that the fair non-repudiation protocol proposed by Zhou and Gollmann [63] could 
be modelled in this manner in Section 3.3.5, and used such a construction to ver- 
ify the Gärgens and Rudolph attack on the ZG protocol using FDR. We also 
demonstrated that, with subtle changes to the model, we can explore traces that 
lead to failures beyond the 100 shortest traces generated in FDR. 
Chapter 4 
The CSP Approach to 
Modelling and Analysing 
Buyer-Seller Watermarking 
(BSW) Protocols 
This chapter presents our novel approach to the modelling and analysis of BSW 
protocols using CSP and FDR. Memon and Wong coined the term Buyer-Seller 
Watermarking (BSW) upon construction of their protocol as a copy deterrence 
solution to the problem of illicit file sharing [32]. The protocol was subsequently 
used as a basis for the design of many such protocols [28,23,22,241. In particu- 
lar, each of these protocols adopt the novel approach of the Memon-Wong (MW) 
protocol, which was to conduct the watermark embedding in the encrypted do- 
main. However, only an informal security analysis was provided alongside the 
MW protocol and subsequently, in [28], Lei et al. identified a failure of the MW 
protocol in meeting its requirements. 
When describing our formal approach to the modelling and analysis of BSW 
protocols, we use the MW protocol as a case study. By using our approach to 
verify Lei et al. 's attack on the MW protocol we shall demonstrate its ability in 
automatically generating traces, or trace/refusal pairs, indicative of a failure of a 
BSW protocol failing to meet its requirements. We model the MW protocol, and 
specify its requirements, as CSP processes and use FDR to check whether the 
model refines the specifications. Such an approach is based upon that described 
in Chapter 3, which we demonstrated to be successful at automatically identifying 
flaws in security protocols. We also describe the Poh-Martin (PM) framework, 
that was constructed for the design and analysis of BSW protocols, and perform 
our analysis of the MW protocol consistent with the assumptions made in [41]. 
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4.1 Overview 
The major benefit of digital media is the ease with which multimedia content can 
be duplicated and disseminated on a large scale. However, copyright owners are 
faced with the task of limiting these activities so that they may make a financial 
gain from licensing such content. 
Copy deterrence mechanisms allow copyrighted content to be illicitly shared 
but discourage consumers from engaging in such activity by enabling copyright 
owners to punish them when they do. It has been proposed that robust digital 
watermarking be used to discourage illicit duplication and dissemination of copy- 
righted material by embedding an imperceptible identifying mark within digital 
content to trace any illicit file sharing back to the original owner [5]. 
Typically, copyright owners punish those consumers believed to have been 
illicitly sharing content either by blacklisting or prosecution. Blacklisting usu- 
ally requires copyright owners to convince themselves of the illicit activity of a 
consumer, such that they carry out no further transactions with the misbehaving 
party, whereas prosecuting the consumer requires copyright owners to provide 
sufficient evidence of illicit file sharing to some arbitrator. 
Pfitzmann and Schunter observed that previous schemes, in which the seller 
chose the watermark, failed to provide a seller with adequate evidence, for pros- 
ecution of illicit file sharing by a buyer, as they are unable to identify the agent 
acting illicitly [37]. Even if the seller is convinced of the buyer's illegal activity, 
whilst the seller has acted honestly throughout, the seller remains unable to prove 
that it was not they that leaked the watermarked content. Qiao and Nahrstedt 
asserted that new protocols were required to accompany existing watermarking 
schemes to prevent this issue, known as the customers' rights [45]. 
In response, Buyer-Seller Watermarking (BSW) protocols have been proposed 
with the aim of distributing watermarked content from a seller to a buyer in a 
manner that protects the rights of both parties. The seller wishes to hold sufficient 
evidence to prove to an arbiter that the source of an illicitly shared file can be 
traced to the buyer responsible. However, the buyer must be assured that no 
seller is able to fabricate evidence of illicit file sharing against them. 
BSW protocols are a new class of security protocol, i. e., some message ex- 
change aiming to achieve one or more security related goals. Vulnerabilities in 
security protocols frequently occur, not because the encryption has been bro- 
ken, but because the associated message exchange leaks information after clever 
manipulation by an active adversary [30]. By abstracting the underlying cryp- 
tographic primitives and reasoning that the message exchange alone is not open 
to attack, we can be confident that the security objectives will be achieved if 
the encryption is suitably robust. Memon and Wong made a similar observa- 
tion of BSW protocols in [32]. Should a BSW protocol meet its objectives then 
the security of the overall system should be dependent only on the underling 
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cryptographic primitives and the robustness of the digital watermarking scheme. 
Motivated by the ad-hoc approach to the design and analysis of BSW proto- 
cols present in the literature, Poh and Martin constructed a framework providing 
a firm foundation for constructing and analysing such protocols 1421. In addition 
Poh and Martin concluded that the formal analysis of the security of such schemes 
is a research direction worth pursuing (411. In this chapter we demonstrate how 
to construct CSP models of BSW protocols with reference to the MW protocol as 
a case study. We use the model checker, FDR, to analyse our CSP model of the 
MW protocol against the primary requirements of BSW protocols, as described 
by Poh and Martin, under the consistent set of assumptions provided by their 
framework. 
We provide a general approach to the modelling and analysis of BSW protocols 
using the CSP approach presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 5 we shall use 
FDR to analyse CSP models of BSW protocols against the formal specification 
of the protocol requirements defined in this chapter. Should a protocol fail to 
meet its requirements, FDR automatically generates an appropriate trace, or 
trace/refusals pair, indicative of the attack. 
Our general approach is such that modelling multiple BSW protocols un- 
der consistent assumptions results in minimal differences between each protocol 
model. Each model differs only in each agents initial knowledge, IK0, the strict 
behaviour of each agents, STR0, and the set of all messages involved in each 
protocol, M. Additionally, only subtle alterations need be made to each protocol 
model to cause the significant differences in behaviour expected under alterna- 
tive assumptions to those proposed by the PM framework, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 6. 
4.2 The Poh-Martin (PM) Framework 
In [421, Poh and Martin proposed a general framework for the design and analysis 
of BSW protocols, composed of two parts: the fundamentals, concerning the de- 
sired properties of BSW protocols; and the environment, concerning the practical 
elements currently available for implementing BSW protocols. We shall adopt 
many of the assumptions proposed in the more detailed description of Poh and 
Martin's framework contained in [411 as a basis for analysing BSW protocols in 
this chapter and in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 2 we provided the necessary background concerning the practical 
element of BSW protocols, in particular the building blocks including digital wa- 
termarking, digital signatures, hash functions and watermarking in the encrypted 
domain. The Poh-Martin (PM) framework also includes other important practi- 
cal considerations of BSW protocols such as computing resources and efficiency 
of the protocols, which lie outside the scope of this thesis. 
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In this section, we describe the fundamentals of BSW protocols, as defined in 
the PM framework, in particular those concerning BSW protocol requirements, 
trust assumptions and threats, such that our formal approach to the analysis of 
BSW protocols may be conducted inline with the framework. It is common for a 
BSW protocol to be constructed under certain assumptions of the environment 
and then analysed under others, resulting in inconsistent evaluation of protocols. 
Adopting the assumptions described in the PM framework shall enable us to 
evaluate each protocol against a single set of explicit assumptions. However, 
we shall demonstrate in Chapter 6 that our approach enables us to consistently 
analyse protocols under alternative assumptions with only minor modifications 
made to our CSP models. 
Requirements 
The PM framework defines three primary requirements of BSW protocols: trace- 
ability, the source of an illicitly shared file can be traced by the seller to the 
buyer responsible; framing resistance, a buyer cannot be falsely accused of illic- 
itly sharing content; and non-repudiation of redistribution, the buyer responsible 
for illicitly sharing content is unable to deny such an act. Poh and Martin also 
state that aspects of privacy, anonymity and unlinkability are common secondary 
requirements of BSW protocols and should payment be involved then fair ex- 
change is a desirable property. These additional properties are out of the scope 
of this thesis although we propose a natural extension of our work to analyse 
BSW protocols against such requirements in Chapter 8. 
Non-repudiation of redistribution strengthens the traceability requirement 
such that not only can the seller determine the source of an illicitly shared file to 
a specific buyer but that they can prove this to an arbiter. Poh and Martin also 
state that framing resistance is a prerequisite of non-repudiation of distribution 
as, without it, the buyer can claim that the seller was responsible for illicitly 
sharing the file. 
We shall analyse our CSP models of BSW protocols against two formal re- 
quirements, specified in Section 4.3.1: the Sellers' Requirement, if a buyer illicitly 
shares content, the seller must immediately hold sufficient evidence to prove who 
was responsible for such illicit activity to some arbiter; and the Buyers' Require- 
ment, that no seller should hold sufficient evidence of illicit file sharing by a buyer 
when the buyer has not shared such content. 
Trust Assumptions 
The PM framework explicates the trust relationships assumed to exist amongst 
the protocol participants. No buyer and seller are assumed to trust one another, 
i. e., either party may try to manipulate the message exchange in order to gain 
an advantage over the other. It is the aim of a misbehaving buyer to illicitly 
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share content without the seller ever being able to gather sufficient evidence to 
form a case against him and the aim of a misbehaving seller to gather sufficient 
evidence of a buyer sharing content that they have never shared. Conversely, it 
is the objective of the protocol to prevent a misbehaving agent achieving either 
of these aims. 
The certification authority that distributes digital certificates is assumed to 
be fully trusted, i. e., he shall only ever distribute valid digital certificates and shall 
be the only party able to do so. Similarly, messages signed by the third party shall 
be trusted to be constructed in a manner strictly defined in the protocol design, 
that is the third party is assumed to never manipulate the message exchange in 
order to cause the protocol to fail to meet its requirements. 
Threats 
The PM framework explicitly assumes that communication between agents par- 
ticipating in a BSW protocol is susceptible to attack by a misbehaving agent 
acting as a Dolev-Yao (DY) saboteur [12], as was introduced during the analysis 
of the NSPK protocol in Section 3.2. Under such an assumption the misbehaving 
agent may overhear, intercept or spoof messages sent between any two agents. 
Our analysis must allow the misbehaving agent to act as an outsider, i. e., a party 
that performs neither role of the protocol but manipulates the message of a trans- 
action between some other buyer and seller, or allow the misbehaving agent to 
perform the role of a buyer or seller in one or more protocol runs, either as himself 
or by impersonating another agent. 
4.3 Memon-Wong (MW) Protocol 
The Memon-Wong (MW) protocol, [32], was proposed in response to Qiao and 
Nahrstedt's assertion, that new protocols were required to accompany existing 
watermarking schemes to the customers' rights issue [45]. The protocol aims to 
distribute watermarked content from a seller to a buyer in a manner that protects 
the rights of both parties. 
The approach taken in [32] to meet the requirements, of both buyer and 
sellers, was to demand that the seller to conduct the watermark embedding in the 
encrypted domain, using the properties of homomorphic encryption. In general, 
watermark embedding in the encrypted domain involves embedding an encrypted 
watermark, Epk(w), into the encrypted digital content, Epk(x), such that: - 
WM(Epk(x), Epk(w)) = Epk(WM(X 9 w)) 
With knowledge of some public key, pk, the original content, x, and the en- 
crypted watermark Epk(w), the seller is able to generate the watermarked content, 
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Epk(WM(x, W))- It follows that should the seller never be allowed to the secret 
key, sk, he is unable to calculate WM (x, w) or w. It is by withholding such 
knowledge of the watermark and the watermarked content from the seller that 
the MW protocol inhibits the buyer from claiming that the some illicit copy of 
the watermarked content was leaked by the seller and not the buyer. 
Memon and Wong provided an example construction using the watermarking 
scheme proposed in [8], as described in Section 2.2, in which the watermark is 
constructed as a sequence of n independent real numbers, which are to be inserted 
into the n largest AC coefficients of x. Each watermark element, xi, is inserted 
into the corresponding frequency coefficient xi using the formula, xi = xi (1 +a wi ), 
where a is some small constant, to produce the watermarked content, WM (x, w). 
Watermark embedding in the encrypted domain, relies on the chosen public 
key cryptosystem used being a privacy homomorphism with respect to watermark 
insertion. The example construction provided uses RSA, to encrypt the n largest 
AC coefficients of x, (xl, x2,.. -, xn), to produce, (Epk(xi), Epk(xz), ... , Epk(x)). 
Watermark embedding involves adjusting each value, xi, using the corresponding 
watermark element, wi. Using the muliplicatively homomorphic property of RSA, 
as described in Section 2.1, watermark insertion is performed using the formula, 
ä; = xi(1+ awi), to adjust the appropriate coefficients in the encrypted domain: - 
Epk(A) = Enk(xi (1 +awi)) = Epk(xi)"Epk(1 + aw+) 
In such a scenario the seller must be provided, Epk(1 + aw), herein referred 
to as the encrypted watermark, Epk(w). 
Epk(w) = (Epk(1 + am), Epk(1 + awZ), ..., 
Epk(1 + aw, a)), 
The seller must be assured that the watermark, that he knows only in en- 
crypted form but may later be required to uniquely identify the buyer responsible 
for illicitly sharing some content, was generated as a sequence of n independent 
real numbers drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, i. e., 
N(0,1). As such, Memon and Wong proposed the use of a trusted third party to 
certify that the watermark is well formed. The message sequence chart, provided 
in Figure 4.1, illustrates the two stages of the MW protocol. 
During the watermark generation stage of the protocol, the buyer receives 
encrypted watermarks froma third party, signed to certify that they are well- 
formed, S, (Epkb(w)). In the watermark insertion stage of the protocol, the buyer 
sends to the seller the signed encrypted watermark, along with an indication of 
what digital content the buyer wishes to purchase, arg(x). 
As the seller is now in possession of the encrypted watermark, Epk, (w), and 
can construct the encrypted content, Epkb(x), they calculate the encrypted value, 
Epk. (WM(x, up(w))), by performing the embedding in the encrypted domain 
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Figure 4.1: MW Protocol 
without ever knowing the watermark or the watermarked content in the clear. 
An indexing watermark v is first embedded to avoid an exhaustive search being 
performed. A permutation function with the property ap(Epk(w)) = Epk(ap(w)), 
permutes the order of the watermark elements before embedding, where pEP is 
a reordering taken from the set of all n! possible reorderings. It is said that since 
the seller has permuted the watermark elements, the buyer is unable to remove 
the watermark from the watermarked content even though he can evaluate w by 
decrypting Epkb(w) using his secret key (32]. 
The probability that a buyer could guess the permutation correctly is -n1T1 
However, without the original content the buyer has no way of verifying that their 
guess of how the watermark elements were permuted is correct. As such they are 
unlikely to use such a guess to attempt to remove the watermark as there is a 
high probability that the watermark will remain embedded within the content. 
We model the permutation of a watermark as, ap, (w), where p, E P, is drawn 
from a set of sequence reorderings that may be chosen by a seller, 8. We assume 
that each set of orderings P where sEA, are distinct to model the inability 
of any other agent guessing how the watermark elements have been permuted. 
62 
However, the ordering, p,, can clearly be determined given a watermark, w, and 
its permutation, CP, (w). 
In this chapter and in Chapter 5, we shall demonstrate our success in iden- 
tifying flaws in BSW protocols, even when adopting such a conservative approx- 
imation of the properties of the permutation function and of informed one-bit 
watermarking. In Chapter 7, we shall re-evaluate the properties inherent in 
Memon and Wong's example construction to investigate whether a buyer is truly 
unable to remove the permuted watermark when knowing w, as claimed in [32]. 
When distributing watermarked content by following the MW protocol it 
should be possible, once an illicitly shared file is intercepted by the seller, for the 
original owner to be traced and this proven to an arbitrator without the buyer 
bearing any plausible claim that the seller fabricated the evidence. However, no 
formal approach was used in the security analysis presented alongside the protocol 
and subsequently Lei et al. proposed their unbinding attack on the protocol [28]. 
We shall demonstrate how our formal approach can be used to identify the 
failure of the MW protocol in meeting its requirements in Section 4.3.5. We use 
the MW protocol as a concrete example for describing the construction of com- 
ponent processes within a BSW protocol model. However, the general approach 
that we present in this section is used to model and analyse a number of BSW 
protocols in Chapter 5. 
As in the analysis of the NSPK protocol, we assume that at most a single 
party misbehaves and the others follow the protocol strictly. It is then the aim of 
the protocol to guarantee that the misbehaving party cannot gain an advantage 
over the others through his actions. BSW protocols are typically proposed in 
terms of three roles, namely buyers, sellers and third parties. We construct the 
CSP process MODEL to express the protocol behaviour as a parallel composition 
of two well-behaved agents, A and B, with a single third party, J, and the 
misbehaving agent M, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Each agent shares an insecure communication channel Comm EAXAXM 
susceptible to attack by a misbehaving agent M who acts as a DY saboteur [12]. 
Any agent, including the misbehaving agent, M, may synchronise on the commu- 
nication of a message from one agent to another. In addition, M may intercept 
or spoof messages sent between any two agents over the take and fake channels. 
Overhearing, as assumed in the DY model, is modelled by a take and subsequent 
fake of the same message, i. e., the message is rerouted via the misbehaving agent 
although the sender or recipient remain unaware of this. 
The following sections describe the construction of the agent processes, ALICE 
and BOB, as a parallel composition of the following two processes: STRO, mod- 
elling the strict agent behaviour specified in the protocol's design; and rDEDa, 
the renamed deductive system of the agent, aEA- {M, J}. 
By synchronising the renamed deductive system, rDEDa, and strict agent 
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behaviour, STRa,, on the transmission of messages of the protocol, i. e., the trans 
events, each agent will send messages only when they can be constructed from 
their current knowledge and only at a time allowed by the protocol. Likewise, 
each agent shall only accept an incoming message at an appropriate time dictated 
by the protocol design. 
We also describe the construction of a process, JEEVES, modelling the strict 
behaviour followed by the third party, J, and the construction of a misbehaving 
agent process MALLORY that shall accept any message, from the processes, 
ALICE, BOB and JEEVES, that follow the protocol precisely, and send any 
message that such agents are willing to accept. We conclude with a precise 
description of how to compose such processes into the protocol model, MODEL, 
and its analysis against the protocol requirements. 
4.3.1 Formal Specification of BSW Protocol Requirements 
Inline with the requirements of BSW protocols described in Section 4.2, we have 
two cases to consider as a consequence of the differing perspectives of buyers and 
sellers. 
The honest seller requires that whenever he comes across watermarked con- 
tent, by downloading it from some file sharing network, he must immediately 
have in his possession all the evidence needed to identify the dishonest buyer as 
the party originally responsible for releasing the content. If honest consumers 
are to accept the protocol as a method of purchasing copyrighted content they 
require that no dishonest seller can ever be in possession of the evidence needed 
to accuse the buyer of file sharing if no such file sharing took place. 
The sellers' requirement is an example of a liveness property because requir- 
ing that evidence be immediately available, once illicitly shared content is down- 
loaded, is an expectation that particular behaviour must occur. Conversely, the 
buyers' requirement that no seller is able to fabricate evidence of piracy against 
them demands that certain behaviour must not occur and is thus defined as a 
safety property. We therefore reason whether the CSP model of a protocol, as 
constructed in Section 4.3.4, meets the sellers' and customers' requirements in the 
traces and stable failures semantic models of CSP, respectively. A more detailed 
explanation of these two semantic models is provided in Section 2.3. 
Sellers' Requirement 
The first specification, SPECB, addresses the requirement of a well-behaved seller, 
B, who demands that once they download some watermarked content that they 
sold, they must immediately have knowledge of all evidence required to prosecute 
the buyer who originally shared the content, bEA- {B, J}. 
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Model checking becomes intractable unless the protocol model is composed 
of a small number of agents, keys, and messages. We have already stated that 
the models we construct are to include just two well-behaved agents, A and B, 
a single third party, J, and a misbehaving agent M. In each model A will be 
willing to perform at least one run of the protocol as a buyer, and B will be 
willing to perform at least one run of the protocol as a seller. This shall enable 
us to model check against the requirements of a single seller B. 
We need only find a single failure in order to demonstrate the failure of the pro- 
tocol in meeting its requirements. To demonstrate that the protocol fails to meet 
the requirements of the seller, B, it is enough to show that the refinement fails 
when considering a specific piece of watermarked content, WM (XB, Up,, ( WJ)). 
In this case Memon and Wong expect the set of evidence, 16VB(b), to be sufficient 
evidence for B to prosecute the buyer who purchased the content, bEA- {B, J}, 
for illicit file sharing of WM (XB, 0 PB ( WJ)) 
EVB(b) - 
WM (XB, aPB (WA), 
Sak ( Epka ( W. 1) ) 
The specification, SPECB, demands that an event signalling the seller B 
has downloaded a shared file, signal. download. B. W M (XB, QPB (Wj) ), appearing 
in the trace, tr, implies that all signal. knows. B events, indicating B's knowl- 
edge of sufficient evidence that a buyer bEA- {B, J} shared the content, 
WM (XB, 0Pß ( Wj)), must not be contained in the refusals set, R. 
SPECB(tr, R) = 
signal. download. B. W M (XB, QPB ( WJ)) in tr 
vA (signal. knows. B. e¢ R)1 
bE. A-{B, J} ý 
CeEEye(b) 
J 
FDR must be provided with a process-orientated specification of the desired 
behaviour that we have defined. The process-orientated specification, SPECB, 
states that for one of the buyers, bEA- {B, J}, who B may have sold con- 
tent to, the process, MODEL, must always be willing to perform the two events, 
eigreal. knows. B. WM(XB, 0P8(Wj)) and signal. knows. B. S, k, (Epk, (Wj)), follow- 
ing the event, signal. download. B. WM (XB, (Pe (Wj)), representing B download- 
ing watermarked content. 
SPECB is an example of a liveness specification and so the stable failures 
model is used to reason whether a BSW protocol satisfies this specification in 
FDR. 
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SPE CB = 
let 
SPEC0(b) =/ 
I STOP nInx -- 
SPEC0(b) 11 
xEE-{signal. download. B. WM(XB ' B(WG))} 
J) 
n signal. download. B. WM(XB, QPB(WJ)) -* SPECI(b) 
SPECI ( b) = 
within 
STOP nIn x-> SPEC, (b) 
11 
\xEE-{signol. knows. B. eI et-EVB(b)} 
Jl 
xEE-{signol. knows. B. eI et-EVB(b)} 
ý Signal. knows. B. e -+ SPECI(b) 
eEEVB(b) 
n SPECo(b) 
6EA-{B, J} 
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Buyers' Requirement 
A second specification, SPECA, concerning the requirement of a well-behaved 
buyer, states that if the buyer has not previously uploaded the watermarked 
content then the seller cannot know all evidence necessary suggesting that the 
watermarked content was illicitly shared. In each model, A will be willing to 
perform at least one run of the protocol as a buyer, and so it will be sufficient 
to show that the requirements of a single seller A are not met to demonstrate a 
failure of the protocol in meeting the requirements of buyers. 
To demonstrate that the protocol fails the buyer, A, it is enough to show that 
the refinement fails when considering only a single piece of watermarked content. 
The buyer, A, must be protected against all sellers but we need only demonstrate 
that M knows all evidence at a time when he must not, as the misbehaving agent, 
M, shall be provided with significantly more capabilities to do so than B. In this 
case Memon and Wong expect the set of sufficient evidence of illicitly sharing 
WM (XM, o pM (WJ)) to be: - 
WM(XM, vpM(WJ)), ýVA = SekJ(EPka(WJ)) 
The absence of a signal. upload. A. WM (XM, 0PM (Wj)) event in the trace, tr, 
implies that at least one signal. knows. M event, indicating M's knowledge of the 
evidence that WM (XM, aPM (Wj)) was shared by A, must also be absent in tr. 
SPECA(tr) _ 
-, (signal. u, pload. A. W M (XM, apm( Wi)) in tr) 
=*V -, (signal. knows. M. e in tr) 
eEEVA 
Sskr (Enka (W. l )) 
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In Section 3.2.4 the process-orientated specification of authentication was de- 
fined as a safety property in terms of a process PRE(i, j), which can be read as 
i precedes j in every trace. In the case of the MW protocol, two pieces of evi- 
dence must be known to the misbehaving agent M only when content has been 
uploaded by the well-behaved agent b. 
As such, we construct a process PRE(i, j) n PRE (i, k), which can be read 
informally as i precedes j or i precedes k. That is, any number of k's can occur 
before an i appears in the trace, so long as j does not also appear in the trace 
until at least one i has occurred. Likewise, any number of j's can occur before an 
i has appeared in the trace, so long as k does not also appear in the trace until 
at least one i has occurred. In general we shall construct a process fl PRE(i, j) 
jEJ 
where i denotes the signal event indicating that the buyer has uploaded some 
watermarked content and J denotes the set of all necessary evidence for the 
seller to form the resulting case for prosecution. 
SPE CA : -- 
n1 PRE(signal. upload. A. WM(XM, 'PM(Wj)), signal. knows. M. e) 
eEEVA 
In this section, we have defined the protocol requirements in terms of various 
agent's knowledge following either an upload or download action, which must be 
reported via signal events in our models. It shall later be useful to define a set of 
all evidence that could be reported via a signal. knows event and we define such 
a set as: 
EV = {EVB(b), EVA Ib +- A- {B, J}} 
4.3.2 Well-behaved Agents 
We construct a process, BUYER(b), defining the messages to be sent and received 
by the protocol initiator, b, regarding the purchase of digital content from any 
other seller. The sequence of message exchanges the buyer performs is defined as 
in the protocol design, as illustrated as the message sequence chart in Figure 4.1. 
We can see from Figure 4.1 that the process modelling the initiator, BUYER, 
must be involved in all four steps of the MW protocol, participating in both the 
watermark generation stage and the watermark insertion stage. 
In the first two messages, during the watermark generation stage, the buyer, 
b, initiates the protocol by sending certification of his public key to the third 
party and in return receives an encrypted watermark signed by the third party 
to certify it is well-formed. The buyer b must accept any watermark, wE Wi, 
as contained in the signed encrypted message from J, and is therefore modelled 
as the resolution of an external choice. 
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The buyer, b, then performs the watermark insertion stage of the protocol, 
by sending to a seller, s, the signed encrypted watermark, received during the 
watermark generation stage, along with an indication of what digital content 
the buyer wishes to purchase, arg(x). The buyer b may decide to purchase any 
content sold by another agent, modelled as the resolution of an internal choice. 
The buyer expects to receive the content he has requested, watermarked with 
the watermark he sent in Step 2, permuted using some permutation variable 
pEP, and encrypted under his public key, Epkb (WM (x, o (w))). In reality the 
buyer is unable to discern what watermark has been used and so must accept the 
content he requested watermarked with any permutation of any watermark. Upon 
completion of the protocol the buyer performs no further events. If we require a 
buyer to purchase multiple items then we shall interleave as many instances of 
BUYER(b) as is required. 
BUYER(b) = 
trans. b. J. CskcA(b, pkb) -* 
trans. J. b. SskJ (EPkb (w)) -4 
trans. b. s. (arg(x), S3kJ(EPkb(w))) -+ 0 f1 O (trans. s. b. EPkb(m) -+ STOP) wEW 
SEA-{b, J} mE{WM(x, ap(w'))lwl+-W, p+-P} 
xEX3 
The well-behaved seller, s, is only involved in the two protocols steps of the 
watermark insertion stage of the protocol. The seller, s, is willing to accept any 
encrypted watermark signed by the third party, J, and so the values, w and b, 
are resolved as an external choice. The seller must also receive indication of what 
digital content the buyer wishes to purchase, arg(x). 
In [32], during the watermark insertion stage the seller also generates an ad- 
ditional watermark, v, unique to this transaction, which is embedded within x, 
before embedding w. The sole purpose of v is to enable the seller to personally 
identify the buyer they believe released an illicit copy. The additional watermark, 
v, is not used as proof of illicit file sharing, and Memon and Wong state that the 
seller is free to use any watermarking scheme of their choosing. We conduct 
our CSP modelling of the MW protocol without reference to this additional wa- 
termark. We make further reference to this additional watermark in Chapter 7 
(Section 7.6). 
As the seller is now in possession of the encrypted watermark, Epkb(w), and 
can construct the encrypted content, Epkb(x), they calculate the encrypted value, 
Epkb(WM(x, op(w))), by performing the embedding in the encrypted domain. 
The seller produces Epkb(WM(x, o (w))) without ever knowing the watermark 
or the watermarked content in the clear. Upon completion of the protocol, the 
seller performs no further events. If we require a seller to sell multiple items then 
we shall interleave as many instances of SELLER(s) as is required. 
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SELLER(s) = 
trans. b. s. (arg(x), Sak(Epkb(w))) -+ 
O rl ( trans. s. b. Epkb(WM(x, QP(w))) -a STOP 
) 
bEA-{s, J} PEP* xEX, 
WEW 
The well-behaved third party, J, is only involved in the two protocols steps 
of the watermark generation stage of the protocol. The third party is willing to 
receive certification of some agent's public key and returns the buyer an encrypted 
watermark, signed to certify it is well-formed. The third party will issue each 
watermark only once and so upon completion of the two protocol steps performs 
no other events. In order to enable the third party to distribute a number of 
watermarks we interleave a number of instances of TTP, each pertaining to a 
single watermark, wE Wj. 
TTP = 
r 
f"m»o h 
_1 
['. (h "nb. l -L 
wEWj \ 6E. A-{J} wuic. 0., i. v.. 4kýk1mPk6lwll -f AlVr 
The set of all messages that could conceivabley be used in some run of the 
protocol is thus constructed as: - 
JN = {WM (x, oP('w)) 
U{C, kcA (b, pkb) (b t-A } 
U{(at(x), S, k, (Epkb(w))) Ibi-A, xi-X, wt-W} 
U{S, k(Epk6(w)) Ibb+-A, wt-W} 
U{Epke(WM(x, Qp(W))) Ib4-A, x4-x, wl-W, pl-P} 
4.3.3 Deductive System 
The amendments we have made to the deductive system described in Section 3.2.2 
are to parameterise the process and to define new deductive rules concerning the 
cryptographic and watermarking functions utilised by BSW protocols. Underly- 
ing each process, ALICE, BOB, and MALLORY, is the same deductive system, 
DED4, that follows Roecoe's construction of a lazy spy [471. An important ob- 
servation to be made when comparing our approach to that in [471 is that the 
misbehaving agent is not the only agent to be provided with a deductive sys- 
tem. This is because we require each agent to remember all watermarked content 
that they have heard/inferred during each run of the BSW protocol so that they 
can illicitly share such content with others. Additionally, constructing the well- 
behaved agents to include their own deductive systems shall provide the signal 
event necessary during analysis in an efficient manner. 
Roscoe's lazy spy provides an efficient method for keeping track of the misbe- 
having agent's current knowledge, i. e., one that avoids unmanageable state space 
III 
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explosion, by enabling the misbehaving agent to make deductions only for their 
set of learnable facts, L. The misbehaving agent cannot learn a fact that they 
knew initially or one that cannot be deduced from their initial knowledge and all 
the messages they could hear. Similarly, we wish to construct each agent's de- 
ductive system such that they too make deductions only for their set of learnable 
facts. By parameterising the deductive system of each agent with the identity of 
the agent, DEDa, we are able to independently define each agents learnable facts, 
La, and so provide them with their own unique behaviour whilst maintaining the 
efficiency afforded by Roscoe's lazy spy approach. 
In fact the initial knowledge, ZICa, is the only distinguishing feature of each 
agent's deductive system, DEDa. The set of learnable facts is calculated as the set 
difference between the knowable, itself defined in terms of the initial knowledge, 
and the closure of the initial knowledge, i. e., all those facts that a could possibly 
know excluding those known initially. 
L. = 1Ca - close(Z)Ca) 
1Ca = close(Z1Ca U Nla) 
The set of all a's possible deductions, Da, is then constructed of all deductions 
that deduce a learnable fact from a knowable fact. 
Da ={ (X, f)1 (X, f) <-- deductions j), 
fE Ga, f e X, 
X-Ka=0} 
where F= {explode(m) 1m t- M} 
Each agent is provided initial knowledge of all agents, all public keys, their 
own secret key, their own digital certificate, their own digital content, their own 
watermarks, their own set of permutations and the unique identifiers of all digital 
content. 
IKa =AU PK U {ska, CekcA(a, pka)} U Xa U Wa U Pa U {ai(x) Ix *- X} 
Some of these facts are unique to a particular type of agent and inappropriate 
facts are omitted from each agent's initial knowledge, e. g., we shall later define a 
process ALICE enabling A to act only as a buyer and therefore set of all digital 
content initially known by A shall be the empty set, 0. The initial knowledge 
pertaining to a role is illustrated above each role in Figure 4.1. 
We define a process IGNa(f) for every fact that the agent, a, is initially 
ignorant of but could be inferred or heard during a protocol run. Each component 
process starts in a state in which a is ignorant of the fact. The fact can either 
be heard or inferred and then enters a state in which a now knows the fact. 
An agent, a, can never deduce a fact that they knew initially or that cannot be 
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deduced from their initial knowledge and all the messages they could hear, and 
Roscoe's lazy spy elegantly omits infer events for such facts [47]. In this state the 
fact can still be heard or inferred. If the fact is a message it can now also be said 
and the remain in a state where the fact is known. If the fact happens to lie in 
the evidence set, 6V, defined in Section 4.3.1, then a signal event signal. knows. a 
is used to report that a has learnt one of these facts. The agent may also make 
use of the recently heard or inferred fact to infer other facts. 
DEDa = chase((II fEca (IGNa(f ), aIGNa(f ))) \ {I infer 1}) III KNOWNa 
IGNa (f)=fEM& hear. f -4 KNWa (f ) 
13 infer? t E {(X, f') I (X, f `) F Da, f' =f1 -4 KNWa(f ) 
KNWa(f )=fE .M& hear. f -+ KNWa(f ) 
Q infer? t E ((X, f') I (X, f') E- Da, fE XI -+ KNWa(f) 
OfEM& say. f -+ KNWa(f ) 
0fE CV & signal. knows. a. f -+ KNWa (f ) 
The replicated alphabetized parallel composition of the IGNa (f) processes 
is such that the alphabets, aIGN0(f ), cause synchronisations of infer events of 
dependent facts, as described in Section 3.2.2. 
a1GNa(f) = 
{hear. f, say. f IfE Jet} 
U{signal. know8. a. f If E EV} 
U{infer. (X, f') I (X, f') E Da, (f' = f)} 
U{infer. (X, f') I (X, f') E Da, fE X} 
As a consequence of defining the replicated alphabetised parallel process only 
in terms of the learnable facts for the sake of efficiency, say, hear and signal. knows 
events regarding initially known messages, close(ZICa), are omitted and hear- 
ing or saying such events would thus be blocked without the interleaving of the 
KNOWN& process which compensates for this omission. 
KNO WNa = 
aay? f e cloae(ZJCa) nm -+ KNOWNa 
O hear? f E cloae(Z1Ca) nM -ý KNOWN, 
OfE EV & aignal. knowa. a. f -º KNOWN. 
The set deductions(F), previously defined in Section 3.2.2, is extended to 
include the rules listed in Table 2.5 and Table 4.1, modelling the various opera- 
tions performed in the BSW protocols, including public key encryption, digital 
signatures, digital certificates and digital watermarking. Similarly, it is necessary 
extend the explode function to work with such primitives. 
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EMB-ENC. 
EXT-ENC. 
{Epk(x), Epk(W)} 
{x, pk, Epk(WM (x, w))} 
SIG . 1. SIG. 2. 
SIG. 3. 
SIG-ENC. 1. 
SIG-ENC. 2. 
SIG-ENC. 3. 
MW-EMB. 
MW-EXT. 
EMB-SIG-ENC. 
EXT-SIG-ENC. 
ARG. 
{p, w} 
{vP(w), p} 
{Qp(w), w} 
{p, Epk(w)} 
{Epk(Qp(w)), P} 
{Epk(ap(w)), Epk(w)} 
{x, QP(w)} 
{WM(x, vP(w)), x} 
{Epk(x), Epk(Qp\w» } 
{x, pk, Epk(WM(x) Qp(w)))} 
{x} 
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ý Epk(WM(x, w)) 
F- Epk(w) 
ý ap(w) 
w 
ýp 
F- Epk(ap('ý)) 
t- Epkýw) 
F- P 
I- WM(x, aP(w)) 
I- orv(w) 
I- EPk(WM(X, vP(w))) 
t - Epk(O'a(w)) 
F- arg (x) 
Table 4.1: Deduction rules capturing properties of watermarking in the encrypted 
domain and watermark permutation 
In Table 4.1, we have defined new deduction rules to reflect the Memon 
and Wong's proposed properties of watermark permutation and watermarking 
in the encrypted domain. EMB-ENC enables encrypted watermarked content, 
Epk(WM(x, w)), to be deduced from the encrypted content, Epk(x), and the en- 
crypted watermark, Epk(w). We must also assume that anyone in possession 
of the encrypted watermarked content, Epk(WM(x, w)), the original content, x, 
and the public key, pk, to infer the encrypted watermark, Epk(w) as defined by 
EXT-ENC. 
The rules of deduction, SIG. 1, SIG. 2 and SIG. 3, capture the properties of 
the permutation function used to permute the watermark elements. The value 
p is some random ordering of the watermark, which can be used to reorder the 
watermark, w, to produce op(w) when both w and p are known. Anyone who 
knows the permuted watermark, cr (w), and how they were permuted is able to 
recover the original watermark, w. Likewise, an agent in possession of both the 
permuted and unpermuted watermarks, i. e., w and ap(w), can infer the reordering 
used to permute the watermark, p. 
Memon and Wong define Epk(w) to mean Epk((wl, url, ... , w,, )) and so it holds 
that encrypting first and then permuting provides the same result as permuting 
first and then encrypting. 
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ap(EpkM) = Qp(Epk((wl , w2, ..., W,, 
))) 
= Op/1(Epk(wl), Epk(wz), ..., Epk(wn))) 
= Epk(Qp((w1i vYl, ..., wn))) 
= Epk(Qp(w)) 
We define the deduction rule, SIG-ENC. 1, to capture the property of permut- 
ing an encrypted watermark and capture additional properties in SIG-ENC. 2 and 
SIG-ENC. 3 to provide the inherent properties of the permutation function when 
performed on the encrypted watermark SIG. 2 and SIG. 3. Likewise, we define the 
rules EMB-SIG-ENC and EXT-SIG-ENC to enable the permuted watermark to 
be embedded and extracted in the encrypted domain. 
Finally, ARG denotes the deduction of a unique content identifier from the 
digital content such that a buyer can state which content they wish to purchase 
from the seller. Anyone in possession of the content x can deduce its identifier 
ary(x) but possessing the identifier does not necessarily mean possession of the 
digital content. 
When modelling each agent, a, the deductive system, DEDa, differs only in 
the agent's initial knowledge, ZACa, on which the agent's deductions, Da, learnable 
facts, Ga, and knowable facts /Ca are dependent. Additionally, DEDa differs 
indirectly from changes to the set M, constructed of every message that could 
be sent and received during each run of the protocol, when analysing differing 
protocols. 
4.3.4 Composition 
Following the suggestion of Ryan et at. in [491, we consider the following systems 
worthy of model checking when determining flaws in BSW protocols. 
"a buyer A, and a seller B 
"a buyer A, and two sellers B 
" two buyers A, and a seller B 
"a buyer A, a seller A, and a seller B 
"a buyer A, a buyer B, and a seller B 
Each system may also be composed with one or two third parties and shall 
include a single misbehaving agent with sufficient initial knowledge to perform 
one or more protocol runs as either buyer or seller, or both. When model checking 
the systems in which either agent, A or B, may perform the role of both a buyer 
and seller in various protocol runs, the models have been constructed such that 
they may perform just one of the roles in a single run of the protocol. The 
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requirements are trivially broken if an agent purchases content from himself as 
he can prove to an arbiter that he shared the content before having done so. 
We do not wish to concern ourselves with such self-destructive behaviour, which 
would distract attention away from protocol failures of greater interest. 
In fact each of the attacks presented in the next section are generated when 
analysing a single protocol model composed of two buyers A, and a seller B. 
Therefore, the process, MODEL, illustrated in Figure 3.1, is constructed of an 
initiator, A, who may perform two interleaved runs of the protocol, a single 
responder, B, a misbehaving agent, M, who can perform either role and a third 
party, J. The strict behaviour of the well-behaved agents is thus defined as: - 
STRA = BUYER(A) III BUYER(A) 
STRB = SELLER(B) 
We wish to construct the process, MODEL, as a single process synchronising 
all agents on an insecure channel comm and must rename the say and hear events 
accordingly. However, we first distinguish between two forms of communication 
during its construction: trans events are messages that an agent send or receives 
as part of the protocol; share events are messages in which watermarked content 
is illicitly shared between agents. 
We rename the deductive systems of A and B such that every say and hear 
is mapped to incoming and outgoing trans events, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
In addition saying and hearing watermarked content is enabled over the share 
channel providing the behaviour of illicit file sharing between agents. Finally, in 
order to prevent an agent from sending shared copies of their own content we 
synchronise with the process STOP on the events that model such behaviour. 
rDEDa = 
(DEDa Qtrans. p. a, trans. a. p, share. p. a. jsham. a. p. f /henr, 
ane hear. f saL. fj) 
II STOP 
{I share. a. p. f11} 
where 
p4-A-{a}, 
f l-{WM(x, ap(w))Ixt-X, p1--P, w4--W}, 
f'+-{WM(x', o , (w'))jx'l-Xa, p'4-P, w'1-W} 
Running the two processes, STRa and DEDa, in parallel ensures that mes- 
sages can be sent by the well-behaved agent, aEA- {M, J}, only at a time 
when they have sufficient knowledge to construct the message to be sent. As the 
two processes synchronize only on the trans events, the signal and share events 
produced by the well-behaved agent's deductive system are made available to 
the overall system whenever they are made available by the deductive system. 
Having performed this synchronisation we rename the trans and share events 
such that the distinction between them is removed and each agent performs all 
communications over a single channel comm. 
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Figure 4.2: Construction of a well-behaved agent a via renaming 
Finally, we rename the well-behaved agent processes process, ALICE and 
BOB, to enable the misbehaving agent to synchronise on take and fake events 
modelling the insecure nature of the communications network conforming to the 
DY model. The definition of ALICE shall then be constructed as a parallel 
composition of the newly defined process, STRA, and the yet to be constructed 
process, rDEDA. BOB is defined similarly. 
ALICE= 
(rDEDA II STRA) 
fit anal} Iovmin, wmm/Mans, 
shareI 
comm, take. A jake. p. A/ comm, comm. A, comm. p. Ann y lwhem 
pa-A 
BOB= 
(rDEDB 11 STRB) 
(IM uff) Icomm, o mm/hana,, ham 
I aomm, take. B, f ake. p. B/ 
oomm, oomm. B, comm. p. B¢ 
where p4--A 
The misbehaving agent is not restricted to perform the strict behaviour of any 
single role but is instead able to receive any messages the other agents choose to 
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send him and send any messages that the other agents are willing to accept. As 
such we need not run the deductive system, DEDM, in parallel with some strict 
behaviour process but instead rename the hear and say events directly to comm, 
take and fake events as appropriate. 
MALLORY = 
comm. p. M, comm. M, take. p. p' ,f ake. p. p' DEDM Q /hear, say, hear, aayý 
where pt-A, p'4-A-{p} 
We have not modelled the third party to include a deductive system as we 
do not consider his knowledge within the specification and therefore do not re- 
quire him to perform signal. knows. J events. Likewise, following the assumptions 
proposed in the PM framework, we assume that the third party is trusted not 
to illicitly share content that he knows, so we do not require him to perform 
share events, although we shall relax this assumption in Chapter 6. As such, the 
process, JEEVES, simply allows J to perform the role of the third party. 
JEEVES = TTP 
Finally, we construct the CSP process, MODEL, as a parallel composition of 
the processes, ALICE, BOB, MALLORY and JEEVES. 
MODEL = 
((ALICE BOB) JEEVES) MALLORY 
comm. A. B, 1f comm. J. p, 1 comm. M. p, ýI 
comm. B. A 
IJ 
l comm. p. J pý{A, B} 
IJ 
comm. p. M, ? 
+'{A, B, J}, 
take. p. p', +-{A, B, J}, 
fake. p. pý POP, 
4.3.5 Analytical Outcomes 
In order to check whether our protocol model, MODEL, meets the requirement, 
SPECB, we must isolate the events included in the specification namely, sig- 
nal events indicative of the seller downloading content, signal. doumload. B, and 
knowing evidence, signal. knows. B. We rename the events in which watermarked 
content is received by B, to identify them as downloads before checking our model 
satisfies its specification in FDR. 
MODELS = MODELQsignal. 
download. B. m, signal. download. B. m/ 
oomm. p. BJJake. p. B. mI 
where p4-A-{B}, 
ml--{WM(x, op(w))Ix4-X, pl-P, wt-W} 
When model checking the MW protocol in this manner, no failure of the 
protocol in meeting the requirements of the seller has been found when model 
checking in FDR. It is important to note that we have modelled only a small finite 
state system and such results alone do not prove the security of the protocol in 
the general case. 
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SPECB CF MODELB 
The MW protocol does not perform so well when considering the require- 
ments of the well-behaved buyer. In order to check whether our protocol model, 
MODEL, meets the requirement, SPECA, we must isolate the events included in 
the specification namely, signal events indicative of the buyer uploading content, 
signal. upload. A, and of the misbehaving agent knowing evidence, signal. knows. M. 
We rename the events in which watermarked content is sent by A, to identify 
them as uploads, and hide the events that do not concern us during analysis 
before checking our model satisfies its specification in FDR. 
MODEL A MODEL signal. uptoad. A. m, e4gnal. upload. A. m Aý /comm. A. p. m, take. A. p. mI 
where p+-A- {A), 
mE-{WM(x, oo(w))Ix4-X, p+-P, wa-W} 
SPECA ¢T MODELA \ {I comm, take, fake I} 
FDR shall automatically generate a trace of events leading to a failure of 
MODELA to refine SPECA. FDR even enables us to reveal the events, hidden in 
the assertion above, in order to reconsider the full sequence of events performed 
by the process MODELA that lead to the protocol failure. 
The MW protocol, illustrated in Figure 4.1, was first shown to be flawed by 
Lei et al. in [28]. They first demonstrate that the MW protocol is vulnerable to 
an unbinding attack once the user has illicitly shared content. We differentiate 
such an attack as a reactive unbinding attack in [59], from a second pre-emptive 
unbinding attack, also presented in [28]. During our formal analysis, FDR auto- 
matically generated traces corresponding to the reactive unbinding attack, one 
of which is presented below. 
(comm. A. J. C, kc,, (A, pkA), 
comm. J. A. S, kr (EpkA( W. r)), 
comm. A. M. (atp(Xjý), C, kcA(A+ pkA), S, kr (EpkA ( Wi))) , 
comm. M. A. EnkA (WM (XM, apm (Wi))), 
aignal. apload. A. WM (XM', vpm (Wi)), 
aignai. knowe. M. WM (XM, opM (Wi)), 
aignal. knowa. M. S, k, (Epk,, ( Wj))) 
This trace begins with four comm events as a consequence of the completion 
of a single protocol run in which the watermarked content, WM (XM, QP,,, ( Wj)), 
is purchased by the buyer, A, from the seller, M. This precisely matches a single 
instance of Figure 4.1 assuming that J and A participate in the protocol in their 
usual roles whilst M performs the role of the seller. In this run of the protocol 
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the watermark chosen by J was Wj, the arg chosen by A was arg(Xf ), and the 
permutation chosen by M was PM. 
Following this single protocol run the buyer chooses to illicitly share the water- 
marked content, WM(Xly, ap,,, ( Wj)), which is subsequently intercepted by the 
misbehaving agent, M. The misbehaving agent, M, can extract the permuted 
watermark, apM ( Wj), from the watermarked content, WM (XM, apM ( Wj)), and 
embed it within a second piece of digital content to create WM (XM, aPM ( Wj)). 
Such actions are invisible internal events of the process, MALLORY, hence they 
do not appear in the trace of MODELA but may be revealed with further explo- 
ration of the FDR output. Since the secondary evidence, Salo (EPkA (Wj)), is not 
bound to X, ', M is thus in possession of the two pieces of evidence suggesting 
that WM (XM, a pm (W j)) has been shared by A when in fact A never shared such 
content. As such the protocol does not meet the requirements of the buyer. 
A longer trace in which the buyer shares the content with another agent, who 
may in turn share the content with others, before the seller is eventually passed 
the shared content, shall also provide the seller with sufficient evidence that A was 
the buyer who originally shared the content. Our CSP model of the MW protocol 
fails to meet the formal specification we defined of the customers' requirement 
and each counterexample provided by FDR corresponds to the reactive unbinding 
attack presented by Lei et at. FDR can generate up to 100 counterexamples and 
due to the manner in which the state space is explored these shall be the 100 
shortest traces leading to an attack. 
Each of the 100 traces generated for our CSP model of the MW protocol 
correspond to the same reactive unbinding attack. That is, only insignificant 
differences occur between the traces, e. g., the order of the two signal. knows events 
is switched or a single comm event between two agents other than the misbehaving 
agent is replaced by a corresponding take and fake of the same message. If the 
protocol is flawed when a message is sent directly from one agent to another 
(other than the misbehaving agent) then a second trace will also exist in which 
the misbehaving agent takes and then fakes the message. Such an identical take 
and fake corresponds to an overhear in the DY model. 
Each of the traces in this section include only comm events indicating that the 
misbehaving agent would be able to attack the protocol even if the communica- 
tions channel comm was secure inhibiting him from taking and faking messages. 
In Chapter 6, we discuss how we may adapt our models in order to weaken the 
threat assumptions. 
Lei et at. also present a second flaw in the MW protocol. Following an 
initial successful transaction, in which A purchases WM (XM, aP ( Wj)), the seller 
pre-empts illicit file sharing by ignoring the newly generated signed encrypted 
watermark, S, k j 
(EpkA ( Wj)), from a second protocol run and instead embeds the 
outdated signed encrypted watermark from the first, S, kj(EPkA(Wj)). As a result, 
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when a copy of WM (X; f, Op,,, (W j)) is found, the seller can extract a p,,, (W j) 
and embed it within XM in order to fabricate evidence of illicit file sharing of 
WM (XM, opM ( Wj)) against the buyer. This attack is particularly relevant when 
prosecuting against illicit file sharing of XM demands more compensation than 
XM. 
The subtle difference from the first scenario is that the seller takes action 
before the share event has occurred in order to gain an advantage. In the first 
attack scenario, the malicious seller reacts to the file sharing maliciously by sub- 
sequently extracting the watermark from the shared file and embedding it within 
another. This is only possible after the file sharing event has occurred. We refer 
to such an unbinding attack as Reactive Unbinding. This is as opposed to what 
we refer to as Pre-emptive Unbinding in which the seller gains an advantage by 
taking action that pre-empts the file being shared [59]. The two attacks are only 
subtly different in the MW protocol but, in Section 5.1, we shall see that Lei et 
al. adopt different mechanisms to prevent each of the two forms of unbinding. 
With minor modifications made to the model we can explore traces that lead 
to refinement failures beyond the 100 examples generated originally. By restrict- 
ing the behaviour of the protocol, such that the buyer shall only upload content 
once he has requested two pieces of content using two different watermarks, FDR 
generates counterexamples corresponding to the pre-emptive unbinding attack. 
RESTRICTION = 
comm. A. M. (arg (XM ), pkA, S, k (EPkA (Wj))) -> 
comm. A. M. (arg(XM), pkA, S, k(EPkA(Wi))) -4 
aignal. upload. A? m -* STOP 
SPECA ¢T (MODELA 11 RESTRICTION) \ {I comm, take, fake 1} 
{jcomm. A. M, uploadj} 
Note that we have already found our original protocol model fails to meet its 
specification and by restricting the behaviour of the protocol model we wish only 
to explore the traces beyond the minimal reactive unbinding attack to uncover 
more complex attacks, i. e., pre-emptive unbinding attacks. 
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(comm. A. J. CskcA(A, pkA), 
comm. J. A. Sskr (EPkA( WJ)), 
comm. A. M. (arg (XM ), CskcA (A, pkA), S8kr (EPkA ( Wj) )) + 
comm. M. A. EPkA(WM(XM, apM(Wj))), 
comm. A. J. CskcA(A, pkA), 
comm. J. A. Ssk,, (EPkA ( Wj)), 
comm. A. M. (arg (Xiy), CskcA(A, pkA), Sskr(EPkA(W; ))), 
comm. M. A. EPkA(WM(X1N, apM(WJ))), 
signal. upload. A. WM (X; yf, apM ( WJ)), 
signal. knows. M. W M (XM, apM (Wj)), 
signal. knows. M. Ssk, (EPkA ( Wj))) 
Both the reactive and pre-emptive unbinding attacks on the MW protocol 
were originally identified by Lei et at. in [28]. We have found no further attacks on 
the MW protocol using our approach. However, the results of the analysis provide 
confirmation that our abstract models and formal specification are adequate for 
the automatic generation of all reported attacks on the MW protocol at the 
time of writing. However, we shall identify an additional attack in Chapter 7 
after scrutinizing the properties inherent in the watermarking scheme adopted in 
Memon and Wong's example construction of their protocol. We also demonstrate 
the ability of our approach to identify such an attack. 
These results also demonstrate important improvements made to the models 
constructed in [60] and [61], which only enabled the misbehaving agent to act 
passively listening in on the messages sent between agents and reporting when 
evidence of file sharing is known. Such restrictions were placed on the misbe- 
having agent's behaviour in order to avoid state space explosion when model 
checking. During this initial investigation only reactive unbinding attacks were 
identified in FDR because the misbehaving agent, acting as the seller, strictly 
followed the protocol. The approach presented in this chapter removes the re- 
strictions imposed on the original passive intruder whilst avoiding unmanageable 
state space explosion. Therefore, the model constructed in this chapter captures 
more of the possible behaviour allowed by the protocol design and subsequently 
attacks requiring a more active intruder, e. g., pre-emptive unbinding attacks, can 
now be identified during analysis, as we have just demonstrated. 
We have already seen that FDR generates up to 100 counterexamples and that 
further attacks, although with longer traces, may not be identified in our analysis. 
We have also seen that the MW protocol fails to meet the requirements of the 
buyer due to the pre-emptive and reactive unbinding attacks identified by Lei et 
at., enabling the misbehaving seller to fabricate evidence of illicit file sharing of 
X; once the buyer shares XM. The finite number of counterexamples we have 
generated in FDR thus far, indicative of the unbinding attacks, may therefore be 
obstructing us from finding more fundamental attacks on the protocol in which 
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the buyer never shares any content. We can modify our protocol model in order 
to analyse such a scenario by restricting the behaviour of the system such that 
signal. upload. A events never occur. 
(MODELA 11 STOP) \ {I comm, take, fake J} 
{upload. A} 
In fact when model checking such a system we find no failure of the protocol in 
meeting such requirements. It is again important to note that we have modelled 
only a small finite state system and such results alone do not prove the security 
of the protocol (assuming the buyer never shares content) in general. 
SPECA CT (MODELA 11 STOP) \ {I comm, take, fake J} {upload. A} 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have proposed a formal approach to modelling and analysis of 
BSW protocols. Our novel approach to the analysis of BSW protocols was to per- 
form refinement checks of protocol models constructed in CSP against formally 
defined requirements using the model checker FDR. FDR was used to automat- 
ically generate traces, or trace/refusal pairs, indicative of protocol failures when 
they exist. Our approach significantly increases the rigour applied to the analysis 
of BSW protocols and automates much of the error prone parts of this process. 
In Section 4.3.1 we provided a formal definition of the primary requirements 
of BSW protocols based upon those informally presented in [41]. We defined 
the requirements of sellers and buyers as CSP processes such that it can be 
determined whether CSP models of BSW protocols refine such specifications. 
The MW protocol was analysed against its requirements, defined as safety and 
liveness specifications, using the traces and stable failures semantic models of 
CSP, respectively. 
In Table 4.1 we defined additional properties to extend the most abstract 
properties of informed one-bit watermarking, previously captured in Table 2.5, 
to include: embedding a watermark in the encrypted domain; permuting an 
encrypted watermark; and embedding a permuted watermark in the encrypted 
domain. Abstracting away from the underlying watermarking scheme and cryp- 
tographic primitives enabled us to reason whether the protocols alone fail to meet 
their requirements. 
Our novel approach of producing the signal events required during analysis 
was to construct CSP models of security protocols to include multiple deductive 
systems. This enables the CSP models to report when facts of interest have been 
learnt by both the misbehaving and well-behaved agents should such information 
be useful during analysis. Previously, only the knowledge of the misbehaving 
4.4. Summary 81 
agent was recorded by Roscoe's construction of the lazy spy [47]. Deductive 
systems efficiently recording the knowledge built by both well-behaved and mis- 
behaving agents were constructed in our CSP model of the MW protocol such 
that the signal events necessary during analysis were generated, whilst avoiding 
unmanageable state-space explosion. Modelling the MW protocol in this manner 
removed the limitations imposed upon the behaviour of the misbehaving agent 
in our initial investigations [60,61]. 
We analysed our CSP model of the MW protocol using FDR in order to 
demonstrate its ability to verify the reactive and pre-emptive unbinding attacks 
identified by Lei et al. [28] and distinguished in [60]. Using our approach, traces 
were automatically generated by the model checker FDR indicative of such flaws. 
Finally, we performed an additional analysis of the MW protocol, under the as- 
sumption that the well-behaved buyer never shares content, in an attempt to 
identify additional fundamental failures. No failure to meet the requirements of 
buyers was identified when analysing the MW protocol under such an assump- 
tion. 
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Chapter 5 
Applying the CSP Approach 
to Additional BSW Protocols 
This chapter presents the broader success we have had in using the approach 
we proposed in Chapter 4 to identify flaws in BSW protocols. We analyse an 
additional four protocols [28,23,22,24] against the primary requirements of BSW 
protocols and identify seven otherwise unreported failures of BSW protocols in 
meeting their requirements when analysing under the environmental assumptions 
of the PM framework. 
The first protocol analysed in this chapter, the Lei-Yu-Tsai-Chan (LYTC) 
protocol, was proposed to resolve the unbinding attacks that they identified in 
the MW protocol [28]. The proposed use of one-time key pairs, and the binding 
of watermarks to content using some signed message, aims to avoid both reactive 
and pre-emptive unbinding attacks. We conclude our analysis of the LYTC pro- 
tocol in Section 5.1 by reasoning about the importance of the one-time key pairs 
in the Lei et at. protocol, demonstrating that the buyer can construct a plausible 
denial of an act of illicit file sharing if the uniqueness of the one-time key pairs 
that they generate is not assured. 
Our analysis of the BSW protocols proposed in [23,22,24] demonstrates the 
failure of each protocol in preventing the unbinding attacks identified by Lei et 
al. Each protocol is based upon the MW protocol, conducting the watermark 
embedding in the encrypted domain, which we analysed previously in Chapter 4. 
Despite the authors of [23] and [22] acknowledging the importance of protecting 
against unbinding, we shall identify both protocols failure to avoid a pre-emptive 
unbinding attack, as described in Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, respectively. Fi- 
nally, in Section 5.4, we identify a reactive unbinding attack on the protocol 
proposed in [24]. 
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A. Pkb, akb. CakCA (Pkb). 
PkcA. (ar0(m) ls - X}, JC¢*, 
A, Pka. aka. PkJ, PkCA.. Vs A. P kJ , ak j, Wj 
Buyer b Seüer a Third Party J 
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(pk', ak`) E KP6 
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ekb(Pk* ), Sek"(ar9 
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Epk. (WM (x, w)) 
Figure 5.1: LYTC Protocol 
I wEWi 
arg)) 
5.1 Lei-Yu-Tsai-Chan (LYTC) Protocol 
The approach taken in [28] to prevent the unbinding attacks that the author's 
identified in the MW protocol was twofold: bind a watermark to content using 
some signed message; and use one-time key pairs to avoid outdated information 
being used in subsequent transactions. The one-time key pairs were proposed as 
a mechanism to prevent pre-emptive unbinding, although other papers refer to 
them as anonymous keys such as [11], [24] and [53]. It is out of the scope of 
this thesis to consider anonymity; instead we will demonstrate the importance of 
one-time key pairs for the overall security of the scheme. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the LYTC protocol. The third party is expected to 
be online during each run of the protocol, generating a unique watermark for 
each transaction. The buyer initiates the protocol by sending Sake (arg(x)) to 
the seller, indicating the content they wish to receive. An anonymous certificate, 
signed by a certification authority, is sent from the buyer to the seller to certify 
the buyer's public key, C, k, A(pkb), although a standard digital certificate may be 
used if privacy is not a concern. 
The buyer constructs a one-time public secret key pair (pk*, sk*) as the unique 
key pair used during the current transaction. This ensures that outdated infor- 
mation cannot be used in subsequent transactions and thus prevents pre-emptive 
unbinding. The buyer certifies the public key by constructing a second digital 
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certificate, Cskb(pk*). The key, pk*, is immediately used to verify the signed 
agreement, that indicates what content the buyer wishes to purchase. 
Upon verification of the signed agreement, the seller forwards C, kb(pk*) and 
Ssk. (arg(x)) to the third party. In order to ensure the watermark is suitably 
robust the seller also sends some characteristics of the cover material, char(x). In 
fact, Lei et at. state that the seller may send the content, x, if unconcerned about 
doing so. In this section shall assume the use of char(x), but shall reanalyse the 
protocol in which x is sent in the clear in Section 6.2.1, in which we demonstrate 
a vulnerability of the LYTC protocol when modelling under alternative trust 
assumptions to those proposed by the PM framework. 
Having received the seller's message, the trusted third party constructs a 
watermark that is unique to this transaction. They use the public key received in 
the digital certificate, Cskb (pk*), to encrypt the watermark ready for use by the 
seller. It is sent along with the public key used to encrypt it and bound to the 
signed agreement by the trusted third party by signing a message constructed of 
all three components. It is this message that prevents reactive unbinding. They 
also encrypt the watermark under their own secret key in case they need to verify 
the watermark in the arbitration process. 
Finally, the seller constructs the watermarked content in the encrypted do- 
main. Once the buyer has received the encrypted, watermarked content they are 
able to decrypt in order to gain the useful watermarked content that they wished 
to purchase. 
5.1.1 CSP Modelling 
We have used our general approach to the modelling and analysis of BSW pro- 
tocols, presented in Chapter 4, to rigorously analyse the LYTC protocol against 
the requirements specified formally in Section 4.3.1. We have previously stated 
that, when analysing under a consistent set of environmental assumptions, our 
BSW protocol models differ only in the strict behaviours of the agents, STRa, 
the set of all messages involved in each protocol M, and in each agent's initial 
knowledge, ZKa. 
As described in Chapter 4, we define the process, MALLORY, to accept 
any message, from the processes, ALICE, BOB and JEEVES, which follow the 
protocol precisely, and send any message that such agents are willing to accept. 
The agent processes, ALICE and BOB, are constructed as a parallel composition 
of the two processes: STRa, modelling the strict agent behaviour specified in 
the protocol's design; and rDEDa, the renamed deductive system of the agent, 
aEA- {M, J}. By synchronising the deductive system, rDEDQ, and strict 
agent behaviour, STRa, on the transmission of messages of the protocol, i. e., the 
trans events, each agent sends messages only when they can be constructed from 
their current knowledge and only at a time allowed by the protocol. Likewise, 
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each agent only accepts an incoming message at an appropriate time dictated by 
the protocol design. 
We construct a process, BUYER(b, (pki, ski)), defining the messages to be 
sent and received by the protocol initiator b regarding the purchase of digital 
content from any other seller, using some one-time key pair, (pki, ski) E )CPÄ. 
The sequence of message exchanges the buyer performs is defined as in the pro- 
tocol design, as illustrated by the message sequence chart in Figure 5.1. We can 
see from Figure 5.1 that the process modelling the initiator, BUYER, must be 
involved in only two of the four steps of the LYTC protocol. 
BUYER(b, (pk*, sk*)) = 
trans. b. s. (CSkca (pkb), CA, (pk*), SSk. (ar9(x))) --ý 
SEA {b, J} wON 
(trans. s. b. Epk*(WM(x, w')) ý STOP) 
zEX, 
Initially the buyer, b, chooses which seller they wish to purchase content from, 
8, as well as choosing the content its is they wish to buy xE X modelled as the 
resolution of an internal choice. The buyer, b, is provided a one-time public-secret 
key pair (pk*, sk*) as the unique key pair used during the current transaction. The 
buyer sends his original anonymous certificate, Cskb(pkb), along with the newly 
generated public key certified using his original secret key, Cskb(pk*), and the 
signed agreement indicative of the content he wishes to purchase, Ssk" (arg (x)). 
The buyer expects the seller to contact the third party in order to receive 
a watermark encrypted under the key, pk*, such that he can construct the wa- 
termarked content, Epk. (WM(x, w)), in the encrypted domain. In reality the 
buyer must be willing to receive the content watermarked with any watermark, 
the choice of which is modelled as the resolution of an external choice. Upon 
completion of the protocol the buyer performs no further events. If we require a 
buyer to purchase multiple items then we shall interleave as multiple instances of 
BUYER, each parameterised with a unique key pair. Similarly, we construct the 
processes, SELLER(s) and TTP, defining the messages to be sent and received 
by a protocol responder, a, and the third party, J, respectively. 
In the previous chapter we suggested that model checking systems composed 
of one or two well-behaved buyers and one or two well-behaved sellers may be 
useful In determining flaws in BSW protocols, following the suggestion of Ryan 
et at. In order to enable a well-behaved agent, aEA- {M, J}, to perform two 
runs of the protocol as a buyer within our model, we must provide the buyer 
with a unique key pair for each protocol run. For example, the process modelling 
the strict behaviour of A, when performing two runs of the protocol as buyer, is 
constructed as: - 
STRA a BUYER(A, (pkÄ, skÄ)) III BUYER(A, (pkÄ , skÄ )) 
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ANON-SGN. {pkb, sk, } H Csko(Pkb) 
ANON-VRF. {C, k, (pkb), pka} F pkb 
CHAR. {x} I- char(x) 
Table 5.1: Deduction Rules 
The process, SELLER, is parameterised only by the agents identity, and so 
the process modelling the strict behaviour of a well-behaved agent performing two 
runs of the protocol as a seller shall simply be two interleaved runs of SELLER. 
Finally, we may also wish to model a scenario in which a well-behaved agent, 
aEA- {M, J}, performs a single protocol run as a buyer and another as a 
seller. To do so we provide the agent with a single one-time key pair. For 
example the strict behaviour of A, when performing both roles, is constructed 
as: - 
STRA = BUYER(A, (pkA*, ski)) III SELLER(A) 
The set of all messages that could conceivably sent within some protocol run 
M is defined to be: - 
M= I" (XI W) Ilxt-X, wt-W} l U{ (Cskca (pkb), Cskb (pk*), Ssk" (ar9(x))) I b+-A, x+-X, (Pk", ak")t--ACP* } 
U{(Cskb(pk*), Ssk"(arg(x)), char(x)) I b+-A, x+-X, (pk", sk")+--ICP'} 
U {Saki (Epk" (w), pk*, Ssk* (arg(x))) I xt-X, wt-W, (Pk", ak")+-xP' } U {Epk" (WM (x, w)) I x+-X, wt-W, (pk", ak')+-xP' } 
Underlying each process, ALICE, BOB, and MALLORY, is the same deduc- 
tive system, DEDa, that follows the construction contained within Section 4.3,3. 
In fact the initial knowledge, -T/Ca) 
is the only distinguishing feature of each 
agent's deductive system, DEDa. 
Each agent is provided initial knowledge of all agents, all public keys, their 
own secret key, their own digital certificate, their own digital content, their own 
watermarks and the unique identifiers of all digital content. In addition each 
agent may require a set of one-time key pairs, ICPQ, to be used uniquely within 
each protocol run. Some of these facts are unique to a particular type of agent 
and inappropriate facts are omitted from each agents' initial knowledge. 
TCa=AUPICU{ska, Cskca(pka)}UX0UW0U{arg(x) I x+-X}U1CPQ 
We extend the deduction system, DED0, from that described in Section 4.3.3, 
to include the rules ANON-SGN and ANON-VRF to allow for the use of anony- 
mous certificates, as illustrated in Table 5.1, i. e., digital certificates that do not 
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disclose the identity of the secret key holder. The deduction rule CHAR. states 
that the characteristics of the digital content, char(x), optionally sent by the 
seller to the third party such that a more robust watermark may be generated, 
can be inferred by anyone in possession of the original content. 
As in the construction of the CSP model of the MW protocol, running the 
two processes STRa and rDED0 in parallel ensures that messages can be sent by 
the well-behaved agent, a, only at a time when they have sufficient knowledge 
to construct the message to be sent. As the two process synchronize only on the 
trans events the signal and share events produced by the well-behaved agent's 
deductive system are made available to the overall system whenever they are 
made available by the deductive system. 
Finally, we perform the necessary renamings before constructing the CSP 
process MODEL as a parallel composition of the four agents processes precisely 
as we did in Section 4.3.4. 
MODEL = 
((ALICE BOB) JEEVES) MALLORY 
{I comm. A. B, I} JI comm. J. p, I p+-{A, B} I} comm. M. p, pý {A, B, J}, comm. B. A fl comm. p. J comm. p. M, ý take. p. p', P +-{A, B, J}, 
fake. p. p' P54P 
The first specification, SPECB, addresses the requirement of a well-behaved 
seller, who demands that once they download watermarked content that they 
have sold, they must immediately have knowledge of all evidence required to 
prosecute the buyer who originally shared content. To demonstrate that the 
protocol fails to meet the requirements of the seller, B, it is enough to show 
that the refinement fails when considering only a specific piece of watermarked 
content, WM(XB, Wj). In this case Lei et al. expect the set of evidence, 
SVB(b, (pkk, ski)), to be sufficient evidence for B to prosecute the buyer, bE 
A- {B, J}, who purchased the content using the key pair (pk*, sk*) E 1CP*, for 
illicit file sharing of WM(XB, Wj). 
EVe(b, (Pk*, ak')) = 
WM(XB) WA, 
CakcA(pkb), 
Caky (Pk* ), 
Sak, 
r 
(EPk" ( W), pk*, Sak' (arg(XB))) 
The specification, SPECB(tr, R), demands that an event signalling the seller 
B has downloaded a shared file, signal. download. B. WM(XB, Wj), appearing in 
the trace, tr, implies that all signal. knows. B events, indicating B's knowledge of 
sufficient evidence that a buyer bE , A-{B, J} shared the content, WM (XB, Wj), 
which was purchased using some key pair (pk*, sk*) E 1CP6, must not be contained 
in the refusals set, R. 
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SPEC B(tr, R) = 
f signal. download. B. WM(XB, Wj) in tr VA (signal. knows. B. e V R) 
bE. A-{B, J} 
(eE6VB(b, 
(pk`, sk")) 
(pk', sk`)EICP6 
The process-orientated specification, SPECB, states that for one of the buyers 
bE A-{B, J}, who B may have sold content to, the process MODEL must always 
willing to perform each event, signal. knows. B. e, where eE EV B (b, (pk', sk') ), 
following the event, signal. download. B. WM(XB, Wj), representing B download- 
ing watermarked content. 
SPE CB = 
let 
SPECo(b, (pk*, sk*)) _ 
CSTOP n( n xýSPECo(b) 
11 
xEE-{signal. download. B. WM(Xg, Wj)) 
JJ 
n signal. download. B. WM(XB, Wj) -+ SPEC1(b, (pk', sk')) 
SPEC1(b, (pk*, sk*)) = 
within 
STOP n( n x-+SPECI(b, (pk', sk')) 
11 
xEE-{signal. knows. B. el e4-eVB(b, (pk", ek"))} 
JJ 
ZEE-{sign!. knows. B. ele4-6VB(b, (pk", ek"))} 
0 signal. knows. B. e -a SPEC, (b, (pk', sk'))1 
eEEVB(b, (pk", sk')) 
n SPECo(b, (pk*, sk*)) 
bEA-{B, J} 
(pk*, 8k*)E1CP6 
SPECB is defined as a liveness specification, requiring that all evidence must 
be available to the well-behaved seller B at a particular a particular instance, and 
so the stable failures model is used to reason whether a BSW protocol satisfies 
this specification in FDR. 
A second specification, SPECA, concerning the requirement of a well-behaved 
buyer, A, states that if A has not previously uploaded a specific piece of water- 
marked content then at least one piece of evidence, necessary to prove that A 
illicitly shared the file, must remain unknown to the seller, M, who sold that 
digital content. To demonstrate that the protocol fails the buyer, A, it is enough 
to show that the refinement fails when considering only a specific piece of war 
termarked content, WM(XM, Wj), purchased by A using the one-time key pair, 
(pkk, skA). In this case Lei et at. expect the set of sufficient evidence of illicitly 
sharing WM(XM, Wj) to be: - 
cv. - 
WM(XM, Wi), 1 
CakcA (pkA), 
C. VA - CdkA(pkA), 
l SBkr (EPkn (WJ ), pkA, Sakä (arg(X M ))) 
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SPE CA = 
f PRE(signal. upload. A. WM(XM, Wj), signal. knows. M. e) 
CEEVA 
5.1.2 Analytical Results 
In order to check whether our protocol model meets the requirement, SPECB, 
we isolate the events included in the specification namely, signal events indica- 
tive of the seller downloading content, signal. download. B, and knowing evidence, 
signal. knows. B, to produce MODELB in the same manner described in Sec- 
tion 4.3.5. Similarly, we isolate the signal events indicative of the buyer upload- 
ing content, signal. upload. A, and of the misbehaving agent knowing evidence, 
signal. knows. M, before checking whether the process MODELA refines the spec- 
ification, SPECB. 
When model checking the LYTC protocol using the approach described in this 
section, no failure of the protocol in meeting the requirements of the buyer or seller 
have been identified using FDR. It is important to note that we have modelled 
small finite state systems and such results alone do not prove the security of the 
protocol in the general case. 
SPECB CF MODELB 
SPECA CT MODELA \ {I comm, take, fake I} 
5.1.3 The Importance of One-Time Key Pairs 
By binding the watermark, w, to the cover material, x, via the signed mes- 
sage, S, kj (Epk" (w), pk', Saks (arg (x))), Lei et at. prevent the malicious seller from 
performing a reactive unbinding attack. However, this message alone does not 
protect against pre-emptive unbinding. 
Let us suppose that the key pair need not be unique, then a buyer, A, 
may use the same key pair, (pkÄ, Al), in multiple transactions. Consider the 
first piece of content, XM, purchased as more expensive than a second piece 
of content XX. In the first transaction the seller, M, receives the signed mes- 
sage, S, kj(Epkl(Wj), pkk, S, kÄ(arg (XM))), before distributing the encrypted wa- 
termarked content EpkÄ(WM(XM, Wj)) to A. Subsequently, in a second run of 
the protocol A purchases Xýy using the same key, pkÄ. As such, M omits the 
communication with the trusted third party, J, and instead embeds the same 
encrypted watermark, EpkA- (Wj), as in the first transaction. 
Should M ever intercept an illicitly shared copy of the less expensive water- 
marked content, WM (X; (, Wj), then Wj can be extracted and embedded into the 
higher priced content to produce WM (XM, Wj). This, along with the signed mes- 
sage received signed message, S, k j (Epkk (Wj), pkÄ, S, k; (arg (XM))), taken 
from 
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the first transaction, and the certificates, C, kcA (pkA) and CakA (pk; ), is then con- 
sidered sufficient evidence of illicit file sharing of the more expensive content, 
when in fact the less expensive watermarked content was illicitly shared. 
Should the encryption key, pk*, be unique to each transaction then it is not 
possible for the seller to perform the watermark embedding using an outdated 
encrypted watermark associated with a previous transaction. Hence, the unique- 
ness of the one-time key pairs must be assured for the LYTC protocol is not 
vulnerable to pre-emptive unbinding. 
This vulnerability was identified by model checking the system involving two 
buyers, A, and a single seller, B, with the following minor modification. Rather 
than constructing the strict protocol behaviour of the buyer, STRA, as an in- 
terleaving of two runs of the protocol using unique one-time keys, we modelled 
STRA as an interleaving of two runs of the protocol in which the same key is 
used for each run. In fact the seller B performs no actions in the trace and so 
the same vulnerability is found in a system in which B is omitted. 
STRA = BUYER(A, pkÄ) III BUYER(A, pkÄ) 
When modelling the protocol under the assumption that the keys chosen need 
not be unique, and analysing it against identical requirements, FDR automati- 
cally generated the following trace identifying a failure of the protocol in meeting 
the requirements of the buyer. This trace relates directly to the vulnerability 
described above. 
(comm. A. M. (CskcA(pkA), C, kA (pkÄ), SakÄ (arg(XM))), 
comm. M. J. (C, kA (pkÄ) , S, kA 
(arg (XM) ), char (XM) ) 
comm. J. M. Sskj (EpkA (Wj), pkÄ, Sskk (arg(XM))), 
comm. M. A. Epk; (WM(XM, Wj)), 
comm. A. M. (CskcA (pkA), CskA(pkA), Ssk;, (arg(Xif))), 
comm. M. A. EpkA(WM(Xý, Wj)), 
upload. A. WM (X'M, Wj), 
signal. knows. M. WM (XM, Wj), 
signal. knows. M. CskcA (pkA), 
signal. knows . M. C, kA 
(pkÄ), 
signal. knows. M. Sskj(EpkA( Wj), pkÄ, S, kA(arg (XM)))) 
Even if the seller followed the protocol faithfully and received the more expen- 
sive watermarked content, WM(XM, Wj), as a result of it actually being illicitly 
shared by the buyer, the seller is unable to prove precisely which of the two pieces 
of watermarked content has been shared as it could be argued that the evidence, 
WM(XM, Wj), could have been generated via the above trace. At the end of the 
trace, the seller is in possession of evidence that could only have been gathered 
if the buyer had shared at least one piece of watermarked content. However, as 
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it cannot be proved which piece of content was shared, it is in the interest of 
a dishonest buyer to act in a manner that renders themselves vulnerable to an 
attack as they may as a consequence construct a plausible denial of an act of 
illicit file sharing. 
In Section 4.3.4 we commented that the self-destructive behaviour of an agent 
who fabricates evidence of piracy against themselves was not of concern in our 
analysis does not stand to gain from such activity. This differs from the scenario 
presented in this section, as the buyer gains an advantage by taking action that 
causes the protocol to fail in meeting its requirements, as a plausible denial of an 
act of illicit file sharing can be constructed. 
In this section, we have demonstrated that the resolution of the customers' 
rights issue in [28] is dependent upon the uniqueness one-time key pairs. A 
pre-emptive unbinding attack is possible on the LYTC protocol should the same 
key pair be used in multiple transactions. A similar vulnerability in [53] was 
presented in [61]. As preventing pre-emptive unbinding is dependent upon the 
uniqueness of the one-time key pairs it is apparent that entrusting the random 
generation of one-time key pairs to the buyer puts the protocol's security at risk. 
5.2 Ibrahim-ElDin-Hegazy (IEH) Protocol 
In order for BSW protocols to be adopted as a suitable copy deterrence solution, 
to the problem of illicit file sharing, consumers must be convinced that they can 
trust the scheme. Ibrahim et al. propose a protocol in which the buyer chooses 
the watermark, which may be a preferable approach [23]. The protocol is initiated 
by the buyer and proceeds as illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
A buyer, b, initiates the protocol by sending an indication of what content 
they wish to purchase, arg(x), to the seller, s. In return the seller provides 
certification of their public key, CakcA(s, pk, ). The buyer chooses the watermark 
to be embedded and sends it encrypted under their own public key. They also send 
the watermark signed using their secret key and encrypted using the public key of 
the trusted third party, Epk, (S, kb(w)). Ibrahim et al. do not wish the scheme to 
be reliant on the buyer performing any decryption during the arbitration process 
and by storing Epk, (S, kb (w)) they have evidence that can later be deciphered by 
the trusted third party during dispute resolution rather than the buyer. In order 
to bind the watermark to the content the buyer also signs a message constructed of 
the combination of a hash of the watermark and a hash of the common agreement, 
S, k, (H(H(w), H(arg(x)))). 
In order to check the consistency of to in the two messages, Epkb (w) and 
S, k, (Esh(w)), received in Step 3, the seller is expecting to receive an identical 
encrypted watermark from the third party. The third party decrypts the received 
value and verifies the signature. They then encrypt the watermark using the 
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A. Pkb, Pk f, . kb, CakCA(b, Pkb), 
pkC W s) x «- S) 
Buyer b 
-4- Pk- . k.. PkJ " PkCA -C. kCA (., ph. ). N. 
Seller s 
A. fAJ. "MJ. lMCA 
I Third Piny J 
sEA-{b, J} 
arg E {arg(x)Ix t- XX} 
E W, 
arg 
CakCp ($+Pka ) 
Epke (v'), Epkj (Skgq(u')), 
CekcA(b, pk6), Sekb(H(H(u'), H(ar9(x)))) 
EpkJ (S. kº(LL')), Cokew (b, pkb) 
Sskj (EPkb ýýýý 
Epkp (WM (x, w)) 
Figure 5.2: IEH Protocol 
public key of the buyer and signs it to confirm that it came from the third 
party, S, kj(Epkb(w)). Upon receiving this value the seller verifies the encrypted 
watermark signed by the trusted third party matches that sent by the buyer in 
Step 3. 
Deng and Preneel identified that the protocol is deficient should a probabilistic 
encryption scheme be used [11]. After receiving S, k, (Epkb(w)) and removing the 
signature, s verifies that the encrypted watermark in Step 3 is precisely the 
same as that received in from the third party. However, this comparison cannot 
be made of messages encrypted under a probabilistic encryption scheme as two 
identical messages will encrypt to different values even when the same encryption 
key and scheme are used. It is only once they have both been decrypted that 
they can be compared, as they can then be expected to be identical. As such 
the IEH protocol will halt when the comparison of the encrypted watermarks is 
made even when identical watermarks are encrypted under the same key. We 
must therefore assume the use of a deterministic encryption scheme. 
The embedding procedure is as in the MW and LYTC protocols. The seller 
embeds an indexing watermark into the cover material and then encrypts this 
under the public key of the buyer in order to conduct the embedding in the en- 
crypted domain. The resulting encrypted watermarked content, Epks(WM(x, w)), 
is then sent to the buyer, the only agent that is able to decipher the requested 
watermarked material. 
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5.2.1 CSP Modelling 
We have used our general approach to the modelling and analysis of BSW pro- 
tocols, presented in Chapter 4, to rigorously analyse the IEH protocol against 
the requirements specified formally in Section 4.3.1. We reiterate that, when 
analysing under a consistent set of environmental assumptions, our BSW proto- 
col models differ only in the strict behaviours of the agents, STRa,, the set of all 
messages involved in each protocol M, an each agent's initial knowledge, ZK.. 
We construct a process, BUYER(b, w), defining the messages to be sent and 
received by the protocol initiator, b, regarding the purchase of digital content from 
any other seller using the watermark, w. The sequence of message exchanges 
the buyer performs is defined as in the protocol design, as illustrated by the 
message sequence chart in Figure 5.2. We can see from Figure 5.2 that the 
process modelling the initiator, BUYER, must be involved in only four of the six 
steps of the IEH protocol. 
B UYER(b, w) = 
f tm. ns. b. s. arg(x) -º tmns. s. b. C. k, (s, pk. ) --º n 
.-L- /G C /c /_.. \\ /L _L sErl-{6, J} o7uiaa. v. a. \v-ykblwhr-Pk! \asknlwJJ+, -skcAlu+PF6J, aakblnl^lwl+nlaT91x/JJJ! y 
SEX. Ow (trnn8.8. b. Epk, (WM(x, w')) -+ STOP) 
Similarly, we construct the processes SELLER(s) and TTP defining the mes- 
sages to be sent and received by a protocol responder, s, and the third party, J, 
Each of the protocol failures identified in the next section were generated from 
the analysis of the process MODEL, constructed of a buyer, A, who may perform 
two interleaved runs of the protocol, a single buyer, B, a misbehaving agent, M, 
who can perform either role and a third party, J, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
The strict behaviour of the well-behaved agents is thus defined as: - 
STRA = BUYER(A, W) III BUYER(A, W') 
STRB = SELLER(B) 
The set of all messages that could conceivably sent within some protocol run 
M is defined to be: - 
,M= {WM(x, w) (xa-X, wa-W} 
U{atg(x) Ixt-x} 
U{C, kcA(b, pkb) Ib+-A} 
U{ (Epkb ( w), Epkr (Sakb (w'», CakcA (b, pkb), 
Sdj4(H(H(w")e H(ang(x))))) 
U{(Epkj (S"kb(w)), CakcA(b, pkb), Sakr(Epkb(w))) Ib+-A, w+-w} 
U{S, k., (Epkb(w)) Ibr-A, w+-w} 
U{Epk, 6 MM (-Ts w)) IbýA, xf-X, wý-W} 
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Underlying each process, ALICE, BOB, and MALLORY, is the same deduc- 
tive system, DEDa, that follows the construction contained within Section 4.3.3. 
In fact the initial knowledge, IsCa, is the only distinguishing feature of each 
agent's deductive system, DEDa. Each agent is provided initial knowledge of all 
agents, all public keys, their own secret key, their own digital certificate, their 
own digital content, their own watermarks, and the unique identifiers of all dig- 
ital content. Some of these facts are unique to a particular type of agent and 
inappropriate facts are omitted from each agents initial knowledge. 
I/Cc,, =AUPICU{ska, C9kcA(a, pka)}UXaUWaU{arg(x) x +- X} 
Finally, we construct the CSP process MODEL as a parallel composition of 
the four agents processes precisely, as we did in Section 4.3.4, ready for analysis 
against the protocol requirements. In Section 4.3.1 we stated that we need only 
find a single failure in order to demonstrate the failure of the protocol in meeting 
its requirements. To demonstrate that the protocol fails to meet the requirements 
of the seller, B, it was previously enough to show that the refinement fails when 
considering a specific piece of watermarked content, WM(XB, Wj). 
In the IEH protocol the buyer generates their own watermark, rather than 
the third party, so we shall instead demonstrate that the protocol fails B when 
considering the watermarked content, WM (XB, WM). Thus, SPECB (tr, R) de- 
mands that an event signalling that the buyer, B, has downloaded shared con- 
tent, signal. download. B. WM (XB, Wm), appearing in the trace, tr, implies that 
all signal. knows. B events, indicating B's knowledge of sufficient evidence that a 
buyer bEA- {B, J} shared such content, must not be contained in the refusals 
set, R. 
SPECB(tr, R) = 
signal. download. B. WM(XBi WM) in tr 
VA (signal. knows. B. e ý R) 
=* 
( 
bE. A{B, J} eEEV8(b) 
The following set EVB(b) is the set of evidence considered sufficient for that a 
buyer, bEA- {B, J}, shared the content, WM(XB, WM), in the IEH protocol. 
WM(XB, WM), 
EVB(b) = CskCA(b, pkb), 
S8kb (H(H( WM), H(arg (XB)))) 
The specification, SPECA, is amended similarly. 
SPECA(tr) _ 
-, (signal. upload. A. W M (Xm, WA) in tr) 
=: ýV -, (signal. knows. M. e in tr) 
eEEVA 
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I WM(XM, WA), EVA = CakcA(A, PkA), 
SakA(H(H( WA), H(ar9(XM)))) 
5.2.2 Analytical Results 
Having constructed MODELB and MODELA, to isolate the events included in 
each specification, we identify a number of failures of the protocol in meeting 
the requirements of the buyer and the seller when model checking against the 
specifications, SPECB and SPECA, in FDR. Each of the attacks are found in 
models constructed of a well-behaved buyer, A, that may perform two runs of 
the protocol and a single well-behaved seller, B. 
SPECB ¢F MODELB 
SPECA ¢T MODELA \ 11 comm, take, fake I} 
Failure to Meet Seller's Requirements 
The protocol fails to meet the requirements of the well-behaved seller as demon- 
strated by the trace provided and described below. We originally identified this 
flaw in [60]. 
((comm. M. B. arg(XB), 
commm. B. M. C, k,,, (B, pkB), 
/ ýmm. M. B. (Epk, r 
( Ww<), Epk, (S. k, u ( WM )), C. ka, (M, pkM ), S. kM (H(H( WM ), FI( arg(XB))))), 
comm. B. J. Epk, (S. k, (Wm)), C. kCA (M, pkM ), 
comm. J. B. S. k, (EpkM (WM)), 
comm. B. M. Epkx(WM(XB, WM)), 
signal. upload. M. WM (XB, WM)), R) 
when aignal. knowa. B. S. k(H(H(WM), H(an3(Xa)))) ER 
A dishonest buyer, M, can send false data in Step 3 of the protocol, in which 
the values for the watermark do not match throughout the message. How- 
ever, the seller cannot construct the message, S, k,,, (H (H ( WM ), H (arg (XB) ))), 
whilst the watermark is unknown to him and is therefore unable to detect that 
the watermark values do not match throughout the message he received, i. e., 
Epk, (S. kM(WM)), C, kcA(M, pkM), S, kM(H(H(WM), H(ang(XB)))). Therefore, the 
seller is unable to build a case against against the dishonest buyer, even if the 
buyer has illegally shared the watermarked document, as he is unable to gather 
both of the pieces of evidence required for prosecution. 
Poh describes a second variation of this attack in which the misbehaving seller 
intercepts and spoofs a message sent between the seller and the third party [42]. 
FDR also automatically generates this trace as a counterexample. 
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((comm. M. B. arg(XB), 
comm. B. M. CakCA (B, pkB), 
comm. M. B. (EpkM (Wm), EpkJ 
(SakM (WM)), CakcA (M, pkM ), SakM (H(H( Wä(), H(arg(XB ))))), 
take. B. J. EpkJ (SakM ( Wmr)), CakCA (M, pkM), 
fake. B. J. EpkJ (SekM (WM)), CakCA 
(M, 
pkM), 
CUTR. 7R.. I. B. Sek, (EPkM (WM)), 
comm. B. M. EDk,,, (WM(XB, WM)), 
signal. upload. M. WM (XB, Wm)), R) 
where signal. knows. B. SskM(H(H(WM), H(arg(XB)))) ER 
In this attack the dishonest buyer, M, again sends false data in Step 3 of the 
protocol, in which the values for the watermark do not match throughout the 
message. However, this time the signed watermark encrypted under the public 
key of the third party, Epkf (SekM (Wýy)), does match the watermark used in the 
construction of the dual signature, SskM (H(H(Wýy), H(arg(XB)))), although the 
encrypted watermark, EpkM (WM ), matches neither. The seller will only accept 
WM within Sski(EpkM (WM)) sent from the third party to the seller and so the 
misbehaving buyer intercepts and spoofs a message sent between the seller and 
the third party. The misbehaving buyer replaces Epk, (SakM (Wj )), sent by the 
seller to the third party, with the value, Epk, (S3kM (WM )). The third party sub- 
sequently returns Ssk,, (EpkM ( WM) ), unaware that the message they received was 
not that intended by the well-behaved seller. The seller is therefore unable to 
build a case against against the misbehaving buyer, even if the buyer has illic- 
itly shared the watermarked document, WM(XB, WM), as he remains without 
S$kM(H(H(WM), H(arg (XB)))), which was required in SVB. 
Failure to Meet Buyer's Requirements due to Pre-emptive Unbinding 
One of the traces automatically generated by FDR, demonstrating a failure of 
the IEH protocol in meeting the requirements of a well-behaved buyer, involves 
two consecutive runs of the protocol. The omission of one-time key pairs, or any 
other security mechanism, to avoid a pre-emptive unbinding attack leaves the 
IEH protocol vulnerable to the following attack. 
(comm. A. M. arg(XM), 
comm. M. A. C. kcA(M, pkM), 
comm. A. M. (EpkA(WA), Epkr (SakA ( WA)), C, kcA 
(A, pkA), S, kA (H(H( WA), H(mg(XM ))))), 
comm. M. A. EpkA (WM (XM, WA)), 
comm. A. M. arg(XM), 
comm. M. A. CakcA(M, pkM), 
comm. A. M. (EpkA (WA), Epkj (S, kA 
( Wä ) ), C, kcA (A, pkA), S. kA (H (H( Wi ), H (arg(XM )) ) )), 
comm. M. A. EpkA(WM(XM, WA)), 
signal . upload. 
A. WM(XM, WA), 
signal. knows . M. WM 
(XM, WA), 
signal. knows . 
M. CakcA (A, pkA), 
signal. knows. M. S, kA(H(H(WA), H(arg(XM))))) 
98 
This trace demonstrates the inability of the IEH protocol to protect against 
a pre-emptive unbinding attack similar to that described in Section 4.3.5. The 
IEH protocol fails to meet the buyers' requirements as the seller, M, holds knowl- 
edge of all elements of the set, EVA, before before the occurrence of the event, 
signal. upload. A. WM (XM, WA). Following an initial successful transaction the 
seller pre-empts illicit file sharing by ignoring the newly generated encrypted wa- 
termark, EpkA( WA), from a second protocol run and instead embeds the outdated 
encrypted watermark from the first, EpkA (WA), (see event 8 in the above trace). 
As a result, when a copy of WM (XM, WA) is retrieved, the seller can extract 
WA and embed it within XM in order to fabricate evidence of illicit file sharing 
of WM(XM, WA) against the buyer. This attack is particularly relevant when 
prosecuting against illicit file sharing of XM demands more compensation than 
XM. 
We have already stated that FDR automatically generates up 100 counter 
examples. The nature in which the model checking is conducted is such that the 
shortest traces shall always be the first to be identified. A shorter variation of 
the above attack is also generated by FDR. We described the previous attack 
initially as it is easier to envisage consecutive runs of the protocol, as apparent in 
the first trace, as opposed to the interleaved protocol runs of which the following 
trace is constructed. 
(comm. A. M. arg(XM), 
comm. M. A. C. kcA (M, pkM), 
comm. A. M. (EPkA( WA), Epk, (S. kA ( WA)), C. kcA (A, pkA), S. kA (H(H(WA), H(ar9(XM ))))), 
oomm. A. M. arg(Xj'w), 
comm. M. A. C. kcA(M, pkM), 
comm. A. M. (EPkA(WÄ), EPk, 
(S. 
kA 
( WÄ)), CkcA (A, pkA), SakA (H(H( WÄ), H(arg(XM ))))), 
comm. M. A. EpkA(WM(Xj'f, WA)) 
signal. upload. A. WM(Xm', WA) 
signal. llnows. M. WM(XM, WA) 
signd. knows. M. C. kcA(A, pkA) 
signd. knows. M. S. kA(H(H(WA), H(arg(XM))))) 
During an initial transaction, in which the buyer wishes to purchase XM, a 
second run of the protocol commences, in which the buyer wishes to purchase 
XM. Either the initial transaction is halted after Step 3 or at least any further 
steps of this initial run of the protocol are delayed. In the mean time, the second 
run of the protocol proceeds to its conclusion. However, the seller pre-empts 
illicit file sharing by ignoring the encrypted watermark generated in the second 
run of the protocol, Epk,, (WÄ), and instead embeds the encrypted watermark 
from the first, EpkA(WA). As a result, when a copy of WM(Xý , WA) is found, 
the seller can extract WA and embed it within XM in order to fabricate evidence 
of illicit file sharing of WM(XM, WA) against the buyer. As before, this attack is 
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particularly relevant when prosecuting against illicit files sharing of XM demands 
more compensation than X. 
Failure to Meet Buyer's Requirements due to Reactive Unbinding 
In Section 5.1, we commented that it is in the buyer's interest for the proto- 
col to fail. From the customers' right issue, Qiao and Nahrstedt observed that 
watermarking schemes in which the seller chose the watermark to be embedded 
failed to protect the copyright [45]. Should the seller fail to address this issue an 
arbitrator is unable to discern whether the buyer or seller has acted maliciously. 
Thus, it is in the interest of a dishonest buyer to act in a manner that renders 
themselves vulnerable to an attack as they may as a consequence construct a 
plausible denial of an act of illicit file sharing that they wish to perform. 
As it is in the interest of the buyer for the protocol to fail to protect their 
rights, this implies it is in their interest to leave themselves vulnerable to unbind- 
ing. In Section 5.1, we demonstrated that the resolution of the customers' rights 
issue in [28] is dependent upon the uniqueness one-time key pairs. A pre-emptive 
unbinding attack is possible on the LYTC protocol should the same key pair be 
used in multiple transactions. The following vulnerability of the IEH protocol 
was identified by model checking our CSP model with the following minor mod- 
ification. Rather than constructing the strict protocol behaviour of the buyer, 
STRA, as an interleaving of two runs of the protocol using unique watermarks, 
we modelled STRA as an interleaving of two runs of the protocol in which the 
same watermark is used for each run. 
STRA = BUYER(A, WA) III BUYER(A, WA) 
When modelling the protocol under the assumption that the watermarks cho- 
sen need not be unique, and analysing it against identical requirements, FDR 
automatically generated the following trace identifying a failure of the protocol 
in meeting the requirements of the buyer. 
(comm. A. M. arg(XM), 
comm. M. A. C, kCA (M, pkM), 
comet. A. M. (EPkA(WA), Epk, (S, kA(WA)), C"k, A(A, pkA), S, kA(H(H(WA), H(ary(X ))))), 
comm. M. A. EPkA(WM(XM, WA)) 
signal. upload. A. WM(XM, WA) 
comm. A. M. arg(XM), 
comm. M. A. C, kcA (M, pkM ), 
comm. A. M. (EPkA (WA), Epk, (S, kA ( WA)), C, kcA (A, pkA), S, kA (H(H(WA ), H(a+g(XM ))))), 
signal. knows. M. W M (XM, WA) 
signal. knows. M. CakCA (A, PkA) 
signal. knows. M. S, kA (H(H(WA), Hang(XM))))) 
An initial run a of the protocol is completed between the buyer, A, and 
the seller, M, in which the buyer purchases the cover material, XX, embedded 
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with their chosen watermark, WA. The buyer then proceeds to illicitly share 
WM (XM, WA). Subsequently, a second protocol run, ß, is initiated between the 
same buyer, A, and seller, M, with A choosing to use the same watermark but 
requesting new content, XM. 
Following the third step of the second protocol run, ß, the misbehaving agent, 
M, is able to gather the evidence required to prove that A has illicitly shared 
WM (XM, WA) without A having ever shared this file. During the third step of the 
second run of the protocol M receives S, kA(H(H(WA), H(arg(XM)))). By this 
point M is also able to construct WM(XM, WA) by extracting the watermark WA 
from the illicitly shared content, WM(Xý, WA), and embedding it within XM. 
As M knows these two pieces of evidence when A has never shared the content, 
WM(XM, WA), the protocol fails to protect the requirements of the buyer. 
The impact of the attack can be explained as follows: the buyer A purchases 
numerous pieces of content from the seller, M, each one embedded with the 
same watermark. A then illegally distributes multiple copies of all these pieces 
of content. M may subsequently retrieve any number of shared content but M 
is only able to prove that at least piece of content has been illicitly shared. M is 
unable to prove how many have been shared or identify which particular pieces 
of content. In common law, this is unlikely to be considered adequate evidence 
to prosecute A even though he was indeed acting maliciously. It is therefore in 
A's interest to choose the same watermark in each run of the protocol. 
5.3 Hu-Zhang (HZ) Protocol 
In [22] a protocol was proposed aiming to increase the efficiency of multiple trans- 
actions. The trusted third party is not required to be online during a transaction 
between the buyer and the seller. As such the HZ protocol, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.3, is subject to two stages, similar to the MW protocol: the watermark 
generation stage; and the watermark insertion stage. 
In the watermark generation stage, Hu and Zhang propose the novel idea of 
enabling the buyer to request multiple signed encrypted well-formed watermarks 
at once. Upon receipt of the buyers digital certificate, Cake (b, pkb), and the 
quantity, 'n, of watermarks required, the trusted third party randomly generates 
n unique watermarks wl, wý, ... w, a E Wi. Each is encrypted using the public 
key of the buyer, pkb, and signed along with the same public key. Thus for each 
watermark, wj, a message, Sak, (pkb, Epkb (w; ) ), is sent from the trusted third party 
to the buyer along with certification of the buyer's public key. 
In the watermark insertion stage the buyer chooses which watermark from 
the generation stage to use for the current transaction. The buyer sends to the 
seller a common agreement, along with a signature used to bind the watermark 
to the cover material, in the message, Sskb(Epkb(w), ang(x)). This is sent with the 
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Third Party J buyer b Seller s 
Watermark Cxaaadon Stop 
nEV 
n, C"kOA (b, pkb) 
u'l, u'3, ,. . 'u, n E W, 
mu", :=S. k, (Pkb, Enk" (w=)) 
mb :=S. k, (Pkb, 
Eyki (C, kpA(b, Pkb))) 
mu"l , mw_, .., mu,, , mb 
Watermark Insertion Stage 
sEA-{b, J} 
arg E {arg(z)Ir 
Mu E 
ma S. ko(Eakb(w), arg) 
ms, mw 
I Mb 
pEP. 
Eya, ý (WM (z, o, (w))) 
Figure 5.3: HZ Protocol 
messages, m,, and mb, received in the watermark generation stage. The seller 
verifies the signatures and embeds the permuted watermark in the encrypted 
domain, sending the result, Epkb(WM(x, ap(w))), to the buyer. 
We have modelled the HZ protocol in the same manner as that described in 
Chapter 4 and reiterated throughout this chapter. The set of all messages, M, 
was defined to include every message that could feasibly sent or received in some 
protocol run in the usual manner. The strict agent behaviour, STRa, underlying 
the construction of the processes, ALICE, BOB and JEEVES, was defined to 
match that of each role illustrated in Figure 5.3, as was the initial knowledge 
ZJCa of each agent. 
The HZ protocol allows a buyer to request multiple signed encrypted wa- 
termarks from the third party. However, in our model only one watermark is 
requested by the buyer during each protocol run. As such our model represents a 
subset of the behaviour of the system, but the specification must still be respected 
in this smaller system. 
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The the set of evidence considered sufficient for B to prove that a buyer, 
bEA- {B, J}, shared the content, WM (XB, upB ( Wj)), and the set of evi- 
dence considered sufficient for M to prove that the buyer, A, shared the content, 
WM(XM, QpM(WJ)), are defined as EVB(b) and EVA, below. 
iVn(%li = 
", o\.. / -1c /_L c /i77 \\ 
-I 
WM(XM, QPýy(wJ))+ 
cýý _1 
SakA(EPkJ(WJ), arg(XM)), 
GvA- 
WM(XB, apB(WJ)), 
Sakb (EPk ( WJ), arg (XB)), 
Sak (pkb, Epk ( Wj) ), 
Sak (pkb, EPk (Cakca ( 6, pkb) 
; )ski lPsb+ r-nkr l vv J)) i 
Sak (pk6, EPk (Cakca (6, Pk6 ) )) 
Sakj (pkA, Epk. º( Wj)), 
I 
Sakj (PkA, EPkr(CakcA(A, PkA))) J 
When model checking the protocol in FDR, against the requirements defined 
in Section 4.3.1, we identify a failure of the protocol in meeting the requirements of 
the buyer. One-time key pairs are not used in [22] and no alternative mechanism 
for preventing pre-emptive unbinding is provided, which leads to a pre-emptive 
attack similar to that described in Section 4.3.5. The following trace is indicative 
of the attack: - 
(comm. A. J. C. koA(A, PkA), 
comm. J. A. (Sak, (PkA, EpkJ (W)), SakJ (PkA, EpkJ(C, kcA (A, PkA)))), 
comm. A. M. (S. kA 
(EpkJ (WJ), arg(XM)), S. kJ (pkA, EpkJ (W)), Sak, (pkA, EpkJ 
(CakcA (A, pkA)))), 
comm. M. A. EpkA (WM (XM, opM ( W ))) 
comm. A. J. C. kcA (A, pkA), 
comm. J. A. (S. k, (PkA, EpkJ (Wj)), S. kJ (PkA, EpkJ (C. kcA (A, pkA)))), 
comm. A. M. 
(S. 
kA(EpkJ ( WJ), ar9(XM)), S. k, (PkA, EpkJ ( WJ)), S. k, (PkA, EpkJ (CakcA (A, PkA)))), 
comm. M. A. EpkA (WM (Xv, op,, ( Wr))) 
signal. upload. A. W M (XM', op, i, 
( W )) 
eignal. knowe. M. WM (XM, Qp,,, ( W)) 
signal. knows. M. S. kA (Elk, ( W), urg(XM)) 
signal. knows. M. S. k, (PkA, EpkJ ( W)) 
signal. knowe. M. S. k, (PkA, EpkJ (C. kcA (A, pkA)))) 
Upon completing a transaction in which purchase the content, XM, is pur- 
chased using the watermark, Wj, the buyer, A, receives the encrypted water- 
marked content, EpkA (WM (XM, opM (Wi))). During a second transaction, in 
which A purchases some less expensive content, XX, the seller, M, ignores the 
watermark, W j, received in the second transaction and instead embeds the per- 
muted watermark, op,,, (Wj), used in the first transaction. Finally, the seller 
distributes the encrypted watermarked content E PkA (WM (XM, oPM ( WA). 
Should the buyer share the less expensive content, M may extract QpM ( Wj) 
and embed it within the more expensive content XM. Thus evidence of illicit 
file sharing of XM, i. e., the four elements of EVB(A), can be obtained by the 
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seller at a time when WM (XM, apM (Wi)) has not been shared by A. The seller 
has gained the possibility of obtaining evidence that the more expensive content, 
XM, has been shared at the cost of forfeiting the possibility of gathering evidence 
that the less expensive content, XX, was shared. This attack closely follows the 
pre-emptive unbinding attack on the MW protocol described in Section 4.3.5. It 
differs only in what constitutes sufficient evidence of file sharing. It demonstrates 
that signing a message to bind the watermark to the cover material does not 
alone prevent unbinding. The seller must also be prevented from using outdated 
information in subsequent transactions. 
5.4 Ju-Kim-Lee-Lim (JKLL) Protocol 
Lei et al. proposed two mechanisms to avoid the unbinding attacks that the 
author's identified in the MW protocol: binding a watermark to content using 
some signed message; and using one-time key pairs to avoid outdated information 
being used in subsequent transactions. In [24], Ju et al. adopt the use of one- 
time key pairs but do not bind a watermark to specific content using some signed 
message. We shall demonstrate that failing to bind the watermark to specific 
content by requiring some signed message including the two leads to a reactive 
unbinding attack. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the JKLL protocol. The third party, J, is contacted 
by a buyer, b, during the watermark generation stage in which a watermark is 
generated by the third party, encrypted using the one-time public key chosen 
by the buyer for use in the current transaction, and signed by the third party 
along with the one-time public key, Ssk, (Epk. (w), pk`). The buyer then sends 
this along with the signed public key, Sskb(pk*). The buyer must also send some 
indication of what content they wish to purchase, although Ju et al. do not 
provide information on how this is done. The seller is then expected to return 
the watermarked content generated in the encrypted domain using the one-time 
key and some permutation of the given watermark, i. e., Epk. (WM (x, c7 (w))). 
We have modelled the JKLL protocol in the same manner as that described 
in Chapter 4 and reiterated throughout this chapter. The set of all messages, 
M, was defined to include every message that could feasibly sent or received 
in some protocol run in the usual manner. The strict agent behaviour, STRa, 
underlying the construction of the processes, ALICE, BOB and JEEVES, was 
defined to match that of each role illustrated in Figure 5.4, as was the initial 
knowledge, ZMa, of each agent. In [24], the author's are not explicit in describing 
how the seller is told what content the buyer wishes to purchase. We assume that 
indication of the content, arg(x), is sent to the seller as part of the message sent 
from the buyer to the seller in Step 3. 
The set of evidence considered sufficient for the seller, B, to prove that a 
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arg, Ssk. (Epk" (u' ), pk. ) 
Epk" (WMix, orP(u'))) 
ý 
Figure 5.4: JKLL Protocol 
buyer, bEA- {B, J}, shared the content, WM (XB, up,,, ( Wj)), and the set 
of evidence considered sufficient for M to prove that the buyer, A, shared the 
content, WM(XM, OP,,, (Wi)), are defined as EVB(b) and EVA, below. 
WM(XB, O-PB(WJ)), 
EVB(b) = S, kM(pkir(), 
S, k, (Epkf, (WJ), pkM ) 
WM (XM, uPM (WJ)), 
EVA = SskA(pkq), 
S, k, (Epkk(WJ), pkk) 
When model checking the protocol in FDR, against the requirements defined 
in Section 4.3.1, we identify a failure of the protocol in meeting the requirements 
of the buyer. Ju et at. do not bind the watermark to the content using some 
signed message and no alternative mechanism for preventing reactive unbinding 
is provided, which leads to a reactive attack similar to that described in Sec- 
tion 4.3.5. The following trace is indicative of the attack. 
Sskb (pk" ) 
A, PK, akb. {arp(x)(x 4- X}, KP6 . 4, 
VK, aka. «Za. Ps 
1 Buyer b Seller s 
Watermark Generation Stage 
I 
(pk', sk ) E1CP 
skj 
(Epk'(w), pk*) 
ý iviui_ - i__ýýý cpk+wvrvllx+Grp lwJJl T 
pEPa 
1 
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(comm. A. J. SskA (pkÄ), 
comm. J. A. Sski(EpkA* (WJ), pkÄ), 
comm. A. M. (arg (XM'), SskA(pkÄ), 
Sskj (EpkA(WJ), pkÄ)), 
comm. M. A. EpkA(WM(Xy, WJ)) 
signal. upload. A. W M (XM, o pM (W j) ) 
signal. knows. M. W M (XM, u pm (WJ) ) 
signal. knows. M. SskA (pkÄ) 
signal. knows . M. Ssk, 
(EpkA* (WJ), pkÄ)) 
Upon completing a transaction in which purchase the content, Xjy, is pur- 
chased using the permuted watermark o'pM (WJ), the buyer A receives the en- 
crypted watermarked content, Epk. (WM(Xiy, upM (WJ))). If the buyer shares 
the content, WM (Xjy, apM (WJ)), and the seller is ever able to retrieve a copy of 
the content, then the misbehaving seller has all the evidence that he requires to 
accuse the buyer of illicitly sharing some other content, WM (XM, op)w ( Wj)). 
5.5 Summary 
Our novel approach to the analysis of BSW protocols was applied to four BSW 
protocols, in addition to the MW protocol analysis contained within Chapter 4. 
We demonstrated the broad success of our formal approach in identifying flaws in 
BSW protocols by describing the traces, or trace/refusal pairs, generated during 
analysis indicative of seven otherwise unreported failures of the four protocols 
to meet their requirements. Additionally, in Section 5.2.2 we verified the attack 
identified by Poh and Martin on the IEH protocol in [44]. 
We have performed an additional analysis of each BSW protocol, under the 
assumption that the well-behaved buyer never shares content, in an attempt 
to identify additional fundamental failures. However, no failure to meet the 
requirements of buyers under such an assumption were identified when model 
checking the five BSW protocols analysed in this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Modelling Under Alternative 
Assumptions 
It is common for a protocol to be constructed under certain assumptions and then 
analysed under others, resulting in inconsistent evaluation of protocols. Whilst 
constructing our CSP models of BSW protocols we were forced to explicate many 
assumptions made during the design of each BSW protocol. Previously in this 
thesis we adopted the assumptions of the PM framework [411, which provides a 
firm foundation for constructing and analysing BSW protocols. The PM frame- 
work assumes that the misbehaving agent may act as DY saboteur, a threat 
model commonly used to analyse security protocols [121. Additionally, the PM 
framework states what trust relationships should exist between buyers and sell- 
ers and the levels of trust that are afforded to the third party and certification 
authority. 
Although the PM framework provides the most comprehensive framework 
for the design and analysis of BSW protocols to date, it is important that we 
demonstrate that the approach proposed in Chapter 4 is extensive enough to 
support any modifications or extensions made to the PM framework and poten- 
tially endure the adoption of alternative BSW design frameworks in the future. 
Hence, this chapter demonstrates that only subtle alterations need be made to 
each protocol model to cause the significant differences in behaviour expected 
under alternative assumptions to those proposed by the PM framework. 
6.1 Assumptions made of the Misbehaving Agent 
Our general approach, provided in Chapter 4, constructs CSP models of BSW 
protocols as a parallel composition of a single misbehaving agent with three agents 
that follow their prospective roles strictly. The misbehaving agent will accept any 
incoming message and can send any message that will be accepted by another 
agent that can be constructed of his current knowledge. The misbehaving agent 
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may act as himself, M, performing the actions of a buyer or seller, but may also 
act as a DY saboteur [12] with full control of the network and hence the ability to 
intercept and spoof any message sent between all other agents through the take 
and fake events. 
We have therefore constructed a misbehaving agent with significant capabili- 
ties and it may be unsurprising to find failures of BSW protocol in meeting their 
requirements in such a hostile environment. However, only one of the counterex- 
amples, presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, included take and fake events and 
therefore the majority of attacks would also occur in a less hostile environment 
in which the misbehaving agent could not perform such events. 
The misbehaving agent is still not expected to follow the protocol faithfully 
but must construct and send messages that will be received by the well-behaved 
agent that do. He is no longer able to intercept or spoof messages sent between the 
well-behaved agents. He must instead act only as himself, performing the actions 
of a buyer or seller, in each protocol run. Even with such limited behaviour, the 
misbehaving agent is often still able to manipulate the message exchange in order 
to gain an advantage over the well-behaved agents. 
We need not construct a new model of the protocol in order to analyse it in this 
less hostile environment but may instead make subtle changes to the renaming 
included in the original model. We remove the renaming of comm, to take and 
fake, from the processes ALICE and BOB, and also remove the renaming of hear 
and say, to take and fake, from the process MALLORY. 
ALICE = 
(rDEDA 11 STRA) 
{itmal} 
comm, comm /tmru, ahanel 
BOB = 
(rDEDB 11 STRB) 
{itmn. I} 
I 
coram, coram / tr ans, Shane y 
MALLORY = 
DEDM [comm. p. M, comm. M /hear, sag1 ! 
where pr-A-{M} 
Running the processes, ALICE, BOB and JEEVES, in parallel with the 
process, MALLORY, will now enable the misbehaving agent, M, to interact 
with the other agents when performing either of the roles of the protocol but will 
not enable him to intercept or spoof messages sent between the other agents. 
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If we return to the counterexamples included in Chapter 5, given as traces 
of events, or trace/refusal pairs, we typically find that no take or fake event is 
necessary for the attacks to occur. Hence, the new model we have created, which 
restricts the behaviour of the misbehaving agent, is able to produce identical 
traces and the same attacks hold. The only attack described in this thesis that 
requires the occurrence of take and fake events is the failure of the IEH protocol 
in meeting the sellers' requirements, as identified in [44]. Such an attack is not 
possible in a scenario in which the misbehaving agent is unable to intercept and 
spoof messages. However, we have also provided a second variation of this same 
failure of the IEH protocol in meeting the sellers' requirements in which take 
and fake events are not necessary, as well as numerous examples of how the IEH 
protocol fails to meet the requirements of the buyer. 
6.2 Assumptions made of the Third Party 
Previously, we adopted the assumption made by the PM framework that the third 
party was fully trusted, strictly following the protocol and never performing any 
other behaviour. However, there are many other assumptions made explicitly 
and implicitly of what it means for the third party to be trusted. 
Laxmi et al., entrust the major responsibilities of watermark generation and 
embedding to the third party [27], requiring the third party to follow the protocol 
precisely. As the third party generates all watermarked content they must be 
trusted by the seller to never share the original content and trusted by the buyer 
never to share the watermarked content. Memon and Wong originally stated 
that it is undesirable to place complete trust into a single source [32]. The agents 
should not be expected to place blind trust into the third party but instead 
trust the third party to not collude with any other agent. The simple separation 
of responsibilities should then mean that no agent acting alone can cheat the 
objectives of the protocol. Deng and Preneel disagree with such an assumption 
and instead expect BSW protocols to enforce such strict behaviour that no agent 
can be cheated by collusion between two or more other agents [11]. 
6.2.1 Third Party Trusted only as much as Well-behaved Agents 
Memon and Wong proposed the use of a third party in generating watermarks 
to avoid the buyer generating a watermark that is approximately invariant to 
permutation. As the seller is only provided with the watermark in the encrypted 
domain, he is unable to determine the validity of the watermark. In each BSW 
protocol, the third party must therefore be trusted to generate valid watermarks 
or, in the IEH protocol, at least be trusted to verify the validity of a watermark 
generated by the buyer. 
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Subsequently, Memon and Wong clarify that it is undesirable to place com- 
plete trust into a single source [32]. The agents are not expected to place blind 
trust into the third party but instead trust the third party to not collude with any 
other agent. This relates directly to Franklin and Reiter's definition of a semi- 
trusted third party within the context of fair non-repudiation protocols; i. e., a 
third party may misbehave on its own but will not conspire with others [17]. 
The nature of copy deterrence as a solution to the problem of illicit file sharing 
is such that even a well-behaved buyer, i. e., a buyer that strictly follows the 
protocol, is still provided with the ability to illicitly share content. It is not a 
requirement of the protocol to prevent such file sharing from occurring but to 
provide the seller with sufficient evidence of file sharing when it does. We may 
therefore wish to provide the well-behaved third party with similar behaviour. 
The third party shall not collude with the other agents be able to receive any 
watermarked content shared by another agent and send them any watermarked 
content that he knows. The aim of the BSW protocol remains the same, i. e., the 
requirements of buyers and sellers must still be met when the third party is able 
to illicitly share content. 
Until now, the third party in our models has never been willing to share 
content. In order to relax such an assumption, we must enable the third party, 
J, to perform share events. In each of the previous models constructed the 
process modelling the third party, JEEVES, simply acted as the process TTP. 
We may instead construct JEEVES as a synchronisation of the strict behaviour, 
STRj = TTP, with the deductive system, rDEDj, constructed in the same 
manner as that of rDEDA and rDEDB. 
Synchronising the two processes, STRj and rDEDj, on the trans events en- 
sures that messages can be sent by the well-behaved third party, J, only at a time 
when he has sufficient knowledge to construct the message to be sent. Due to the 
reasonable design of each protocol, as illustrated by the message sequence chart 
for each protocol, the third party has never been required to send a message that 
they could not construct and therefore the synchronisation does not add or deny 
any trans events to the behaviour of the third party offered previously. As the 
two processes synchronize only on the trans events, the signal and share events 
produced by DEDj are made available to the overall system whenever DEDj can 
perform them. It is the addition of share events to the third party's possible 
behaviour that relaxes our previous assumption that the third party is trusted 
not to share content. 
Having performed this synchronisation we rename the trans and share events, 
as we did for the other well-behaved agents, such that the distinction between 
the two events is removed and the third party performs all communications over 
a single channel comm. Finally, we rename the process, JEEVES, to enable the 
misbehaving agent to synchronise on take and fake events. 
6.2. Assumptions made of the Third Party 111 
JEE VES = 
(rDEDJ 11 STRJ) 
{Itransl} 
ff comm, comm / trans, share 
II 
týjll 
comm, take. J , fake. p. J/ Il comm, comm. J, comm. p. J] ll 
where p+--A 
The manner in which we constructed the other agent processes, ALICE, BOB 
and JEEVES, already enabled the agents, A, B and M, to perform share events in 
correspondence with the third party, although JEEVES was unable to perform 
such events and thus the synchronisation between the agents prevented these 
share events from occurring. Our new construction of the process, JEEVES, now 
allows such events and J is therefore able to receive any watermarked content 
from the other agents and send them any watermarked content he knows. 
When analysing the BSW protocols, described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, in 
this manner no further failures of the protocol are identified. Each of the protocols 
prevent the third party from learning of any watermarked content other than that 
originally leaked by a buyer. However, when constructing our CSP model of the 
LYTC protocol we commented that Lei et al. declare that the seller may send 
the content, x, rather than char(x), if unconcerned about doing so. We have 
reanalysed the LYTC protocol assuming that x is sent in place of char(x) under 
the assumption that the third party is as trustworthy as the other well-behaved 
agents, i. e., he strictly follows the protocol but shall share any content that he 
knows, the following trace is generated in FDR indicating a failure of the LYTC 
protocol in meeting the requirements of the buyer. 
(comm. A. M. (CskcA(pkA), CskA(pk* ), SskA(arg(XM))), 
comm. M. J. (CskA(pkÄ), Ssk; (arg (XM), XM), XM), 
upload. J. WM(XM, Wj), 
signal. knows. M. W M (XM, Wj), 
signal. knows. M. CskcA (pkA) , 
signal. knows. M. CAA (pkk), 
signal. knows . M. 
Ssk, (Epkq ( Wj), pkk, S3kA(arg (XM)))) 
The trace begins with the first two messages of the protocol in which A wishes 
to purchase XM from M. Once M has received the initial request from A, he 
sends a message to J which includes the original content, XM. Even at this 
early stage in proceeding the third party can produce the watermarked content 
WM (XM, Wj) and share it with others. Should M, acting as the seller, intercept 
the file being shared then he gains sufficient evidence of file sharing against B 
when in fact J was the agent illicitly sharing watermarked content. 
It is important to note that J acts as honestly as any of the well-behaved 
agents. He follows the protocol strictly but shall share content should the op- 
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portunity arise to do so. Outside of any protocol run, we provide additional 
behaviour to all agents, whether they follow the protocol strictly or not, that 
enables them to receive watermarked content from any other agent and send any 
other agent watermarked content that they know. When analysing the protocol, 
the misbehaving agent acting as the seller, M, is able to gather supposedly suffi- 
cient evidence of illicit file sharing of WM(XM, Wj) by B when in fact it was J 
that shared the watermarked content. The seller M does so without manipulating 
the protocol but by following the protocol strictly as a seller. 
We do not consider the protocol failure to be an unbinding attack of either 
kind distinguished in [59]. It is a reoccurrence of the original failure of watermark- 
ing schemes to protect the customers' rights as identified by Qiao and Nahrstedt. 
Qiao and Nahrstedt observed that schemes, in which the seller chose the water- 
mark, fail to protect the seller's copyright as they are unable to identify the agent 
acting illicitly [45]. Even if a seller had acted honestly, and is convinced of the 
buyer's illegal activity, the seller remains unable to prove that it was not they 
that had leaked the watermarked content. For this reason Memon and Wong 
suggested that the watermark and the watermarked content remain unknown to 
the seller during embedding. Withholding this information from the seller during 
embedding inhibits the buyer from claiming that the illicit copy was released by 
the seller. Withholding this information from the seller but instead providing it 
to the third party simply raises the same problem. Even if a third party had 
acted honestly, the seller remains unable to prove that it was the buyer, and not 
the third party, that leaked the watermarked content. Instead, a separation of re- 
sponsibilities should maintain that no agent acting alone can cheat the objectives 
of the protocol in their own interest. 
6.2.2 Collusion between the Misbehaving Agent and Third Party 
Deng and Preneel disagree with the assumption that the third party can be 
trusted not to collude with any other agent (11]. Instead the protocol is expected 
to enforce such strict behaviour that no buyer can be cheated by collusion between 
the seller and third party. 
In order to model collusion, the only alteration we make to our original model 
is to provide the misbehaving agent with the initial knowledge of the party with 
which he is able to collude. If we modify our analysis of the Ibrahim et at. 
protocol in this manner then FDR identifies the collusion attack presented by 
Deng and Preneel, given by the following trace: 
(comm. A. M. ary(: ), 
comm. M. A. C. bo, (M, pkjv), 
comm. A. M. (E, k ( WA), Erk, (S"kA ( WA )), C. k (A, pkA), S. k(H(H ( WA ), H (a+g(XM ))))), 
knotw. M. WM,,, ww(Xm, We), 
knaw. M. Sms (H(H( WB), H(a^y(XM))))) 
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As we have provided the misbehaving agent, M, acting as the seller in this 
protocol run, with the initial knowledge of the third party, J, modelling a collu- 
sion between M and J, the misbehaving agent is able to decrypt the watermark 
in the third message using the secret key, ski, and can therefore produce the wa- 
termarked content even before distributing the encrypted content to the buyer. 
Memon and Wong state that it is undesirable to place complete trust into 
a single source but understood that the third party must be trusted not to col- 
lude with any other agent in order for solutions involving a third party to work. 
However, they point out that the use of a third party is a common solution 
proposed by cryptographers to provide fair exchange. They also state that the 
reliance on the third party may be mitigated by using other sophisticated cryp- 
tographic tools, such as oblivious transfers and blind signatures, although this 
would increase the complexity of the solution. As such, the approach of Deng 
and Preneel [11], and others [37,261, which does not require the involvement of 
a third party, may be preferable to those that rely upon the trust afforded to the 
trusted third party. Meanwhile, analysing solutions that include a third party 
as a means of separating the responsibilities of the protocol, whilst expecting 
the third party to collude, is always likely to lead to the protocol trivially being 
shown to fail in meeting its requirements. 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter we have described how our CSP models can be modified when 
deviating from the assumptions made explicitly by the PM framework, namely 
the threat model and trust relationships. The strength of the framework is that it 
enables us to consistently evaluate BSW protocols under a uniform set of environ- 
mental assumptions. However, this chapter has demonstrated that the approach 
proposed in Chapter 4 may be extensive enough to support any modifications or 
extensions made to the PM framework in the future. 
All but one of the attacks presented in Chapters 4 and 5 were also present 
assuming a weaker threat model than that proposed by Dolev and Yao (12), as 
assumed in the PM framework. Additionally, we considered the role of the third 
party by analysing our BSW protocol models when the third party is not assumed 
to be fully trusted. This lead to the identification of a new attack on a variation 
of LYTC protocol under the assumption that the third party is trusted only as 
much as the well-behaved agents. We also verified the attack presented by Deng 
and Preneel on the IEH protocol (111, in which collusion between the third party 
and the other agents is considered possible behaviour. 
Generally speaking, protocols that meet their requirements under a stronger 
threat model, i. e., an environment in which the misbehaving agent is provided 
with a larger set of behaviours, are preferable to protocols that only withstand 
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attacks assuming a weaker threat model. Similarly, BSW protocols that require 
less trust to be afforded to the third party are preferable to those that require 
third parties to be fully trusted. 
Chapter 7 
Finer Grained Analysis of 
Buyer-Seller Watermarking 
(BSW) Protocols 
In Chapters 4,5 and 6, we analysed BSW protocols under the most abstract 
properties of informed one-bit digital watermarking, as defined in Table 2.5 and 
Table 4.1. Even under such a conservative abstraction of the capabilities of the 
misbehaving agent, our formal analyses generated multiple attacks against BSW 
protocols. However, in this chapter we shall demonstrate that newly identified 
properties, inherent in Memon and Wong's example construction of their protocol, 
lead to an additional failure of the MW protocol in meeting its requirements. 
We begin with a concrete example of Cox et al. 's watermarking scheme in 
which a watermark constructed of five elements is embedded into an 8x8 grayscale 
image, in Section 7.1. We then justify, in Section 7.2, Memon and Wong's concern 
of letting a buyer know both the watermark and watermarked content by demon- 
strating that the original content can be recovered by a buyer using information 
obtained during two transactions. However, Memon and Wong's proposed use 
of a permutation function fails to rectify this issue, as demonstrated by our pro- 
posed approach to the removal of the permuted watermark, which is described in 
Section 7.3. 
Having presented our approach to the removal of the permuted watermark, 
using an 8x8 grayscale image as an example, we evaluate the effectiveness of 
our approach in recovering the original content when considering ten standard 
512x512 grayscale images in Section 7.2. Finally, in Section 7.5, we capture 
the abstract property of watermark removal, enabling an agent to recover the 
original content with knowledge of two watermarks and two pieces of watermarked 
content, in which the watermarks were embedded. We demonstrate how our 
models can be extended to include this additional deduction and how FDR can 
be used to check whether any agent is able to recover the original content sold 
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Figure 7.1: Original Content: 512x512 Grayscale Image, Fishing Boat 
by others. Stich behaviour should never be possible when using BSW protocols, 
as any agent who can recover and share the original content can do so without 
being identified as the agent responsible for such illicit activity. 
7.1 Practical Example of Cox et al. 's Scheme 
In [8], Cox et al. proposed a watermarking scheme under the novel perception 
of digital watermarking as a form of spread-spectrum communications. A wa- 
termark, w= (wl, w2, ... , wn), 
is constructed as a sequence of n independent 
real numbers drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, i. e., 
N(0,1). For a practical implementation the real numbers are assumed to be ap- 
proximated to a reasonable but finite precision and insignificant rounding errors 
are ignored [9]. 
Let us consider a concrete example in which we wish to embed the following 
watermark, constructed as a sequence of five real numbers drawn from . 
V(0,1). 
Cox et al. assume such numbers will be represented by a reasonable but finite 
precision [8]. In this practical example we use double precision numbers, although 
they are presented to 4 decimal places in this chapter. 
W= (W1, W2, W3, W4, W5) 
= (0.6607, -0.3509, -0.4147,2.0878,1.3472) 
Embedding involves first extracting a sequence of n frequency coefficients, 
(x1, x2, ... , x,, 
), from the digital content into which we wish to embed. The digi- 
tal content, X, we use in our concrete example is an 8x8 sub-block of the image 
Fishing Boat taken from the University of Southern California Signal, and Image 
Processing Institute, (USC-SIPI) Image Database [55], and illustrated in Fig- 
ure 7.1. It is important to note that we demonstrate how watermark embedding 
is conducted using an 8x8 image in order to clearly illustrate the steps taken with 
reference to specific values of pixels and frequency coefficients. The Cox et al. 
scheme does not involve block-wise embedding. In Section 7.4.1 and Section 7.4.2 
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Figure 7.2: Unpernmted Watermark Removal: Image Fragments and Corre- 
sponding DCT: (a) original content; (b) watermarked content WM (X , 
W); (c) 
watermarked content WM(X, W'); (d) recovered content; and. ((-li) the corre- 
sponding DCT of (a-d). 
we shall evaluate our approach to removing a permuted watermark from water- 
marked content using images taken from a standard image library using standard 
image dimensions of 512x512, and a watermark constructed of 1000 watermark 
elements, in order to reflect the results presented in ý]. 
X= 
131 84 51 70 95 99 139 104 
137 68 51 63 78 110 137 81 
129 67 59 78 66 110 1: 32 69 
135 73 56 98 66 80 126 7,1 
137 71 55 112 71 48 123 9r, 
133 80 52 117 76 45 105 117 
127 82 44 98 75 37 76 Ilfi 
125 65 54 61) 56 36 41 92 
(,. i) 
The image is an 8x8 grayscale image, as illustrated in Figure 7.2 (a), in which 
each pixel value lies in the range of integers [0,2551, where larger numbers denote 
lighter pixels. The watermark is to be spread across the frequency coefficients 
of an image, selected to ensure that the original image degrades significantly 
should an adversary attempt to destroy the watermark. The experimental results, 
presented in [9], were obtained by embedding 1000 watermark elements. into the 
1000 highest magnitude AC coefficients of the 2D-DCT of a 512x512 grayscale 
image, using Equation 2.3. 
The original 8x8 grayscale image, from Figure 7.2 (a), is converted into the 
frequency domain using the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) to produce the 
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following 8x8 array of doubles precision numbers. Figure 7.2 (e) illustrates the 
result of this conversion, emphasizing the relative frequencies by mapping the 
colours to range from red to blue. The highest frequency values are displayed in 
deep red, whereas the lowest frequencies are displayed in deep blue. 
DCT(X) = 
692.1250 0.4285 118.0236 68.6395 78.1250 91.8372 -43.3397 -1.6743 
50.9825 -44.8225 -7.1254 69.8521 -67.2416 24.1808 -0.4567 11.7318 
-22.9925 -1.3952 13.9775 5.3373 3.6743 -47.6599 21.7290 9.3472 
36.4436 -13.6115 7.0047 -23.6751 30.4564 -1.5631 -31.2678 0.8424 
-11.6250 10.4683 1.4138 -5.2583 1.8750 -0.6162 -0.1797 7.7828 
10.7218 -2.1513 -3.6507 -4.7252 2.8907 -7.1377 -9.4778 -7.8896 
1.0000 -0.6859 -3.5210 -3.2272 -5.1750 -0.6755 6.0225 -1.7371 
0.0289 -2.4302 -1.1337 -2.9027 0.6617 0.6610 -2.8213 1.6353 
In the above example the five highest magnitude AC coefficients are isolated. 
We must not embed in the DC value given by the upper-left-most corner of 
DCT(X) [8]. It is these five coefficients that are adjusted according to the formula 
ii = xi(1 + awi), where a is some small constant, chosen here to be 0.1 to reflect 
the results provided in [8]. For example, the first watermark element, 0.6607, is 
embedded within the highest magnitude AC coefficient, 118.0236, to produce the 
adjusted value 125.8217 = 118.0236 * (1 + 0.1 * 0.6607). 
DCT(WM(X, W)) = 
692.1250 0.4285 125.8217 77.8866 74.8854 88.6142 -43.3397 -1.6743 
50.9825 -44.8225 -7.1254 84.4358 -67.2416 24.1808 -0.4567 11.7318 
-22.9925 -1.3952 13.9775 5.3373 3.6743 -47.6599 21.7290 9.3472 
36.4436 -13.6115 7.0047 -23.6751 30.4564 -1.5631 -31.2678 0.8424 
-11.6250 10.4683 1.4138 -5.2583 1.8750 -0.6162 -0.1797 7.7828 
10.7218 -2.1513 -3.6507 -4.7252 2.8907 -7.1377 -9.4778 -7.8896 
1.0000 -0.6859 -3.5210 -3.2272 -5.1750 -0.6755 6.0225 -1.7371 
0.0289 -2.4302 -1.1337 -2.9027 0.6617 0.6610 -2.8213 1.6353 
Figure 7.2(f) illustrates the watermarked content in the frequency domain. 
Performing the inverse DCT, and rounding the values back to integers, returns 
the image to a consumable state, WM (X, W), as illustrated in Figure 7.2(b). Fig- 
ure 7.2(b) is imperceptably different to Figure 7.2(a), although the pixel values 
of X and WM(X, W) are clearly different. A subtle difference may be observed 
between certain pixels of Figure 7.2(e) and Figure 7.2(f) but the true differ- 
ence between the frequency coefficients are easier to observe in DCT(X) and 
DCT(WM(X, W)) above. The same is true for Figures 7.3 and 7.4. 
WM(X, W) = 
136 84 46 65 97 104 140 101 
141 69 46 58 79 115 138 78 
133 68 55 74 67 114 133 67 
138 74 53 95 66 82 127 73 
138 72 54 109 70 49 124 95 
133 82 52 115 75 45 105 119 
126 84 45 97 73 36 76 118 
124 67 56 59 54 34 41 95 
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Extracting the watermark is possible as the formula, xi = xi(1 + awi), is 
invertible, assuming xi # 0. Hence, extracting involves performing the inverse 
function to derive wi from ii and xi. 
Cox et at. propose their embedding method somewhat independently of its 
potential applications. Memon and Wong adapt Cox et al. 's scheme in order to 
use it in conjunction with their BSW protocol as a copy deterrence solution to the 
problem of illicit file sharing [321. We have already seen that Memon and Wong 
have specified that a is some small constant, rather than a value that Cox et at. 
allow to be variable, and that the embedding formula used is, xi = xi(1 + awi), 
chosen from the three embedding formulae proposed by Cox et at. 
A more significant assumption made by Memon and Wong, is that the buyer 
shall be allowed to gain knowledge of the sequence of pseudo-randomly generated 
watermark elements, w, embedded within the watermarked content, WM(x, w), 
whilst remaining unable to remove the watermark and recover the original con- 
tent, x. To this end Memon and Wong proposed the use of a permutation func- 
tion. By permuting the watermark elements before embedding, Memon and Wong 
state that a buyer cannot remove the watermark, w, from DCT(WM (x, ap(w))) 
even when he knows both w and DCT(WM (x, o (w))). We justify Memon and 
Wong's concern that the unpermuted watermark could be removed in Section 7.2 
but we then proceed to demonstrate that permuting the watermark does not 
provide an adequate solution in Section 7.3. 
7.2 Non-permuted Watermark Removal 
In this section we present justification of Memon and Wong's concern that the 
buyer knowing the watermark, w, where no permutation function is applied, 
might lead to the original content being recovered. One method of removing a 
watermark, w, from the watermarked content, DCT(WM(x, w)), is to use the 
information gathered from two transactions in which the same content is pur- 
chased, although watermarked with differing watermarks. This may come as a 
result of a single buyer purchasing the same content twice, or if such behaviour is 
not allowed, it may come as a result of two misbehaving buyers sharing informa- 
tion gained when they each purchase the same content. To extend our example 
we generate a second watermark, W', and again embed it within the five highest 
magnitude AC coefficients of the original content having transformed the image 
into the frequency domain using DCT. 
Wý _ (Wl+ W21 W31 W41 W5) 
_ (0.1926,0.8944, -1.5283, -0.2159,0.1957) 
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DCT(WM(X, W')) = 
692.1250 0.4285 120.2971 89.9828 66.1850 100.0510 -43.3397 -1.6743 
50.9825 -44.8225 -7.1254 88.3439 -67.2416 24.1808 -0.4567 11.7318 
-22.9925 -1.3952 13.9775 5.3373 3.6743 -47.6599 21.7290 9.3472 
36.4436 -13.6115 7.0047 -23.6751 30.4564 -1.5631 -31.2678 0.8424 
-11.6250 10.4683 1.4138 -5.2583 1.8750 -0.6162 -0.1797 7.7828 
10.7218 -2.1513 -3.6507 -4.7252 2.8907 -7.1377 -9.4778 -7.8896 
1.0000 -0.6859 -3.5210 -3.2272 -5.1750 -0.6755 6.0225 -1.7371 
0.0289 -2.4302 -1.1337 -2.9027 0.6617 0.6610 -2.8213 1.6353 
Figure 7.2 (g) illustrates the second piece of watermarked content in the 
frequency domain. Performing the inverse DCT, and converting the values back 
to integers, returns the image to a consumable state, WM(X, W'), as illustrated 
in Figure 7.2 (c). 
WM(X, W') = 
131 84 53 69 92 100 142 102 
137 68 53 62 75 111 140 79 
129 67 61 77 63 111 135 67 
135 73 57 97 63 81 129 72 
137 71 56 111 68 49 126 93 
133 80 53 116 73 46 108 115 
127 82 45 97 72 39 79 114 
125 65 55 59 53 38 44 90 
With knowledge of the two pieces of watermarked content, DCT(WM(x, w)) 
and DCT(WM(x, w')), and the two watermarks, w and w', a misbehaving buyer 
may use the following approach to recover the original content. The misbe- 
having buyer should first perform an element-wise division of the two pieces of 
watermarked content in the frequency domain, as illustrated for our example in 
Equation 7.2. 
DCT(WM(X, W))/DCT(WM(X, W')) = 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0459 1.1129 1.1315 0.8857 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.2355 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
(7.2) 
In doing so, the coefficients that remain unaltered during watermark embed- 
ding will resolve to 1.0000, whilst those that were adjusted give a value dependent 
only on the two related watermark elements w; and wi. 
xi(1+awi) 
_ 
1+awi 
xi(l+aw; ) 1 +aw; 
7.2. Non-permuted Watermark Removal 
1+aWi 1+aW2 1+aW3 1+aW4 1+aWI 
1+a Wl 1.0459 ---- 
1+a W2 - 0.8857 --- 
1+aW3 --1.1315 -- 
1+a W4 ---1.2355 - 
1+aW5 ----1.1129 
Table 7.1: Pairwise division of watermarks, 
l±ýýr (abridged) 
l+awj 
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Independently, the buyer can construct a table, as we have for our concrete 
example in Table 7.1, by calculating the value i for each pair of watermark 
elements. We know wi and wi' were both embedded in the same location and 
so only the values along the diagonal need be calculated, the table is simply 
provided in this format such that clear comparisons can be drawn with Table 7.2. 
By matching a value taken from the array, calculated in Equation 7.2, to a value 
in the Table 7.1, we are able to discern the specific watermark elements used at 
this location when embedding. 
Let us consider the effect of the embedding process on the the smallest 
magnitude AC coefficient of the five in which we embedded. Originally, the 
smallest AC coefficient in DCT(X) had the value 68.6395. When embedding 
watermark element, W5 = 1.3472, the coefficient was adjusted to 77.8866 = 
68.6395 * (1 + 0.1 * 1.3472). Due to the other coefficient adjustments made dur- 
ing embedding, 77.8866 is no longer the fifth highest magnitude AC coefficient in 
DCT(WM (X, W)), and so in general the information about the locations at which 
the watermark elements were embedded is somewhat lost during embedding. By 
performing the element-wise division on two pieces of watermarked content we 
are able to determine this lost information by identifying the watermark element 
used at each embedding location. As we know the two watermarks we are able 
to perform the following calculation: - 
1 +aW5 
_1+0.1 
* 1.3472 
= 1.1129 1+aW5 (1+0.1*0.1957) 
The location of the value 1.1129 in the array (see Equation 7.2) is therefore the 
location in which W5 = 1.3472 is embedded in DCT(WM(X, W)), i. e., 77.8866, 
and the location in which W5' = 0.1957 is embedded in DCT(WM(X, W')), i. e., 
69.9826. This provides us with sufficient information to reverse the operation on 
either DCT(WM(X, W)) or DCT(WM(X, W')), which removes the watermark. 
77.8866 
_ 
69.9826 
- 68.6395 1+(0.1*1.3472) 1+ (0.1 * 0.1957) 
When calculating each of the original AC coefficients in this manner, and then 
applying the inverse DCT function and rounding the double precision numbers 
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back into integers, the buyer reconstructs the original content leaving no trace of 
the watermark that had been embedded. Hence, the recovered image illustrated 
in Figure 7.2 (d) is identical to the original content, X, defined in Equation 7.1 
and illustrated in Figure 7.2 (a). 
7.3 Permuted Watermark Removal 
In order to avoid those in possession of the watermark and watermarked content 
being able to remove the watermark and recover the original content, Memon and 
Wong propose the use of a permutation function. By permuting the watermark 
elements during embedding, Memon and Wong state that a buyer cannot remove 
the watermark, w, from DCT(WM(x, cP(w))) even when he knows both w and 
DCT(WM(x, ap(w))). 
Returning to our example, we select a permutation of the watermark, W, at 
random to produce, ap(W). Similarly, we select a permutation of the watermark, 
W', independent to that of W, to produce ap, (W'). The only difference between 
W and ap(W) is the order of the sequence of watermark elements. 
oP (W)= (0.6607,2.0878, -0.3509, -0.4147,1.3472) 
apt (W) _ (-1.5283,0.8944,0.1926,0.1957, -0.2159) 
Watermark embedding is performed as before, embedding the elements of 
ap(W) to the five highest magnitude AC coefficients of X using Formula 2.3. 
DCT(WM(X, op(W))) = 
692.1250 0.4285 125.8217 77.8866 75.3833 111.0108 -43.3397 -1.6743 
50.9825 -44.8225 -7.1254 66.9556 -67.2416 24.1808 -0.4567 11.7318 
-22.9925 -1.3952 13.9775 5.3373 3.6743 -47.6599 21.7290 9.3472 
36.4436 -13.6115 7.0047 -23.6751 30.4564 -1.5631 -31.2678 0.8424 
-11.6250 10.4683 1.4138 -5.2583 1.8750 -0.6162 -0.1797 7.7828 
10.7218 -2.1513 -3.6507 -4.7252 2.8907 -7.1377 -9.4778 -7.8896 
1.0000 -0.6859 -3.5210 -3.2272 -5.1750 -0.6755 6.0225 -1.7371 0.0289 -2.4302 -1.1337 -2.9027 0.6617 0.6610 -2.8213 1.6353 
1 
/ 
Performing the inverse DCT, and converting back to integers, returns the 
image to a consumable state. 
W(X, op(W)) _ 
135 81 51 71 91 99 143 102 
141 65 50 64 74 110 141 79 
133 64 58 79 62 110 136 67 
139 70 55 98 62 81 130 72 
141 68 54 112 68 49 128 93 
138 77 50 117 73 46 110 114 
132 79 42 98 72 38 81 113 
130 62 52 60 53 37 46 89 
7.3. Permuted Watermark Removal 
(h) 
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Figure 7.3: Unpermuted Watermark Removal: Image Fragments and Corre- 
sponding DCT: (a) original content; (b) watermarked content WM (X , (7p(W 
)); 
(c) watermarked content WM (X, Q'' (W')); (d) recovered content; and, (e-li) the 
corresponding DCT of (a-d). 
Figure 7.3 illustrates similar results to those of Figure 7.2. Figure 7.3 (a), 
again depicts the original content, X, and Figure 7.3 (e) depicts its corresponding 
DCT. Likewise, Figure 7.3 (b) depicts the first piece of watermarked content, 
WM (X, Qp( W)), and Figure 7.3 (f) depicts its corresponding DCT. Similarly, 
(op, ( W') is embedded within the five highest magnitude AC coefficicii s of X, to 
produce Figure 7.3 (g). 
DCT(WM(X, ap, (W'))) = 
692.1250 0.4285 99.9858 67.1575 79.6299 100.0510 -43.3397 -1. (i743 
50.9825 -44.8225 -7.1254 71.2189 -67.2416 24.1808 -0.4(i(i7 11.7318 
- 22.9925 -1.3952 13.9775 5.3373 3.6743 47. (i599 21.7290 9.3472 
36.4436 -13.6115 7.0047 -23.6751 30.4564 -1.5(331 -31.2678 0.8424 
-11.6250 10.4683 1.4138 -5.2583 1.8750 -0. (i1(i2 -0.1797 7.7828 
10.7218 -2.1513 -3.6507 -4.7252 2.8907 -7.1377 -9.4778 -7.889(i 
1.0000 -0.6859 -3.5210 -3.2272 5.1750 -0.6755 6.0225 1.7371 
0.0289 -2.4302 -1.1337 -2.9027 (1.6617 0.661(1 -2.8213 1.6353 
Performing the inverse DCT, and converting to integers, returns the image to 
a consumable state, thus generating Figure 7.3 (c). 
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W(X, sP, (W')) = 
129 81 52 74 97 100 139 100 
135 65 52 67 80 111 137 77 
127 64 60 82 68 111 132 65 
133 70 58 102 68 81 126 71 
135 68 57 117 73 48 123 92 
131 77 54 122 78 45 105 114 
125 79 46 103 77 37 76 113 
123 62 56 65 58 36 41 89 
With a minor modification of the approach we described in Section 7.2, we are 
also able to recover the original content even when the watermarks are permuted 
before they are embedded. As before, the misbehaving buyer should first perform 
an element-wise division of the two pieces of watermarked content in the frequency 
domain. 
DCT(WM (X, ap( W)))/DCT(WM(X, op, ( W'))) = 
1.0000 1.0000 1.2584 1.1598 0.9467 1.1095 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9401 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
(7.3) 
I 
In doing so, the coefficients that remained unaltered during watermark embed- 
ding will resolve to 1.0000, whilst those that were adjusted give a value dependent 
on some pair of watermark elements, W, EW and Wk E W'. In general we have 
that: - 
xi(1+awj) 
- 
1+awj 
xi (1 + awe) 1+ awk 
Independently, the buyer can calculate '+aw! for each possible pair of water- 1+awk 
mark elements, as illustrated in Table 7.2. Where the value taken from the array, 
constructed in Equation 7.3, matches a value in Table 7.2, we are able to discern 
the specific watermark elements used at this location when embedding. 
Again let us consider the effect of the embedding process on the smallest 
AC coefficient, 68.6395, of the five in DCT(X) in which we embedded. The fifth 
watermark element, W5, in the sequence, ap (W ), is used to adjust the coefficient 
as follows: 77.8866 = 68.6395 * (1 + 0.1 * 1.3472). However, the fifth watermark 
element in the sequence, ap, (W'), is -0.2159, thus the coefficient is adjusted as 
follows: 67.1575 = 68.6395 * (1 + 0.1 * -0.2159). Note that ap, (W5) matches 
that of W4. Hence the permutation has affected the ordering of the watermark 
elements. 
7.4. Evaluation of Permuted Watermark Removal 
1+aWi 1+aW2 '+a W3 1+aW4 1+aW5 
1+a Wi 1.0459 0.9786 1.2584 1.0896 1.0456 
1+a W2 0.9467 0.8857 1.1390 0.9862 0.9464 
1+a W3 0.9404 0.8798 1.1315 0.9797 0.9401 
1+a W4 1.1859 1.1095 1.4268 1.2355 1.1856 
1+a W5 1.1133 1.0416 1.3394 1.1598 1.1129 
Table 7.2: Pairwise division of watermarks, 1+aw2 l+awk 
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In order to remove W' from DCT(WM(X, W')) we first isolate the location 
of the value in the array, calculated in Equation 7.3, which matches one of the 
values in the fourth column of Table 7.2. 
_ 
77.8866 1 +a W5 
67.1575 - 
1.1598 =1+a W4 
Once the misbehaving agent knows the location at which W4' was embedded, 
reversing the operation removes the watermark. 
67.1575 
- 68.6395 1+ (0.1 * -0.2159) 
We remove each watermark element, Wk E W', from DCT(WM(X, Wý)) in 
this manner by isolating the location of a value in the array, constructed in Equa- 
tion 7.3, which matches a value in the kth column of Table 7.2. Having calculated 
all of the original AC coefficients, and applied the inverse DCT function, the buyer 
has reconstructed the original content leaving no trace of the permuted water- 
mark that had been embedded. The recovered image illustrated in Figure 7.3 (d) 
is therefore identical to the original content, X, defined in Equation 7.1 and 
illustrated in Figure 7.3 (a). 
7.4 Evaluation of Permuted Watermark Removal 
In the previous section we presented an approach to the recovery of the origi- 
nal content when two pieces of watermarked content are known along with the 
two watermarks that have been embedded. We provided an example, in which 
a watermark constructed of five elements was embedded into an 8x8 grayscale 
image, to illustrate the steps taken to recover the original content. In this section 
we provide results comparable to those presented in [8] by testing our approach 
to watermark removal on 512x512 grayscale images into which permuted water- 
marks of 1000 elements are embedded. 
In an initial experiment we compare the similarity of the permuted watermark 
extracted from three images, as illustrated in Figure 7.4 whose construction is 
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(a) (I)) (c) 
Figure 7.4: Permuted Watermark Removal: Watermarked and Attacked Images: 
(a) watermarked content; (h) collusion attack; and, (c) recovered content. 
described in Section 7. -1.1, to 1000 randomly generated and permuted watermarks. 
The three images illustrated in Figure 7.4 all relate to the same original content, 
Fishing Boat. Subsequently, we evaluate the performance of our approach across 
10 other standard images, taken from the USC-SIPI Image Database, details of 
which are presented in Section 7.4.2. 
7.4.1 Experiment 1: Detector response following watermark re- 
moval from example image, Fishing Boat 
We illustrate the effectiveness of our approach to removing the permuted wa- 
termark by comparing the results of watermark detection concerning the three 
images illustrated in Figure 7.4. Figure 7.1 illustrates the original content, Fish- 
ing Boat, whereas Figure 7. -1 (a) illustrates the content within which a single 
permuted watermark has been embedded, selected as one of 1000 randomly gen- 
erated, and independently permuted watermarks. During the experiment a sec- 
ond piece of watermarked content is also constructed, by embedding another one 
of 1000 randomly generated, and independently permuted watermarks, into the 
same original content. Figure 7.4 (b) illustrates the result of a simple collusion 
attack in which the two watermarked images are averaged in a naive attempt to 
prevent the watermark detector returning a positive response for either water- 
mark. Finally, Figure 7.1 (c) illustrates the image recovered using our approach 
to remove the permuted watermark. 
Cox et al. measured the similarity of a watermark, w, to the extracted wa- 
termark, -w, using the following equation: - 
sim(w, -w) = 
We tiw 
w -w "- 
Some threshold T is set such that w is said to match Nw when sim(w, -w) > 
T. The detection threshold must he set to minimize the rate of false negatives 
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and false positives, where a watermark is incorrectly judged to match, or not 
match, the extracted watermark, respectively. Cox et al. state that, for a small 
amount of documents, setting T=6 causes spurious matchings to be extremely 
rare. In general, larger similarity values will result from comparing the relative 
embedded and extracted watermarks generated of a larger number of elements, 
without increasing similarity values of unrelated watermarks. However, Cox et 
at. also point out that increasing the length of the watermark adversely effects 
its perceptibility. In practice, watermarks constructed of 1000 elements are used 
to generate their experimental results. 
It is worth noting that Cox et al. 's similarity measure produces an undefined 
number, denoted by NaN, when calculating the similarity between a watermark 
w and a vector of zeros. 
sim(w, (0, ... , 0)) = (O, 
w. ", 
0)' " (00>.. , 0) 
0= NaN 
This is of relevance should we wish to compare the similarity of a watermark 
extracted from the original content to some watermark w. The original content 
has no watermark embedded and watermark extraction outputs a watermark 
consisting of a sequence of zero values (0, ..., 0). We should therefore expect the 
similarity measure to return an undefined number, when comparing the water- 
mark extracted from the attacked image to any watermark, if our approach to 
removing the permuted watermark enables us to recover an identical image to the 
original. If the attacked image is not identical to the original, but the similarity 
of the embedded watermark to that extracted from the attacked image is below 
the threshold, T=6, then we shall still have demonstrated that the watermark 
is no longer detectable in the image recovered using our approach. 
Reflecting the results of [8], Figure 7.5 (a), demonstrates that the similarity 
measure returns a significantly stronger result when comparing the embedded 
permuted watermark to that extracted from the watermarked content, than when 
comparing the embedded permuted watermark to any of the other 999 randomly 
generated and permuted watermarks, suggesting a low false positive rate. 
Figure 7.4 (b) illustrates the image created by averaging two watermarked im- 
ages. Figure 7.5 (b) illustrates that this simple collusion attack is ineffective. The 
detector response is smaller when comparing the extracted permuted watermark 
to either of the two permuted watermarks embedded into the two pieces of water- 
marked content used during the attack, however, the two spikes clearly indicate 
the presence of the two watermarks in the colluded image shown in Figure 7.5 (b). 
The two watermarked images used during the collusion attack to produce 
Figure 7.4 (b), are assumed to be received following two independent runs of the 
MW protocol in which a buyer purchases the same content but with different 
permuted watermarks embedded. Following these two protocol runs, the buyer 
also has the two unpermuted watermarks in his possession. Therefore, instead of 
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Figure 7.5: Permuted Watermark Removal: Detector Response: (a) watermarked 
content and (b) collusion attack. 
performing the collusion attack, we may use the approach described in Section 7.3 
to recover the original content. The buyer holds the two unpermuted watermarks, 
along with all other necessary information to identify the coefficients in which each 
watermark element was embedded, and thus reverses the embedding operation 
to produce the attacked image, illustrated in Figure 7.4 (c). 
Figure 7.4 (c) is identical to Figure 7.1, that is every pixel value is identical and 
the peak signal to noise ratio between Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.4 (c) is infinite. 
This demonstrates that using the approach described in Section 7.3 we have 
recovered an identical copy of the original content. The watermark extracted 
from Figure 7.4 (c) therefore consists of a sequence of one thousand zero values, 
hence the similarity of all 1000 randomly generated watermarks, including the two 
embedded in the two pieces of watermarked content, to the extracted watermark 
is an undefined number, NaN. 
This experiment demonstrates that our approach enables us to recover the 
original image, with knowledge of two watermarked images, and the two unper- 
muted watermarks used to watermark them, when the content purchased is taken 
to be the standard 512x512 grayscale image, fishing boat. A simple collusion at- 
tack, in which two watermarked images are averaged, is ineffective in removing 
either of the embedded watermarks, whereas neither watermark can be detected 
in the image recovered using our approach, following the same two protocol runs. 
7.4.2 Experiment 2: Detector response following watermark re- 
moval from other standard images 
The experimental results presented in this section extend the results of the pre- 
vious section to consider a larger range of independent images taken from the 
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same USC-ISIP Image Database, as presented in Table 7.3. 
Clearly the PSNR of the original image and itself is infinite and the similarity 
of the watermark extracted from the original content, i. e., a sequence of 1000 
zero values, is an undefined number, NaN, for the reasons discussed in the pre- 
vious section. The PSNR of the watermarked images ranged from 30.34 dB and 
38.73 dB, which are typically acceptable values for lossy compression of images or 
video. The PSNR of each image was larger following the collusion attack, demon- 
strating that averaging multiple watermarked images tends towards removing the 
watermark. 
Due to the construction of the similarity measure, the similarity between the 
watermark extracted from the watermarked content and that which was embed- 
ded, is likely to be fn, where n is the number of elements of which the watermark 
is constructed. Therefore, a similarity result close to 1000 ^_J 31.62 strongly in- 
dicates the presence of the watermark, when watermarks are constructed as a 
sequence of 1000 independent real numbers drawn from N(0,1). The results 
of our experiment meet such an expectation as the similarity between the wa- 
termark extracted from the watermarked content and the embedded watermark 
range between 30.29 and 30.74. 
Figure 7.5 illustrates that the response of Cox et al. 's watermark detector, 
i. e., the similarity measure, is such that both watermarks remain detectable fol- 
lowing a simple collusion attack. Table 7.3 shows the similarity of the watermark 
extracted from each image, constructed by collusion, to one of the two embedded 
watermarks, reduces to between 21.40 and 21.66. However, when assuming a 
threshold of T>6 for the watermark detector, the watermark is still clearly 
detectable for all 10 of the images generated by collusion. 
The results presented in Table 7.3, regarding the image recovered using our 
approach to removing the permuted watermark, match those of the original im- 
age. As each image we recover is identical to the original, the PSNR between 
the recovered image and original is in each case infinite, whilst the similarity is 
in each case an undefined number. 
7.5 Model Checking Under Finer Granularity 
Previously in this chapter, we demonstrated that Memon and Wong's concrete 
example of their protocol, in which Cox et al. 's watermarking scheme is imple- 
mented, fails to provide an adequate copy deterrence solution to the problem 
of illicit file sharing. By recovering the original content, using the information 
gathered during the two runs of the MW protocol, in which the same content is 
purchased, a buyer is able to share digital content without being identified as the 
buyer responsible for releasing the content to the public domain. 
The models constructed in Chapters 4,5 and 6 did not capture such be- 
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Original 
Content 
Watermarked 
Image 
Collusion 
Attack 
Watermark 
Removal 
Image PSNR sim PSNR sim PSNR sim PSNR sim 
Baboon oo NaN 36.58 30.74 38.53 21.65 00 NaN 
Couple 0o NaN 36.98 30.29 39.19 21.40 0o NaN 
Elaine oo NaN 34.16 30.74 36.47 21.66 00 NaN 
F16 0o NaN 34.24 30.74 36.47 21.65 0o NaN 
Fishing 0o NaN 35.71 30.74 37.50 21.63 0o NaN 
Lena oo NaN 34.52 30.74 36.67 21.63 0o NaN 
Peppers oo NaN 32.74 30.74 34.92 21.64 00 NaN 
Sailboat oo NaN 30.34 30.74 32.51 21.65 00 NaN 
Tank oo NaN 38.54 30.72 40.53 21.61 oc NaN 
Truck 00 NaN 38.73 30.73 41.04 21.54 00 NaN 
Table 7.3: PSNR and Detector Response of Watermarked and Attacked Images 
haviour. It is clear by inspection of the deductive rules, defined in Tables 2.4,2.5 
and 4.1, that the original content could never be inferred and so a misbehav- 
ing buyer could never learn of any original content other than their own. Each 
model was constructed assuming the most abstract properties of informed one-bit 
watermarking: WMRK-EMB, any agent in possession of some content x and a 
watermark w can construct the watermarked content, WM (x, w); and WMRK- 
EXT, any agent with the original content, x, and watermarked content, WM (x, w) 
can evaluate the watermark, w. Even under such a conservative abstraction of 
the capabilities of the misbehaving agent, our formal analyses generated multiple 
attacks against BSW protocols. 
Having inspected the Cox et al. watermarking scheme in finer granularity 
in this chapter, we have demonstrated the presence of an additional properties 
in Memon and Wong's implementation of Cox et al. 's scheme, as captured us- 
ing the entailment relation in Table 7.4. MW-REM. 1 represents the abstract 
property of watermark removal demonstrated in Section 7.2, in which knowledge 
of two watermarks, and the two pieces of watermarked content in which they 
have been embedded, enables the recovery of the original content. MW-REM. 2 
represents the abstract property of permuted watermark removal demonstrated 
in Section 7.3, in which knowledge of two watermarks, and the two pieces of 
watermarked content in which they have been embedded following permutation, 
enables the recovery of the original content. 
In this section we shall provide further analyses of the MW protocol and 
LYTC protocol under the assumption that the protocols are used in conjunction 
with Memon and Wong's implementation of the Cox et at. scheme. 
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MW-REM. 1. {w, w', WM(x, w), WM(x, w')} ý- x 
MW-REM. 2. {w, w', WM(x, QP(w)), WM(x, vp, (w'))} f- x 
Table 7.4: Deduction rules capturing properties of watermarking 
7.5.1 MW Protocol 
Previously in our analyses, we did not concern ourselves with the possibility of a 
buyer sharing the original content, avoiding identification as the buyer responsible 
for illicitly sharing the digital content. This is because it is clear by inspection of 
the deductive rules, defined in Tables 2.4,2.5 and 7.4, that the original content 
could never be inferred and so a misbehaving buyer could never learn of any 
original content other than their own. 
When providing agents with the ability to deduce the original content, using 
the deductive rules defined in Table 7.4, we must provide the additional require- 
ment that a BSW protocol must prevent each agent from recovering the original 
content sold by others. In order to discern when an agent has deduced original 
content, sold by some other agent, we include signal. error. a events in our model, 
which occur only when the content xEX- Xa is known by an agent, a. 
IGNa(f )=fEM& hear. f --> KNWa(f) 
O infer? t E {(X, f') I (X, f `) E- Da, f' =f} -i KNWa(f ) 
KNWa (f)=fEM& hear. f --ý KNWa (f) 
o infer? t E IMP) I (X, f') E- Da, fE X} -3 KNWa(f) 
QfE JVl & say. f --3 KNWa(f ) 
OfE EV & signal. knows. a. f -+ KNWa(f ) 
0fEX- XQ & aignal. error. a. f -i KNWa(f ) 
aIGNa(f )= 
{hear. f, say. f 1fE M1 
U{signal. knows. a. f 1fE CV} 
U{aignal. et'r»t-. a, f 1f EX - Xa} U{infer. (X, f') 1 (X, fl) E Da, (f'= f)} 
U{infer. (X, f') 1 (X, fl) E Da, fE X} 
Having extended each agent's deductive system and provided appropriate sig- 
nal events we check that our CSP model of the MW protocol, MODEL, prevents 
agents from inferring the original content of others by performing the following 
refinement check in FDR. 
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STOP 9T MODEL \E-{I signal. error I} 
Such an assertion is constructed in a similar manner to that of the secrecy 
requirement of the NSPK protocol, as described in Section 3.2.4. In order to 
check the safety property that no agent shall infer the original content sold by 
others we check that the process STOP, that never performs any event, is trace 
refined by our protocol model when all events but the signal. error events are 
hidden. In fact such an assertion does not hold for the MW protocol. When 
model checking in FDR we are automatically provided a trace proving the failure 
of the protocol in providing such a requirement. 
(comm. A. J. CekcA (A, PkA), 
comm. J. A. S, kr ( EPka (Wi)), 
comm. A. B. (arg (XB), CekcA(A, PkA), Saki (EPkA (Wj))), 
comm. B. A. EPkA(WM(XB, apB(WJ))), 
comm. A. J. CekCA (A, PkA), 
comm. J. A. Sek, (EPkA(Wj)), 
comm. A. B. (arg(XB), CekCA (A, pkA), Sekt (EPkA ( Wj))), 
comm. B. A. EPkA (WM (XB, °P'e ( Wi))), 
signal. error. A. XB) 
As was to be expected, when a buyer twice purchases the same content from a 
seller, in which two different permuted watermarks are used to create the water- 
marked content sold in each protocol run, the buyer is able to recover the original 
content, using the deduction rule MW-REM. 2, defined in Table 7.4. It is worth 
noting, that the well-behaved agent, A, has been able to recover the content, 
even though he has been defined to faithfully follow the protocol. Of course, the 
misbehaving agent, M, is also able to recover the original content, and FDR also 
provides traces indicative of such an attack, but M may do so without the need 
to overhear, intercept or spoof messages. As such, the protocol also fails when 
relaxing the assumptions made of the threat model, as described in Section 6.1. 
7.5.2 LYTC Protocol 
We described the LYTC protocol in Section 5.1, which built upon the work of 
Memon and Wong, removing the necessity to permute the watermark, allowing 
the adoption a larger set of watermarking schemes so long as privacy homo- 
morphism is preserved. The failure of the MW's concrete example in satisfying 
the requirements of BSW protocols comes as a consequence of the buyer learn- 
ing the embedded watermarks, although before permutation, during the message 
exchange. The failure does not come as a direct result of watermarking in the en- 
crypted domain using Cox et al. 's scheme with the multiplicatively homomorphic 
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encryption scheme, RSA. As such we consider it appropriate to analyse the LYTC 
protocol when used in conjunction with the Cox et al. watermarking scheme. 
We extend our model of the LYTC protocol, such that each agent's deductive 
system includes the deduction rules, defined in Table 7.4, and provides the ap- 
propriate signal. error events. We then check that our CSP model of the LYTC 
protocol prevents agents from inferring the original content of others by per- 
forming the following refinement check in FDR, which fails to be satisfied as 
demonstrated by the trace presented below. 
STOP V=T MODEL \E- 11 signal. error I} 
(comm. M. B. (CekcA(pkM), Ckm (pk, ý), S9kM (arg(XB))), 
comm. B. J. (pkýy, SekM (arg(XB)), char(XB)) 
take. J. B. Sek,, (Epk; 
y 
(Wi), pkný, SekM (arg(XB))), 
fake. J. B. S9k,, (Epker(Wr), pkM, SskM(arg(XB))), 
comm. B. M. EpkM(WM(XB, WJ)), 
comm. M. B. (CekcA(pkM), CekM (pkný), Sekts (arg(XB))), 
comm. B. J. (pk1y, Seky' (arg(XB)), char(XB)) 
take. J. B. Sek, (Epký ( WJ), pkjN, Sekts (arg(XB))), 
fake. J. B. Sek, ( Epký ( Wý ), pkM, Selo; (arg (XB ))), 
comm. B. M. Epký(WM(XB, WJ)), 
signal. error. M. XB) 
The trace demonstrates that the misbehaving agent, M, is able to recover the 
original content sold by the well-behaved seller, B, again following two trans- 
actions in which the same content is purchased. However, unlike the trace 
provided for the MW protocol, a take and subsequent fake of the message, 
Sek,, (EpkM(Wj), pk* , SekM(arg 
(XB))), sent from the third party, J, to the seller 
B, is performed by M, representing M overhearing the message. Likewise, in the 
second run of the protocol M overhears Sek, (Epk. l ( Wj), pkM, Sek. I (arg(XB))). As 
these messages, are only signed by the third party, and not encrypted, M is able 
to infer the encrypted messages, EpkM ( Wj) and Epk., ( Wj), using the public key 
of the third part, pkj, and subsequently infer the watermarks, W and W', using 
the secret keys, skM and skjy, both of which were generated by M. In knowing 
the two watermarks, and the two pieces of watermarked content, M is able to 
infer the original content, X, using the deductive rule MW-REM. 1, defined in Ta- 
ble 7.4. When model checking the same CSP model of the LYTC protocol, under 
the relaxed assumption of the misbehaving agent, that the malicious agent does 
cannot intercept messages as described in Section 6.1, we do not find a failure of 
the protocol in meeting its requirements. 
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7.6 Summary 
In this chapter we demonstrated a vulnerability in Memon and Wong's example 
construction of a BSW protocol, which is based upon an implementation of the 
Cox et at. watermarking scheme in conjunction with the multiplicative homomor- 
phic property of RSA [161. Our approach enables a malicious buyer to recover 
the original content, prior to illicitly sharing the content, following two runs of 
the protocol in which the same content is purchased. By recovering the original 
content in this manner, we have demonstrated that the permutation function is 
ineffective in prohibiting the buyer from removing the watermark, w. 
Recall from Section 4.3 that an additional watermark, v, may be embedded 
within the digital content before embedding w. Memon and Wong state that the 
seller is free to select any watermarking scheme for embedding v. Thus, v may 
or may not conflict with w. We discuss these two possibilities below. 
Firstly, v may be embedded using the same embedding method as for w but 
within the mid-frequency coefficients rather than within the highest frequency 
coefficients. Following a single protocol run, the buyer would then have sufficient 
information to remove w using the approach described in this paper, but not v. 
The presence of the additional watermark, v, within the shared content would 
enable the seller to identify the buyer they wish to prosecute but would not 
provide sufficient evidence of file sharing, due to the original customers' rights 
problem described in Section 4.3. 
Secondly, suppose v is embedded to conflict with w, such that w cannot be 
removed, even when it is known by the buyer. In such circumstances v may have 
the unintentional effect of securing w against removal. However, the purpose of 
embedding v is to assist the seller in the identifying the buyer. If the embedding 
of v is being relied upon to prevent the removal of w, it negates the requirement 
for a permutation function in the protocol. If the effects of v are unintentional 
it would be inappropriate to rely on it to perform such an important security 
function. As such, our research has focused on the permutation function, which 
is the stated provider of the security function to prevent w being removed. 
The existence of this attack demonstrates the need for a thorough analysis 
when proposing a watermarking protocol. Our approach is not a typical attack, in 
which some function is applied to distort the content such that the watermark is 
no longer detected without significantly degrading the content. Nor is it an attack 
on the message exchange under the originally assumed abstract properties of 
digital watermarking captured in Table 4.1, as analysed in Chapter 4. Instead our 
approach capitalises on a flawed security assumption regarding the permutation 
function, enabling the original content to be recovered from knowledge gained 
during two honest protocol runs. We reason that ad hoc security analyses, such 
as that which accompanies Memon and Wong's example construction, should be 
replaced by stronger models for evaluating security of watermarking schemes. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Future Work 
In this thesis we have met our objective to increase the rigour with which BSW 
protocols are analysed. Poh and Martin's comprehensive survey of BSW protocols 
concluded that only heuristic approaches to security analysis had been adopted 
in the literature and that a formal analysis of the security of such schemes was 
a research direction worth pursuing [-11]. We have proposed a novel approach to 
the formal analysis of BSW protocols using the process algebra, CSP [21], and 
the model checker, FDR [54]. Should a BSW protocol fail to meet its require- 
ments, FDR automatically generates traces, or trace/refusal pairs, indicative of 
such failures. 
We captured the most abstract properties of informed one-bit watermarking in 
Table 2.5, and of watermarking in the encrypted domain in Table 4.1. Abstracting 
away from the underlying watermarking scheme and cryptographic primitives 
enabled us to reason whether the protocols alone fail to meet their requirements. 
In Section 4.3.1 we defined the requirements of buyers and sellers as CSP processes 
and performed refinement checks, using the traces and stable failures semantic 
models of CSP, respectively, to determine whether our CSP models of BSW 
protocols met the primary requirements of BSW protocols, based upon those 
informally defined in [41]. Five published protocols, as proposed in [32], [28], 
[23], [22], and [24], were analysed using our approach. 
We are the first to compose CSP models of security protocols to include multi- 
ple deductive systems. Deductive systems representing the building of knowledge 
by both well-behaved and misbehaving agents were constructed such that they 
produced the signal events necessary during analysis in an efficient manner, fol- 
lowing Roscoe's construction of the lazy spy [47]. Modelling BSW protocols in 
this manner removed the limitations imposed upon the behaviour of the misbe- 
having agent in our initial investigations [60,61]. Additionally, in Section 3.3.5, 
we modelled the non-repudiation protocol proposed by Zhou and Gollmann [63] in 
this manner in order to verify the attack proposed by Gärgens and Rudolph [20]. 
Our formal analysis verified two previously known vulnerabilities of the MW 
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protocol [28] and a single vulnerability of the IEH protocol [44], as described in 
Sections 4.3.5 and 5.1.2, when modelling under the assumptions proposed in the 
PM framework [41]. Using our approach, traces, or trace/refusal pairs, were au- 
tomatically generated by the model checker FDR indicative of such flaws. Addi- 
tionally, we identified seven otherwise unknown vulnerabilities of BSW protocols 
when analysing them under the assumptions proposed in the PM framework. The 
first recorded in this thesis was a vulnerability of the LYTC protocol, and was 
discussed in Section 5.1. We identified four previously unknown attacks on the 
IEH protocol in Section 5.2, and a previously unknown attack on both the HZ 
and JKLL protocols in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Traces, or trace/refusal 
pairs, corresponding to each attack were automatically generated by the model 
checker FDR as a result of our analysis. 
We demonstrated that the expressiveness of CSP enables BSW protocols to 
be modelled under alternative assumptions to those proposed in the PM frame- 
work with only minor modifications to the original models constructed. This 
demonstrated that our analytical approach remains applicable to protocols de- 
signed/analysed outside of the PM framework. We also performed an additional 
analysis of each BSW protocol, under the assumption that the well-behaved buyer 
never shares content, in an attempt to identify additional fundamental failures. 
No failure to meet the requirements of buyers were identified when analysing the 
five BSW protocols under such an assumption. We demonstrated that all but 
one of the attacks presented in Chapters 4 and 5 were also present assuming a 
weaker threat model than that proposed by Dolev and Yao [12], as assumed in 
the PM framework. 
We considered the role of the third party by analysing our BSW protocol 
models under alternative assumptions to that proposed in [41], i. e., the third 
party is fully trusted. This lead to the identification of a new attack on a variation 
of LYTC protocol under the assumption that the third party is trusted only as 
much as the well-behaved agents. Additionally, we verified the attack presented 
by Deng and Preneel on the IEH protocol [11], in which collusion between the 
third party and the other agents is considered possible behaviour. We concluded 
that in general protocols that meet their requirements under a stronger threat 
model, i. e., an environment in which the misbehaving agent is provided with a 
larger set of behaviours, are preferable to protocols that only withstand attacks 
assuming a weaker threat model. Similarly, BSW protocols that require less trust 
to be afforded to the third party are preferable to those that require third parties 
to be fully trusted. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, we increased the granularity of our analysis of BSW 
protocols, considering the properties present in the watermarking scheme used 
in Memon and Wong's example construction of their protocol. We demonstrated 
that Memon and Wong's implementation of the Cox et al. secure spread-spectrum 
8.1. Limitations 137 
watermarking scheme [8] introduces additional properties to the most abstract 
properties of informed one-bit watermarking in Tables 2.5, and 4.1. Such proper- 
ties were captured in Table 7.4, such that our formal analyses could be to extended 
to include them. Subsequently, we demonstrated that the additional properties, 
present in Memon and Wong's implementation of the Cox et at. scheme, lead to 
an additional failure of the MW protocol to meet its requirements in Section 7.5. 
We also demonstrated that the Lei et at. protocol fails to meet its requirements 
assuming it follows Memon and Wong's implementation. Additional failures of 
the IEH, HZ and JKLL protocols are also present if used in conjunction with 
such an implementation. 
8.1 Limitations 
The benefit of fully automatic analysis offered by model checking in FDR comes 
at the expense of only being able to reason about systems with finite state spaces. 
To avoid our model checking of BSW protocols becoming intractable we composed 
our models of a small number of agents, messages, keys, content and watermarks. 
Such an approach proved successful in determining flaws in BSW protocols. How- 
ever, in the cases in which our model checking did not identify a failure of the 
protocol to meet a particular requirement we lack a general proof that the pro- 
tocol satisfies such a requirement. 
In Chapter 4 we stated that our general approach is such that modelling mul- 
tiple BSW protocols under consistent assumptions results in minimal differences 
between each protocol model. Casper, a compiler for the analysis of security pro- 
tocols [311, leverages a similar property of security protocol models to construct 
a complete CSP model of a security protocol from a simple abstract description 
and interfaces with FDR to model check the security protocol against various 
requirements. 
We were unable to utilise Casper to model check BSW protocols for three 
primary reasons. Firstly, the requirements that can be checked in Casper are 
limited to various definitions of secrecy, agreement and aliveness. The require- 
ments of BSW protocols that we defined in Section 4.3.1 cannot currently be 
checked via Casper. Secondly, it was unclear how to model the arbitrary sharing 
of watermarked content conducted between agents outside of some protocol run. 
Thirdly, Casper's Encryption datatype, which defines data items such as nonces, 
keys, encrypted items and hashed items does not include data items intended to 
model original content, watermarks and watermarked content. Moreover, Casper 
lacks the deduction rules necessary for defining the behaviour of the intruder re- 
garding such data items, as we defined in Section 4.3.3. As such our approach 
proposed the manual construction of CSP models for the analysis of BSW proto- 
cols and additional automation of the modelling process is left as an open research 
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direction. 
In Section 2.1 we stated that by abstracting the underlying cryptographic 
primitives, and reasoning about the message exchange alone, we could be con- 
fident that the security objectives will be achieved if the encryption is suitably 
robust. Memon and Wong made a similar observation of BSW protocols: should 
a BSW protocol meet its objectives then the security of the overall system should 
be dependent only on the underling cryptographic primitives and the robustness 
of the digital watermarking scheme [32]. Our abstraction of the properties of 
digital watermarking schemes extended those typically made of cryptographic 
primitives, as described in Section 2.1 and Section 4.3.3 respectively. The ab- 
stractions reduced the behaviour of the overall system retaining only that which 
was relevant during our analyses of BSW protocols. Strong arguments should be 
provided to support the use of such abstractions in a rigorous security analysis 
of the overall system. 
Cryptographic primitives are evaluated in various security models, as de- 
scribed in [33]. For example, the unconditional security model is the most strin- 
gent measure of security that determines whether an adversary with unlimited 
computational resources can gain enough information such that the specified 
properties of the cryptographic primitive are not satisfied. The provable security 
model argues that a cryptographic primitive can be said to provide its specified 
properties if the difficulty of defeating it can be reduced to solving a well-studied 
hard problem, e. g., integer factorisation. Security analyses conducted within the 
ad hoc model are said to provide a variety of convincing arguments that the set 
of known attacks are withstood but remain at risk from unforeseen attacks. 
In Chapter 7 we identified an unforeseen attack on the watermarking scheme 
proposed in Memon and Wong's example construction. This challenged the suit- 
ability of the abstractions made regarding the watermarking scheme. Therefore, 
we reason that the security analyses, such as that which accompanies Memon and 
Wong's example construction, should be classified as ad hoc. It should be the 
aim of the digital watermarking research community to move towards stronger 
models for evaluating security of watermarking schemes in line with the security 
analyses of cryptographic primitives. 
8.2 Future Work 
There remains scope to broaden our research on the analysis of BSW protocols. 
Using our approach, a wider range of BSW protocols could be analysed against 
a growing list of requirements, including anonymity and redistribution [24,7]. 
In Section 8.1 we described the limitations of model checking. Hence, there also 
remains scope for reassessment of how appropriate other model checking tools 
[1,10,4,31] are for the analysis of BSW protocols, as well as other formal 
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verification techniques. 
8.2.1 Extending Our Formal Analysis of BSW protocols 
In this section we provide insight into how our approach to the analysis of BSW 
protocols could be extended to evaluate protocols beyond the five analysed in this 
thesis. We introduce additional BSW protocols in this section that adopt alter- 
native cryptographic and watermarking primitives and aim to provide a broader 
set of requirements than the primary requirements of BSW protocols formally 
defined in this thesis. 
Additional BSW protocols 
The five BSW protocols chosen for analysis in this thesis were all based upon the 
work of Memon and Wong, which proposed the novel approach to watermarking 
in the encrypted domain enabling the seller to perform watermark embedding 
without learning the watermark or the watermarked content. The watermarks 
generated in each of the five protocols are generated as a sequence of n indepen- 
dent real numbers drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, 
i. e., N(0,1), following Memon and Wong's proposed construction. A third party 
is then expected to certify that the watermark was generated in this manner, i. e., 
the third party certifies that the watermark is well-formed, whether the third 
party generated the watermark or, in the case of the IEH protocol, the buyer 
generates the watermark. 
Pfitzmann and Schunter take an alternative approach to ensuring that the 
watermark is well formed [37]. The buyer generates the watermark and proves 
its validity via a zero-knowledge proof removing the reliance on a third party. The 
PM framework [41] classifies such protocols as BSW protocols without a third 
party. This is a different classification to online and offline BSW protocols, which 
do require a trusted third party. We have focussed our work on increasing the 
rigour applied to online and offline BSW protocols as no formal approach to the 
analysis of the five protocols described in this thesis had previously been provided 
in the literature. It is not clear whether the CSP modelling and analysis of 
BSW protocols that adopt the use of zero-knowledge proofs, i. e., BSW protocols 
without a third party, would provide additional insight into their security. 
Another approach to the generation and embedding of a watermark is pro- 
posed in [43], which uses chameleon encryption to simultaneously decrypt and 
watermark the encrypted original content [2]. Scrutinising the inherent properties 
of such a scheme may provide insight into how abstractions of such properties 
could be captured to enable our approach to be used to analyse the proposed 
message exchange. Furthermore, other protocols propose the construction of 
watermarks not as pseudo-random noise but as some deterministic function of 
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information pertaining to the transaction [62,271. Such schemes cannot assume 
the use of one-bit watermarking and so the inherent properties of the watermark- 
ing schemes used in conjunction with such protocols would need to be considered 
before adopting our approach for their analysis. 
Additional Requirements 
Each analysis of the five protocols considered only the primary requirements of 
BSW protocols: the seller must hold sufficient evidence to prove to an arbiter 
that a buyer has illicitly shared content; but no seller should hold sufficient 
evidence of illicit file sharing against a buyer that has not shared such content. 
It would therefore be appropriate to formalise a larger set of requirements that 
BSW protocols aim to satisfy. The JKLL protocol was the first attempt to provide 
protection of the buyers' privacy [24], an issue also considered in the design of 
the LYTC protocol. The identity of a buyer should remain unknown unless it has 
been proven that they have performed illicit file sharing. The formal specification 
of anonymity using CSP has been addressed in [52]. Whether such a specification 
is appropriate for the analysis of BSW protocols is yet to be investigated, but 
the extension of our approach for the analysis of BSW protocols against such a 
secondary requirement should be considered a research direction worth pursuing. 
It was assumed in each of the five BSW protocols analysed in this thesis, that 
the distribution of copyrighted material to a seller is conducted as a single trans- 
action performed directly between a seller, who holds the original content, and a 
buyer. Subsequently, a more complex distribution network has been considered 
in [40] and the potential for resale in second hand markets has been considered 
in [7]. In order for second hand markets of digital content to become successful 
there must be mechanisms for copyright owners, original customers and second 
hand customers to monitor and prove ownership of the content. We conclude that 
how best to extend our analytical approach to include such additional protocol 
participants with varying roles is worth investigation. 
8.2.2 Alternative Methods of Analysis 
Having had success in finding attacks on BSW protocols using CSP and FDR it 
would be worth considering other methods and tools appropriate for this purpose. 
In this section we provide a short description of potential methods and tools for 
the analysis of BSW protocols that may prove to be a useful alternative to the 
CSP approach. 
The x-calculus [34,35], is a calculus for describing communicating systems. 
It was extended for the description and analysis of security protocols in [1] and 
aptly named the spi-calculus. The Scyther Tool [10] is a tool for the verifica- 
tion of security protocols based on a pattern refinement algorithm that offers 
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unbounded verification with guaranteed termination. The AVISPA Tool [4] aims 
to provide an industrial-strength technology for the automated validation of se- 
curity protocols. The limitations of Casper [31] for the analysis of BSW protocols 
were described in Section 8.1 although it may be possible to extend Casper to 
incorporate the additional functionality required. 
As it stands our current approach is unable to prove that security protocols 
satisfy their requirements on a system larger in size than that modelled. It would 
also be appropriate to consider the use of alternative approaches that are able to 
verify BSW protocols in their full generality. In the remainder of this section we 
describe methods of proving security protocols in their full generality using the 
process algebra CSP. 
This problem was addressed in [48], allowing security protocols to be proven 
with model checkers by data independence techniques. A process P constructed 
of events of type T is data independent in the type T if P places no constraint 
on what T is. The approach imposes conditions on T and P allowing results 
regarding P(T) to be deduced for any T' of larger size. This enables us to 
draw conclusions, regarding systems of a large size, even infinite, from the results 
of model checking protocols of a limited size. Moreover, research into the au- 
tomation of data independence has worked towards the automatic generation of 
complete correctness proofs in Casper and FDR [6]. Whether such results hold 
from the models we have constructed has not been addressed in this thesis and 
remains an open research question. 
The model of the ZG protocol described in Section 3.3, as constructed by 
Wei and Heather for analysis using the model checker FDR, was limited in size 
in order to make the analysis tractable [57]. Using this approach, the protocol 
could only be verified against its requirements in a limited domain. Previously, 
Schneider provided a formal verification of the ZG protocol in the general case by 
producing a hand written proof making use of rank functions [51], although under 
different assumptions to those adopted by Gärgens and Rudolph, which lead 
the attack verified in Section 3.3.6. Subsequently, Evans demonstrated how the 
safety properties of non-repudiation of receipt and non-repudiation of origin can 
be embedded within PVS to reproduce the verification of such properties using 
a theorem prover [15], which is useful in avoiding pitfalls of the often erroneous 
task of producing hand written proofs. Wei and Heather [58], extended the work 
of Evans by also embedding liveness properties of fairness into PVS. Such work 
demonstrated an ability to verify the ZG protocol in its full generality using the 
theorem prover PVS. Finally, we propose that the investigation into whether the 
correctness of BSW protocols can be proven using such an approach is a research 
direction worth pursuing. 
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BLANK PAGE 
IN 
ORIGINAL 
Notation 
Many of the variables below are parameterised by the agent variables, denoted 
using subscripts. We may consider the following two examples: the public key 
pka represents the public key belonging to an agent a; and the symmetric key kab 
is shared by agents a and b. Values denoted in lowercase are considered variable 
whereas those denoted in uppercase are to be considered concrete values. Thus 
we say pka is the public key of some agent a, whereas pkA is the public key of a 
specific agent A. 
A set of agents 
a, b agent variables 
t agent variable representing third party 
ca agent variable representing certification authority 
A, B particular given agent names of well-behaved agents 
M particular given agent name of misbehaving agent 
J particular given agent name of third party 
CA particular given agent name of certification authority 
na 
k 
ka 
kab 
nonce (number used once) variable generated by a 
symmetric key variable 
symmetric key variable belonging to a 
symmetric key variable shared by a and b 
PIC set of all public keys 
pk public key variable 
sk secret key variable 
(pk, sk) public/secret key pair variable 
pka public key variable belonging to a 
ska public key variable belonging to a 
(pka, ska) public/secret key pair variable belonging to a 
pk* one-time public key variable 
sk* one-time secret key variable 
(pk*, sk*) one-time public/secret key pair variable 
149 
150 
KP' 
ICPQ 
f, fi 
(! 1 
... 
A) 
Ek(f) 
Epk(f ) 
Sak (f ) 
Cak(a+ Pka) 
HV) 
X 
Xa 
x 
Xr 
a, 
X. 
W 
W. 
w 
Wý a, W. 
m 
wk 
arg(x) 
char(x) 
WM(x, w) 
-WM (X, w) 
Nm 
Nw 
P, Q 
STOP 
a -ºP 
C. v4 .. V,, -+ P 
c? v ET -º P 
PoQ 
DP(x) 
xEA 
PnQ 
set of all one-time key pairs 
set of all one-time key pairs generated by a 
fact variables 
sequence of facts 
symmetric key encryption 
public key encryption 
digital signature 
digital certificate 
cryptographic hash 
set of all digital content 
set of digital content sold by a 
digital content variable 
particular given digital content sold by a 
set of all watermarks 
set of all watermarks generated by a 
watermark variable 
particular given watermarks generated by a 
message variable 
watermarking key variable 
common agreement used as unique identifier of x 
characteristics of x 
watermarked content variable 
watermarked content with added noise 
extracted message (possibly noisy) 
extracted watermark (possibly noisy) 
the deadlocked process that never performs any event 
event prefix 
output 
input 
external/deterministic choice 
replicated external choice 
internal/non-deterministic choice 
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n P(x) 
xEA 
P\A 
PQ6/aD 
pill Q 
III P(x) 
xEA 
PIIQ A 
PQ 
«P «Q 
11 (P(x), aP(x)) xEA 
SKIP 
P; Q 
P, n, Q 
replicated internal choice 
hiding 
renaming 
interleaving 
replicated interleaving 
generalised parallel 
alphabetized parallel 
replicated alphabetized parallel 
successful termination 
sequential composition 
interrupt 
In Section 3 we introduce two security protocols described in protocol nota- 
tion. Each protocol is defined in terms of numbered steps. For example, the 
NSPK protocol, in its reduced three message form, is denoted: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
a -ý b: Epkb (na, a) 
b -> a: Epko (na, nb) 
a --+ b: Epkb(nb) 
Each numbered step denotes a message sent from the agent on the left of the 
arrow to the recipient on the right side of the arrow. The message is defined to the 
right of the colon and constructed of the variables defined above. The attack on 
the protocol, discovered by Lowe [29], is described below in a consistent notation: 
a. l. 
ß. l. 
ß. 2. 
a. 2. 
a. 3. 
ß. 3. 
A -ý M: EpkA, (nA, A) 
M(A) -> B: EpkB(nA, A) 
B -> M(A) : EpkA (nA, nB) 
M -a A: Epk,, (nA, nB ) 
AM EPkM (nB) 
M(A) -r B: EPkB(nB) 
Again each numbered step denotes a message sent from the agent on the left 
of the arrow to the recipient on the right side of the arrow. However, the message 
is defined to the right of the colon and constructed of the concrete values, rather 
than the variables, defined above. Likewise, the agents are particular given agent 
names and are no longer agent variables. In this attack, two interleaved runs of 
the protocol are required. Such protocol steps are denoted as a and Q indicating 
which protocol run they belong. Finally the given agent names denoted using 
brackets M(A) represent the agent M faking a message as if it were sent by A. 
